As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism

Preface xi

1 Overview of the Argument for Marxian Liberalism 1

2 Marx and Rawls and Justice 29

2.1 Marx’s Theory of Capitalism and Its Ideology 30

2.2 Rawls’s Theory of Justice as Fairness 39

2.3 Rawls on Marx 52

2.4 Marx and Justice 57

2.5 Marxian Liberalism’s Historical Conception of Justice 61

3 The Natural Right to Liberty and the Need for a Social Contract 67

3.1 A Lockean Argument for the Right to Liberty 70

3.2 Our Rational Moral Competence 78

3.3 From Liberty to Lockean Contractarianism 88

4 The Ambivalence of Property: Expression of Liberty and Threat to Liberty 94

4.1 Locke, Nozick, and the Ambivalence of Property 96

4.2 Kant, Narveson, and the Ambivalence of Property 102

4.3 Marx and the Structural Coerciveness of Property 111

5 The Labor Theory of the Difference Principle 122

5.1 The Moral Version of the Labor Theory of Value 123

5.2 The Labor Theory of the Difference Principle 128

5.3 Finding a Just Distribution 133

5.4 Is the Difference Principle Biased? 141

5.5 Answering Narveson and Cohen on Incentives 147

6 The Marxian-Liberal Original Position 158

6.1 Property and Subjugation 160

6.2 The Limits of Property 163

6.3 The Marxian Theory of the Conditions of Liberty 168

6.4 Inside the Marxian-Liberal Original Position 172

6.5 The Difference Principle as a Historical Principle of Justice 183

7 As Free and as Just as Possible: Capitalism for Marxists, Communism for Liberals 190

7.1 The Just State 191

7.2 Capitalism for Marxists 195

7.3 The Marxian-Liberal Ideal: Property-Owning Democracy 197

7.4 Communism for Liberals 204

Conclusion: Marx’s “Liberalism,” Rawls’s “Labor Theory of Justice” 210

Index 221