Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

Introduction: Jonathan Cohen (University of California, San Diego).

Part I: Mental Content:.

Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content?.

1. Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions: Gabriel Segal (King’s College, London).

2. There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content: Sarah Sawyer (University of Nebraska-Lincoln).

Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access?.

3. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent: Anthony Brueckner (University of California, Santa Barbara).

4. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent: Michael McKinsey (Wayne State University).

Is the Intentional Essentially Normative?.

5. Normativism Defended: Ralph Wedgwood (University of Oxford).

6. Resisting Normativism in Psychology: Georges Rey (University of Maryland at College Park).

Is There Non-Conceptual Content?.

7. The Revenge of the Given: Jerry Fodor (Rutgers University).

8. Are There Different Kinds of Content?: Richard G. Heck Jr (Brown University).

Part II: Physicalism:.

Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable?.

9. Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism: Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts, Amherst).

10. The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism: Paul M. Churchland (University of California, San Diego).

Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists?.

11. A Priori Physicalism: Frank Jackson (Australian National University).

12. On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University).

Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation?.

13. Causation and Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim (Brown University).

14. Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough: Barry Loewer (Rutgers University).

Part III: The Place of Consciousness in Nature:.

Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical?.

15. Dualist Emergentism: Martine Nida-Rümelin (University of Fribourg, Switzerland).

16. Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness: David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney).

Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical?.

17. New Troubles for the Qualia Freak: Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin).

18. A Case for Qualia: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University).

Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness?.

19. All Consciousness Is Perceptual: Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).

20. Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I): Christopher Peacocke (Columbia University).

Index