Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction
Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction
ISBN: 978-1-444-33368-8 May 2011 Wiley-Blackwell 422 Pages
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- Treats a wide range of mind-body theories and arguments in a fair and balanced way
- Shows how developments in neuroscience, biology, psychology, and cognitive science have impacted mind-body debates
- Premise-by-premise arguments for and against each position enable readers to grasp the structure of each argument quickly and easily
- Diagrams and illustrations help readers absorb the more complex ideas
- Bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter bring readers up to date on the latest literature
- Written in a clear, easy to read style that is free of technical jargon, and highly accessible to a broad readership
- The only book to explain systematically how a hylomorphic theory such as Aristotle’s can contribute to current mind-body debates and vie with current mind-body theories
- Online chapters on free will and the philosophy of persons make the book a flexible teaching tool for general and introductory philosophy courses - available at www.wiley.com/go/jaworski
Table of contents
1. Mind-Body Theories and Mind-Body Problems.
1.1 Mind and brain.
1.2 Mind-body theories.
1.3 Mind-body problems.
1.4 The problem of psychophysical emergence.
1.5 The problem of other minds.
1.6 The problem of mental causation.
2. The Mental-Physical Distinction.
2.1 Mental vs. physical.
2.2 Physical phenomena.
2.3 First-person authority and subjectivity.
2.4 Qualia and phenomenal consciousness.
2.5 Intentionality, mental representation, and propositional attitudes.
3. Substance Dualism.
3.1 Substance dualism: its claims and motivations.
3.2 The argument for substance dualism.
3.3 Objections to the argument for substance dualism.
3.4 Substance dualism and the problem of other minds.
3.5 The problem of interaction.
3.6 Noninteractionist views: parallelism and occasionalism.
3.7 The problem of explanatory impotence.
3.8 Substance dualism in perspective.
4. The Physicalist Worldview.
4.1 What physicalism claims.
4.2 Varieties of physicalism: eliminative, reductive, and nonreductive.
4.3 Implications of physicalist theories.
4.4 Motivations for physicalism.
4.5 The argument for physicalism: past scientific success.
4.6 Hempel’s dilemma.
4.7 The knowledge argument.
4.8 Absent and inverted qualia.
4.9 Representational, higher-order, and sensorimotor theories of consciousness.
5. Reductive Physicalism.
5.2 Arguments for and against behaviorism.
5.3 The theory model of psychological discourse.
5.4 The psychophysical identity theory.
5.5 Smart’s argument for the identity theory: Ockham’s razor.
5.6 Lewis’s argument for the identity theory: transitivity of identity.
5.8 The multilevel worldview.
6. Nonreductive Physicalism.
6.1 The multiple-realizability argument.
6.2 Reductivist responses to the multiple-realizability argument.
6.4 Higher-order properties.
6.5 Functionalism versus the identity theory.
6.6 Functionalism and the nonreductivist consensus: realization physicalism.
6.7 Troubles with functionalism: liberalism and qualia.
6.8 The Chinese room.
6.9 The embodied mind objection to functionalism.
6.10 Kim’s trilemma.
6.11 Supervenience physicalism.
6.12 The exclusion argument.
6.13 Nonreductive physicalism in perspective.
7. Eliminative Physicalism, Instrumentalism, and Anomalous Monism.
7.1 The argument for eliminativism.
7.2 The argument against eliminativism.
7.4 Arguments for and against instrumentalism.
7.5 Anomalous monism.
7.6 The argument for anomalous monism.
7.7 Arguments against anomalous monism.
8. Dual-Attribute Theory.
8.1 Dual-attribute theory vs. physicalism and substance dualism.
8.2 Nonorganismic dual-attribute theories.
8.4 The argument for epiphenomenalism.
8.5 Do qualia exist?.
8.6 Dennett’s argument against qualia.
8.7 Wittgenstein’s private language argument.
8.8 Arguments against epiphenomenalism.
8.9 Explaining emergence: panpsychism, panprotopsychism, psychophysical laws and structure.
8.11 Arguments for and against emergentism.
8.12 Dual-attribute theory in perspective.
9. Idealism, Neutral Monism, and Mind-Body Pessimism.
9.1 Varieties of idealism.
9.2 The motivation and argument for ontological idealism.
9.3 Arguments against idealism.
9.4 Neutral monism .
9.5 The arguments for and against neutral monism.
9.6 Mind-body pessimism.
10. The Hylomorphic Worldview.
10.1 What is hylomorphism?.
10.2 The hylomorphic worldview.
10.3 Organic composition and functional analysis.
10.4 The concept of organization.
10.5 Hylomorphism and the multilevel worldview.
10.6 Hylomorphism vs. physicalism and classic emergentism.
10.7 Causal pluralism.
10.8 The argument for hylomorphism.
11. A Hylomorphic Theory of Mind.
11.1 Patterns of social and environmental interaction.
11.2 Rejecting inner minds.
11.4 Inner experiences versus sensorimotor exploration.
11.6 Direct access, pattern recognition, and the problem of other minds.
11.7 Psychological language: pattern expression versus the theory model.
11.8 Hylomorphism versus behaviorism.
11.10 Hylomorphism and the mental-physical dichotomy.
11.11 Hylomorphism and the problem of mental causation.
11.12 Hylomorphism and the problem of psychophysical emergence.
11.13 Arguments for and against a hylomorphic theory of mind.
12 Persons [Available online at www.wiley.com/go/jaworski].
13 Free Will [Available online at www.wiley.com/go/jaworski].