Readings in Industrial Organization
June 2000, Wiley-Blackwell
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Part I: Static Oligopoly Theory: .
1. Capacity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes: David M. Kreps (Stanford University) and Jose A. Sheinkman (University of Chicago).
2. The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy and the Lean Hungry Look: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) and Jean Tirole (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
Part II: Repeated Games and Oligopoly Theory: .
3. Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information: Edward J. Green (University of Minnesota) and Robert H. Porter (Northwestern University).
4. A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms: Julio J. Rotemberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Garth Saloner (Stanford University).
5. Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behaviour: B. Douglas Bernheim (Stanford University) and Michael D. Whinston (Northwestern University).
Part III: Product Differentiation: .
6. On Hotelling's Stability of Competition: Claude d'Aspremont, J. Jaskkold Gabszewicz and Jacques-Francois Thisse (all at Universite Catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)).
7. Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation: Avner Shaked (University of Bonn) and John Sutton (London School of Economics).
8. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Avinash K. Dixit (Princeton University) and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Stanford University).
Part IV: Empirical Analysis of Oligopoly: .
9. The Oligopoly Solution is Identified: Timothy F. Bresnahan (Stanford University).
10. A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886: Robert H. Porter (Northwestern University).
11. Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium: Steven Berry (Yale University), James Levinsohn (University of Michigan), and Ariel Pakes (Harvard University).
Part V: Entry: .
12. The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence: Avinash Dixit (Princeton University).
13. Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: Philippe Aghion (Harvard University) and Patrick Bolton (Princeton University).
14. Free Entry and Social Inefficiency: N. Gregory Mankiw (Harvard University) and Michael D. Whinston (Northwestern University).
15. Selection and Evolution of Industry: Boyan Jovanovic (New York University).
Part VI: Technology and Dynamics: .
16. Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly Power: Richard J. Gilbert (University of California-Berkeley) and David M. G. Newberry (Cambridge University).
17. Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Jennifer F. Reinganum (Vanderbilt University).
18. The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing: Luis M. B. Cabral (London Business School) and Michael H. Riordan (Boston University).
19. Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology: Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) and Jean Tirole (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
Part VII: Asymmetric Information:.
20. Reputation and Imperfect Information: David M. Kreps (Stanford University) and Robert Wilson (Stanford University).
21. Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: Paul Milgrom (Stanford University) and John Roberts (Stanford University).
22. Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality: Paul Milgrom (Stanford University) and John Roberts (Stanford University).