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Chapter One
Introduction

During a keynote address to global leaders at the 2016 B20 meeting in Hangzhou, the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, emphasised how China's developmental approach remains predicated on 'crossing the river by feeling for stones' (*mozhe shitou guohe* 摸着石头过河).[1] While the application of this metaphor is not novel, its recurring reference by the Communist Party of China (CPC) more than 60 years after its introduction by Chen Yun, the Vice Premier of the first governing regime led by Mao Zedong, is noteworthy.[2] Chen advocated a measured approach to change during the early 1950s after China entered an entirely new historical phase as a nation-state – hence the term 'new China' – and could not rely on past experiences for guidance. All the newly-victorious CPC knew was what it did *not* want, namely the inherited institutions associated with feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism. When Mao's economic programs failed to meet expectations after three decades of 'transition to socialism' (*shehui zhuyi guodu* 社会主义过渡), Chen (1995: 245; author's translation) insisted again on a tentative approach to change in December 1980: 'We want reforms, but also firm steps…which means "crossing the river by feeling for stones." The steps should be small initially, the movement gradual'. Deng Xiaoping, then newly appointed as paramount leader of the CPC, fully endorsed Chen's exhortation as 'our subsequent guiding agenda' (Deng 1994a: 354; author's translation). Read against this 'agenda', Xi's reference to 'feeling for stones' in Hangzhou almost four decades later raises a theoretically-significant question on post-1949 Chinese

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political–economic evolution: if the *necessity* to feel for 'stones' indicates a preference for stable foundations within the capricious 'river' of global economic integration, (how) have these foundations shifted from their Maoist origins?

Some answers, this book argues, could be derived from an emergent geographical trend of 'feeling for stones' across China – the intensifying institution of experimental socioeconomic policies within territories designated as 'nationally strategic new areas' (*guojia zhanlüe xinqu* 国家战略新区). Newly established regulatory authorities in these intra-urban territories have been delegated the power to 'move first and experiment first' (*xianxing xianshi quan* 先行先试权) with exploratory reforms deemed to be of national significance. These reforms have become integral to the legitimacy of the CPC – and in particular its socialistic rule – as it negotiates the demands of global economic integration (Lim 2014). To be sure, the demarcation of urban frontiers to drive national-level reforms is not a policy innovation per se; it could be argued that the first wave of marketising reforms in four 'Special Economic Zones' (SEZs) – Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen and Zhuhai – generated more transformative impacts on China's developmental pathway during the post-Mao era. After all, the SEZs set in motion the collective willingness to welcome foreign capital, relinquish the Maoist notion of self-sufficiency and tap into what was otherwise idling rural surplus labour. This said, there was very little between the SEZs by way of policy differentiation or positioning within the global economy.[3] On the contrary, a distinguishing feature of this recent series of 'nationally strategic' experimentation is the considerable expansion of its territorial platforms, policy scope, and socioeconomic spheres of influence.

First designated was Pudong New Area in Shanghai. Approved in 1990, the territory has since transformed into a world-renowned city-regional 'motor' – or 'dragon head' (*longtou* 龙头), in popular parlance – of China's economic growth.[4] Subsequent experimentation only (re)gained intensity in 2006, however, after the Hu Jintao regime assigned 'nationally strategic' status to the Binhai industrial region in Tianjin. Three more similar territories were instituted during Hu's tenure, namely the Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing; the Nansha New Area in Guangzhou, which has since been co-opted into a broader Guangdong Free Trade Zone (GFTZ) that includes two other zones previously also termed 'nationally strategic', Hengqin and Qianhai; and the Zhoushan Archipelago New Area off the coast of Zhejiang province. The pace and geographical spread of experimentation grew after Xi Jinping took over the CPC leadership in 2013. At the time of writing, the Xi regime officially assigned 'nationally strategic' status to 13 additional 'new areas' across all major regions in China (see Figure 1.1). These are, namely, Guian New Area, Xixian New Area, Qingdao Xihaian New Area, Dalian Jinpu New Area, Chengdu Tianfu New Area, Changsha Xiangjiang New Area, Nanjing Jiangbei New Area, Fuzhou New Area, Yunnan Dianzhong New Area, Harbin New Area, Changchun New Area, Nanchang Ganjiang New Area and Baoding Xiongan New Area. Viewed holistically, this geographical trend suggests the desire to seek out new 'stones' have never been stronger than at any other



