Minds, Causes and Mechanisms: A Case Against Physicalism
February 2000, Wiley-Blackwell
1. Physicalism and the Mental: The Dominant View.
2. An Initial Tension: Narrowness and Multiple Realization.
3. Dispositions, Minimality, and Intrinsic Causal Powers.
4. 'Ceteris Paribus' Laws and the Autonomy of Nonbasic Properties.
5. Strict Laws, Causes, and Background Conditions.
6. Mental Causation.
Josep L. Prades was born in Valencia, Spain in 1954. He taught philosophy at the University of Murcia and is presently a lecturer at the University of Girona. He has published several studies of Wittgenstein's philosophy and papers on the philosophy of mind and epistemology.
* Questions the internal consistency of causal physicalism, and vindicates a novel approach to mental causation
* Makes clear, through a series of original and detailed arguments, that many difficulties in the physicalist picture derive from an implausible view of causality
* Defends an alternative conception of causality that allows us to see how mental contents may be causally efficacious without having an implementing mechanism.
Christopher Hookway, University of Sheffield
'Minds, Causes, and Mechanisms is a timely and highly
valuable contribution that will re-energize the ongoing debate and
take it to another level. It offers refeshingly lucid and
illuminating analysis and critique of the basic assumptions and
arguments that have shaped the dominant physicalist outlook in this
area, what Corbí and Prades call "causal physicalism".
This book is an essential contribution. Highly recommended.'
Jaegwon Kim, Brown University
'A thorough and subtle critique of physicalism. After reading
it, even committed physicalists may conclude that their doctrine is
George Couvalis, Flinders University