Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity
January 1996, Wiley-Blackwell
Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost.
Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.
Part I: Moral Relativism (Harman):.
1. Moral Relativism.
2. Social Contracts.
3. Expressing Basic Disagreement.
4. Universality of Practical Reasons?.
5. Judgements about Outsiders.
Part II: Moral Objectivity (Thomson):.
6. Epistemological Arguments for Moral Skepticism.
8. Evaluations and Directives.
Part III: Responses:.
9. Harman's Response to Thomson's Part II.
10. Thomson's Response to Harman's Part I.
Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her publications include The Realm of Rights (1990), and Rights, Restitution and Risk (1986).
- A lucid and lively debate for a wide student readership
- An illuminating introduction to and examination of what is arguably the key issue of contemporary moral theory
- Contains powerful new arguments by two prominent philosophers at the forefront of contemporary ethical debate.