Preface to the First Edition.

Acknowledgements.

Part I: Ontology: The Identity Theory and Functionalism:.

Introduction.

Behaviorism.

1. Excerpt from About Behaviorism: B. F. Skinner.

The Identity Theory and Machine Functionalism.

2. Is Consciousness a Brain Process?: U. T. Place.

Causal and Functionalist Views.

3. The Causal Theory of Mind: D. M. Armstrong.

4. The Nature of Mental States: Hilary Putnam.

5. Troubles with Functionalism (excerpt): Ned Block.

Anomalous Monism.

6. Mental Events: Donald Davidson.

Homuncular and Teleological Functionalism.

7. The Continuity of Levels of Nature: William G. Lycan.

Part II: Intentionality:.

Introduction.

Psychosemantics.

8. Information and Representation: Jerry A. Fodor.

9. Biosemantics: Ruth Garrett Millikan.

10. A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics (excerpt): Barry Loewer.

Other Approaches to Intentionality.

11. Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality: Robert Brandom.

Part III: The Computational Theory of Mind and Artificial Intelligence.

Introduction.

The Language of Thought and Computationalism.

12. Why There Has to Be and How There Could Be a Private Language: Jerry A. Fodor.

13. Which Language Do We Think With?: Peter Carruthers.

Artificial Intelligence.

14. Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design: John Haugeland.

15. Can Computers Think?: John R. Searle.

Part IV: Eliminativism, Neurophilosophy, and Anti-Representationalism.

Introduction.

Eliminativism.

16. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes: Paul M. Churchland.

Connectionism.

17. Neural Representation and Neural Computation: Patricia Smith Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski.

18. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture (excerpt): Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn.

Dynamical Systems Theory and Robotics.

19. What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?: Tim Van Gelder.

20. Intelligence Without Representation: Rodney A. Brooks.

Part V: Instrumentalism and Folk Psychology.

Introduction.

Instrumentalism.

21. True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works: Daniel C. Dennett.

22. Dennett on Intentional Systems: Stephen P. Stich.

23. Real Patterns: Daniel C. Dennett.

Simulationism and the Theory Theory.

24. Folk Psychology as Simulation: Robert M. Gordon.

25. Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? (excerpt): Stephen P. Stich and Shaun Nichols.

Part VI: Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge.

Introduction.

For and Against Folk Psychology.

26. Autonomous Psychology and the Belief--Desire Thesis: Stephen P. Stich.

27. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay: Terence Horgan and James Woodward.

Supervenient Causation.

28. Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim.

29. Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical: Brian P. McLaughlin.

For and Against Externalism.

30. Individualism and Supervenience: Jerry A. Fodor.

31. The Argument from Causal Powers: Robert A. Wilson.

32. Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions, and Unicorns: Gabriel M. A. Segal.

Self-Knowledge.

33. Knowing One’s Own Mind: Donald Davidson.

34. Externalism and Inference: Paul A. Boghossian.

Radical Externalism.

35. The Extended Mind: Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers.

Part VII: Consciousness, Qualia, and Subjectivity.

Introduction.

What Is Consciousness?.

36. How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness: Ned Block.

37. What Should We Expect from a Theory of Consciousness?: Patricia S. Churchland.

38. Consciousness and its Place in Nature (excerpt): David J. Chalmers.

Conscious Awareness.

39. A Theory of Consciousness (excerpt): David M. Rosenthal.

40. The Superiority of HOP to HOT: William G. Lycan.

41. Perception without Awareness: Fred Dretske.

What It’s Like.

42. Epiphenomenal Qualia: Frank Jackson.

43. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?: Robert Van Gulick.

Qualia.

44. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience: Gilbert Harman.

45. Sensation and the Content of Experience: Christopher Peacocke.

46. Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: Michael Tye.

Part VIII: Perceptual Content.

Introduction.

47. Simple Seeing: Fred Dretske.

48. Excerpts from The Varieties of Reference: Gareth Evans.

49. Non-conceptual Content: John McDowell.

50. Experience Without the Head: Alva Noë.

Part IX: Animal Minds.

Introduction.

51. Rational Animals: Donald Davidson.

52. The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything it is Like to be a Honey Bee?: Michael Tye.

53. Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much: Peter Carruthers.

Part X: Emotion.

Introduction.

54. Emotions and Choice: Robert C. Solomon.

55. Embodied Emotions: Jesse Prinz.

56. Is Emotion a Natural Kind?: Paul E. Griffiths.

Index