Figure 1.1 New frontiers of reforms: China's 'nationally strategic new areas', 1990–2016. Source: Author, with cartographic assistance by Elaine Watts.

stage of 'crossing the river'. *On Shifting Foundations* aims to explain and evaluate this phenomenon.

At one level, this division and differentiation of Chinese state spatiality could be construed as a proactive attempt on the part of the CPC to engage with the global system of capitalism through its own variant of instituted uneven development. Simultaneously, however, the growing pace of change is *symptomatic* of increasingly severe strains within the national regulatory structure. During the build-up to China's 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), the Chinese central government issued an unprecedented admission that its GDP-focused developmental approach of the past three decades was undertaken in tandem with 10 structural challenges (delineated in Table 1.1). One prominent example can be seen in the extensive extraction of natural resources and low-cost dumping of waste into the biosphere in the pursuit of GPD growth. Similarly, the rollback in rural welfare provision and municipal governments' corresponding denial of (already-minimum) social benefits to rural residents who migrate into and support urban economies generated huge savings that were consequently redirected into capital-friendly, supply-side projects (Oi 1999; Whiting 2001; He and Wu 2009). Accompanying this rollback was the proliferation of social contradictions that collectively exemplify the fragile social contract that constituted the so-called Chinese economic growth 'miracle'.

Rather than tackle these challenges head on at the national scale, central policymakers chose to develop and test potential solutions within each of the designated 'new areas'. Herein lies a key relationship that will be further examined in this book: the institution of 'nationally strategic' experimental policies through territorial reconfigurations. Specifically, the built environment, administrative boundaries and industrial compositions of targeted city-regions have been repurposed to generate new conditions for reforms. Each 'new area' is charged with experimenting with a predetermined range of national-level initiatives that have been formulated with local conditions in mind.

For instance, experimental policies in Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing built on the broader regional program to develop the western interior (more on this program shortly). To facilitate this, the Chongqing government deepened its reform of another national-level institution – the urban–rural dual structure (*chengxiang eryuan jiegou* 城乡二元结构). This was and remains a direct attempt to dismantle a longstanding and highly discriminatory national institution established during the Mao era – the *hukou*, or household registration, system of demographic controls. In the Pearl River Delta (PRD) extended metropolitan region where Hengqin, Qianhai and Nansha New Areas are located, reforms were focused primarily on financial innovation (*jinrong chuangxin* 金融创新), particularly the creation of 'backflow' channels for RMB in offshore financial centres to 'return' to China (*renminbi huiliu* 人民币回流). These reforms deal with another problematic institution of the Mao era, namely the fixed currency exchange rate system. As trade with the global economy expanded, Chinese merchants developed an over-reliance on the US dollar for trade settlements (Lim 2010; McKinnon 2013). The CPC consequently began promoting the external circulation of RMB through currency swaps, bond issues and trade settlements to reduce dollar usage. Opportunities must be offered to foreigners to

Table 1.1 China's 10 socioeconomic challenges, identified in the proposal of the 12th Five-Year Plan.

1.	Increasing constraints of resource environments
2.	Relationship between investment and consumption is unbalanced
3.	Income distribution gap widened
4.	Scientific and technical innovation capacity remains weak
5.	Asset structure is unsatisfactory
6.	Thin and weak agricultural foundation
7.	Lack of coordination in urban–rural development
8.	Coexistence of contradictory economic structure and employment pressures
9.	Apparent increase in social contradictions
10.	Persistent structural and systemic obstacles to scientific development

Source: Suggestions on the 12th Five-Year Plan by the Communist Party of China (p. 3, Mandarin document; NDRC 2011). Author's compilation and translation from Mandarin.

re-invest their RMB holdings in order to expand offshore RMB demand (hence the focus on providing 'backflow channels'). The unfolding of these geographically differentiated sets of new policies raises a question of policy experimentation: to what extent does it lead to foundational institutional change at the national level?

