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Q.
How do you describe this book?
A.
It’s an optimistic sequel to my last book, The Case for Israel that sets out the strongest possible case for the two-state solution to the Arab Israeli conflict and directly tackles the various barriers to peace which have been erected by anti-peace activists on both sides. It will probably be much more controversial than The Case for Israel because it will be attacked both by anti-peace activists on the anti-Israel side (of whom there are plenty) and right-wing pro-Israel activists who oppose the two-state solution and Prime Minister Sharon’s current efforts to make peace. I call the one group “more Palestinian than the Palestinians” and the other “more Israeli than the Israelis.
Q.
Why did you write this book now?

A.


 I actually wanted to write The Case for Peace when I wrote The Case for Israel several years ago. But with PLO leader Yasser Arafat still alive, there was no case to be made for peace. Arafat’s untimely death—untimely because it should have come much earlier, and if it had peace might have already been achieved—was a pre-condition for real peace. And while peace will still be very difficult to achieve, it is possible now that he’s gone. With all the elements in place I thought it the perfect time for this book. And I’m actually quite pleased that it will be published at about the same time that Israel is scheduled to begin it’s withdrawal from Gaza. That will be a very traumatic event in Israel but it’s an important first step towards lasting peace.
Q.
In the book’s introduction you essentially suggest that an alternate title might The Case Against the Enemies of Peace. What do you mean by that?

A.


 There are real enemies of peace out there. Many of them are academics from the hard-left who oppose the two-state solution and instead pretend to favor that of the one-state. However, the one-state solution is anything but a solution. It is an invitation to disaster. It would mean the end of Israel and the end of any possibility of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel. Part of the book is an exposé of these hard-left academics who pretend to be for peace but whose policies would assure a continuation of bloodshed.
Q.
How is this book different from The Case for Israel?

A.
The Case for Israel was an attempt to clear the air of the rhetorical lies about Israel that dominate discussions at the United Nations, in many parts of Europe, and on many American college campuses. It was a reactive book. The Case for Peace, on the other hand, is proactive. It looks to the future. And it could not have been written had The Case for Israel not succeeded in changing the nature of the debate about Israel, because a country cannot be asked to make sacrifices and take risks for peace if it is under the kind of attack that Israel was under.
Q.
How did that book change the debate?

A.
I think it made the debate much less one-sided, particularly on college campuses. It left students much better prepared to respond to anti-Israel attacks. The best evidence of its success is that it has become the focus of a well-orchestrated and sustained attack by Israel-bashers such as Noam Chomsky, Alex Cockburn, Norman Finkelstein, and a web site called “The Electronic Intifada.” I’ve always been as proud of my enemies list as I have been of my list of friends, and I’m especially proud of the enemies I’ve engendered as a result of the success of The Case for Israel. I should also mention that I plan to do the same thing with my new book as I did for that one, namely circulate copies on college campuses so that students can get them free of charge. I’ve done this in the United States, in France, in Germany, and even in Israel. And I plan to continue doing it with The Case for Peace. Also, I will be debating Noam Chomsky about our two books sometime in the Fall, either at Harvard or at MIT. The fact that my book is called The Case for Peace while his is titled No Chance for Peace speaks to our two very different approaches. I think it will be an interesting debate between an optimistic, forward looking view and a pessimistic view mired in the status quo.
Q.
You’ve said this book is primarily about the current conflict between the advocates of peace and those who are barriers to peace. These include anti-Israel naysayers among academics, students, political leaders and pundits in all countries. What message do they send to terrorists and why is this message particularly dangerous?

A.
The message of the naysayer is particularly dangerous because it sends a double message. The message to terrorists is that even if you continue to kill innocent civilians, these radical academics will support you; the Presbyterian Church will support you; the United Nations will support you. The end result for the terrorist is that there’s no down-side to continuing to use terrorism instead of negotiation. For example, Norman Finkelstein bemoans the fact that he has not been more supportive of Hezbollah which he regards as a heroic organization despite the fact that it circulates video tapes showing suicide bombers where to stand on crowded busses in order to maximize civilian deaths. Finkelstein is complicit in those deaths and has blood on his hands, as do other radical academics whose message is supportive of terrorism. The naysayer’s message is also a very negative message to Israel. Namely that no matter what risks it takes for peace; Israel will continue to be condemned. It’s a message that strengthens the hands of anti-peace advocates there. The bottom line is that it’s a lose lose situation for peace.
Q.
There are people who feel a “one-state” or “bi-national” solution is the only way to achieve peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Why do you see that as nothing more than a ploy?

