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Semantic Relationism

Semantic Relationism

Kit Fine

ISBN: 978-0-470-69082-6

Feb 2008, Wiley-Blackwell

160 pages

Description

Introducing a new and ambitious position in the field, Kit Fine’s Semantic Relationism is a major contribution to the philosophy of language.
  • Written by one of today’s most respected philosophers
  • Argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought
  • Proposes that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves
  • Forms part of the prestigious new Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy series, based on an ongoing series of lectures by today’s leading philosophers
Preface.

Introduction.

1. Coordination among Variables.

A. The Desiderata.

B. The Problem.

C. The Contextualist Response.

D. The Dismissive Response.

E. The Instantial Approach.

F. The Algebraic Approach.

G. Relational Semantics for First-order Logic.

2. Coordination within Language.

A. Frege’s Puzzle.

B. Rejecting Compositionality.

C. Semantic Fact.

D. Closure.

E. Referentialism Reconsidered.

F. A Relational Semantics for Names.

G. Transparency.

3. Coordination within Thought.

A. Intentional Coordination.

B. Strict Co-representation.

C. The Content of Thought.

D. The Cognitive Puzzle.

4. Coordination between Speakers.

A. Kripke’s Puzzle.

B. Some Related Puzzles.

C. A Response.

D. A Solution.

E. A Deeper Puzzle.

F. A Deeper Solution.

G. The Role of Variables in Belief Reports.

H. Some Semantical Morals.

Postscript: Further Work.

Index

"Combines careful, detailed argumentation with inspiration and synoptic vision for the bigger picture. ... One can reasonably expect Fine's book to be a spur for thinking about these issues for many years to come." (Mind, October 2009)
  • A major contribution to the philosophy of language
  • Written by one of today’s most respected philosophers
  • Argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought
  • Proposes that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves
  • Forms part of the prestigious new Blackwell/Brown Lectures in Philosophy series, based on an ongoing series of lectures by today’s leading philosophers