 Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind
ISBN: 978-1-4051-1760-9
Hardcover
384 pages
October 2007, Wiley-Blackwell
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Notes on Contributors.
Introduction: Jonathan Cohen (University of California, San Diego).
Part I: Mental Content:.
Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content?.
1. Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions: Gabriel Segal (King's College, London).
2. There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content: Sarah Sawyer (University of Nebraska-Lincoln).
Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access?.
3. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent: Anthony Brueckner (University of California, Santa Barbara).
4. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent: Michael McKinsey (Wayne State University).
Is the Intentional Essentially Normative?.
5. Normativism Defended: Ralph Wedgwood (University of Oxford).
6. Resisting Normativism in Psychology: Georges Rey (University of Maryland at College Park).
Is There Non-Conceptual Content?.
7. The Revenge of the Given: Jerry Fodor (Rutgers University).
8. Are There Different Kinds of Content?: Richard G. Heck Jr (Brown University).
Part II: Physicalism:.
Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable?.
9. Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism: Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts, Amherst).
10. The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism: Paul M. Churchland (University of California, San Diego).
Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists?.
11. A Priori Physicalism: Frank Jackson (Australian National University).
12. On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University).
Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation?.
13. Causation and Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim (Brown University).
14. Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough: Barry Loewer (Rutgers University).
Part III: The Place of Consciousness in Nature:.
Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical?.
15. Dualist Emergentism: Martine Nida-Rumelin (University of Fribourg, Switzerland).
16. Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness: David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney).
Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical?.
17. New Troubles for the Qualia Freak: Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin).
18. A Case for Qualia: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University).
Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness?.
19. All Consciousness Is Perceptual: Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).
20. Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I): Christopher Peacocke (Columbia University).
Index
Introduction: Jonathan Cohen (University of California, San Diego).
Part I: Mental Content:.
Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content?.
1. Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions: Gabriel Segal (King's College, London).
2. There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content: Sarah Sawyer (University of Nebraska-Lincoln).
Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access?.
3. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent: Anthony Brueckner (University of California, Santa Barbara).
4. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent: Michael McKinsey (Wayne State University).
Is the Intentional Essentially Normative?.
5. Normativism Defended: Ralph Wedgwood (University of Oxford).
6. Resisting Normativism in Psychology: Georges Rey (University of Maryland at College Park).
Is There Non-Conceptual Content?.
7. The Revenge of the Given: Jerry Fodor (Rutgers University).
8. Are There Different Kinds of Content?: Richard G. Heck Jr (Brown University).
Part II: Physicalism:.
Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable?.
9. Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism: Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts, Amherst).
10. The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism: Paul M. Churchland (University of California, San Diego).
Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists?.
11. A Priori Physicalism: Frank Jackson (Australian National University).
12. On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University).
Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation?.
13. Causation and Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim (Brown University).
14. Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough: Barry Loewer (Rutgers University).
Part III: The Place of Consciousness in Nature:.
Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical?.
15. Dualist Emergentism: Martine Nida-Rumelin (University of Fribourg, Switzerland).
16. Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness: David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney).
Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical?.
17. New Troubles for the Qualia Freak: Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin).
18. A Case for Qualia: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University).
Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness?.
19. All Consciousness Is Perceptual: Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).
20. Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I): Christopher Peacocke (Columbia University).
Index