A.
First of all, no Israeli, and virtually no Palestinian today favors the one-state solution. That makes it a purely academic proposal. Second, a one–state solution will inevitably produce yet a third state with a majority Palestinian population. There would be the state of Palestine, the state of Jordan (which already has a majority Palestinian population), and the one state comprised of Israel and Palestine which would quickly have a Palestinian majority. And finally, there’s no reason to try to bring states together. Nobody today would even think of trying to bring Pakistan, India and Bangladesh together and imposing a one-state solution on them. Similarly, nobody would try to bring the former Yugoslavia back together again. Self-determination requires two states, not one. If there were ever to be a one-state solution, every birth would be regarded as a defeat for the opposing demographic group and every death a victory. It’s just a horrible non-solution, and the people who propose it are smart enough to know it. That’s why it’s a ploy.
Q.
In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict both sides assert “rights.” For the Palestinians it’s the right of return. For the Israeli settlers on the West Bank it’s the right to remain. Does the will truly exist on the part of both sides to achieve the kind of sophisticated compromise that will be necessary to move past these obstacles? How do you achieve a “win-win” outcome in all this?

A.
There are elements within both camps that favor compromise—or at least recognize its inevitability—and there are groups within both camps that don’t. The important point is to strengthen the hand of those who favor it and weaken the hand of those who oppose it, because you can’t build a solution on “rights.”

Each side has to recognize the seriousness of the rights being asserted and then compromise them in the interest of pragmatic peace. It must be remembered that some settlers have been living in Gaza and the West Bank far longer than many of those claiming the right of return ever lived in Israel. And there also is the right of the Jews who were expelled from Arab countries between 1948 and 1970. (There are at least at least as many as them as there are Arabs who left Israel.) All of these issues have to be resolved once and for all.
Q.
You cover a lot of territory in this book: the division of Jerusalem; the issue of the non-contiguous Palestinian State; the rights demanded by both sides; the informal Geneva accords; making peace and preventing terrorism at the same time; Israeli counter-terrorism measures; the notion of a Palestinian state as a possible launch pad for terrorism; he security fence; the Iranian nuclear threat; and many others Which do you consider the most significant issue?

A.
I think the four most significant issues, in this order, are the right of return, which must be compromised in the interest of peace (it was this alleged right that destroyed the Camp David peace prospects); border adjustments; the ongoing hatred that gets in the way of making peace; and then finally Jerusalem. And Jerusalem will be easier to resolve than people think. In the end there will have to be a circumferential road connecting the West Bank that may require Palestinians to go ten minutes out of their way, but you don’t fight a war over ten extra minutes of travel. And that’s the only issue of non-contiguity. Because with road systems and railroads, no Palestinian city will be more than 90 minutes away from any other Palestinian city. That’s functional contiguity. So I think the non-contiguous issue—the issue of the so-called Bantustans—is one of the biggest phony issues out there. I recently came back from a visit to Israel and I went on the West Bank and physically saw for myself how easy it would be for a Palestinian to travel from any West Bank city to any other West Bank city through a network of highways. The shortest distance between two points is not a straight line when it comes to building roads either through crowded cities like Jerusalem or around them.
Q.
What do you think will most surprise readers of this book?

A.
I think European readers will be surprised to see how supportive I am of peace and compromise; that I favor a two-state solution; and that I have long opposed the occupation of Palestinian cities by Israel. They’ll be surprised because in the European press I’m often referred to as a militant—the same word used to describe suicide bombers—while opponents of peace, like the late Edward Said, are still referred to as moderates. As to American readers, nobody who knows me or my views will be surprised. And I think most American readers will support my views. I think they reflect the American mainstream both within the Jewish community and the community at large.

The group that supported me strongly with The Case for Israel that might not support me as strongly with this book is the Christian Zionist right. They may think I’m a bit too soft on peace and a bit too trusting of the Palestinians. I want to make it clear that I’m not at all trusting of the Palestinians. But you make peace with people you don’t trust. And the peace has to be based on the possibility that any trust will be misplaced. In other words, it has to be a tough peace—with guarantees and protective features. I do think, and this will surprise some readers, that as soon as Israel withdraws from Gaza and some of the West Bank there will be an immediate increase in terrorism. Hopefully it will be short-lived. Unfortunately there are some who are determined to make an Israeli withdrawal look like a victory for the terrorists.
Q.
A recent meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas ended bitterly as the two men failed to reach new agreements on issues related to Israel’s planned withdrawal from Gaza and the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to rein-in violence. Isn’t the bottom line here that Abbas will never be able to crack down on terrorists to the extent the Israelis want because it will result in civil war?

A.
I have a chapter in the book about civil wars and whether they’ll be necessary to produce peace. And I do think Israel can’t expect too much of Abbas in terms of doing what Ben Gurion did at the beginning of the State of Israel, namely disarming all paramilitary groups. It will be a much more complicated and long term process. But I think it’s in Israel’s interest to strengthen the Palestinian Authority and to weaken Hamas. As usual the Europeans may be undercutting this process by beginning to treat Hamas as something other than a terrorist group. That would be a big mistake.
Q.
You consider the much-bandied about phrase “cycle of violence” a bit of a misnomer. Why?

A.
It’s worse than a misnomer. It’s a tactic used by terrorists. The phrase is designed to provoke Israel into retaliation and then condemn Israel equally with the terrorists. It’s a very dangerous concept that, in itself, promotes terrorism.
Q.
One of the most visible bones of contention today between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the security fence on the West Bank. One side says it’s about security the other says it’s about land annexation. In the final analysis isn’t the barrier itself a barrier to peace?

A.
I just came back from a visit to the security fence. Not only is it not a barrier to peace I think it is essential to peace. Peace will never occur while there is massive terrorism. What the fence does is substantially cut down on terrorism and that makes it a positive force in the struggle for peace. It is a movable barrier, in the sense that when the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that it had to move, it was moved. I argue in the book that the danger is that it may ultimately become the default boundary if the Palestinians refuse to negotiate and refuse to accept a reasonable peace offer. If it were to become a default boundary it would not be a disaster. But it would be far better if the final boundaries were negotiated as part of an agreed upon peace process. And when that happens the wall can easily be moved to comport with what the agreed upon boundaries are.
Q.
What’s the answer to dealing with the Iranian Nuclear threat?

A.
The Europeans have some responsibility in this and they’re not doing enough. The entire burden of preventing a nuclearized Iran can not be put on Israel. We saw what happened when Israel had to take the entire responsibility for denuclearizing Iraq and thank God it did. Had Israel not destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor Saddam Hussein would still be the dictator of Iraq. He’d also still be the dictator of Kuwait and who knows what else. Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s reactor in 1981 was an absolute prerequisite for any hope of democratization in the area. And an Iranian nuclear capacity would end any hope for the democratization of Iran. But this is a problem that transcends both Israel and the U.S. Europe and Pakistan caused the problem by providing Iran with the ingredients for a nuclear weapon, and they have the responsibility for ending the threat. As to the specific solution, it’s a combination. There has to be diplomacy. There have to be sanctions. But in the end, as President Bush has said, the military option can’t be taken off the table. The constant must be that Iran can never get a nuclear bomb. The variables are how to stop that from happening.
Q.
You take note of a curious turn of events: the more Israel moves towards peace with the Palestinians the more anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment increases in Europe. Why do you suppose that’s the case?

A.
I think many Europeans—both from the extreme right and the extreme left—have this visceral hatred of the Jewish state. When Israel does anything to defy their totally fallacious stereotypes or expectations it drives them nuts and into an even greater frenzy. How else do you rationally explain Sue Blackwell, draped in a Palestinian flag, screaming almost pornographically against Israel just at a time when Israel is making sacrifices and taking risks for peace? Similarly, those people who urged an academic boycott against Israeli universities cannot be dealt with rationally. Their eroticized hatred is more an appropriate area of inquiry for Freud and Sartre than it is of political analysts.
Q.
What do you want readers to get out of this book?

A.
I want readers to have a deep-down understanding that peace is possible but that it will require a complete normalization of the Jewish state. Until academics, the international community, and churches begin to treat Israel the way they treat New Zealand there will never be peace. Normalization of Israelis, normalization of Jews, normalization of the Jewish state is an absolute moral imperative and essential prerequisite for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.