To address this question, this book draws from and advances the current body of research that underscores the importance of policy experimentation under CPC rule. As Sebastian Heilmann's work (2008: 2) shows, 'existing, and initially deficient, institutions can be put to work, transformed, or replaced for economic and social development in an open-ended process of institutional innovation that is based on locally generated solutions rather than on imported policy recipes'. This process is not as top–down and rigid as it appears, observe Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry (2011). On the contrary, the preferred modus operandi is to effect 'adaptive governance' through a type of 'guerrilla-styled' decision-making that originated from the CPC's sporadic and opportunistic military strategy in its 'long revolution' through the 1930 and 1940s. The 'wartime base areas' formula of encouraging decentralised initiative within the framework of centralised political authority proved highly effective when redirected to the economic modernisation objectives of Mao's successors' (Heilmann and Perry 2011: 7). To this it could be added that the 'guerilla' approach was never jettisoned during the Mao era. Indeed, despite Mao's grandiose efforts to institute a Soviet-styled central planning system, socioeconomic regulation was more accurately characterised by decentralised rule in the rural 'People's Communes' (*renmin gongshe* 人民公社), within which more than 80% of the population resided. It was also during this era that senior CPC cadres such as Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi and Li Fuchun called repeatedly for gradualism and pragmatism (including the selective retention of market-based practices that Mao found unacceptable), two defining characteristics of the party's impromptu wartime forays.[5]

Confronting growing external debt and persistent domestic poverty at the time of Mao's passing in 1976, the CPC knew it had to make changes to preclude social and political chaos. It was uncertain, however, on what directions to take without undermining its Marxist–Leninist foundations and its ideological commitment to facilitate the previously-mentioned transition to socialism.[6] This uncertainty re-accentuated the need to 'feel for stones'. As Deng Xiaoping explained in 1978, the end-goal of reform would be the modification of national-level institutions through place-specific experimentation. No pre-existing playbook guided this potentially uncomfortable process:

> Before a unified national agenda is developed, new methods can be launched from smaller parts, from one locality, from one occupation, before gradually expanding them. The central government must allow and encourage these experiments. All sorts of contradictions will emerge during experimentation, we must discover and overcome these contradictions in time. (Deng 1994b: 150; author's translation)

Implemented across a growing number of institutionally-distinct territories, Deng's experimental approach in the 1980s and early 1990s was *qualitatively* distinct from those instituted during the Mao era. While it was superficially like decentralised governance in the People's Communes, experimentation after 1978 strongly encouraged spontaneity while it delicately accommodated Mao-era practices. Thomas Rawski (1995: 1152) puts this shift in clear perspective:

> China's reforms typically involve what might be termed 'enabling measures' rather than compulsory changes. Instead of eliminating price controls, reform gradually raised the share of sales transacted at market prices. Instead of privatization, there was a growing range of firms issuing shares. Production planning does not vanish, but its span of control gradually shrinks. This open-ended approach invites decentralized reactions that the Centre can neither anticipate nor control.

Viewed in relation to the most recent wave of policy experimentation in 'nationally strategic new areas', this 'open-ended' approach continues to define the contemporary spatial logics of socioeconomic regulation in China. 'Crucially', Jamie Peck and Jun Zhang (2013: 380) argue, this approach 'has meant that endogenous state capacities and centralised party control have been maintained through China's developmental transformation'. Then again, reforms in China remain, in Zhichang Zhu's (2007) observation, 'without a theory'. There is, specifically, no explanation why experimental reforms have not led to federal-styled autonomy for subnational governments. Likewise, it is not clear whether increasingly differentiated subnational initiatives could drive national-level institutional change in a way that enhances stability. *On Shifting Foundations* will address these gaps in the following three ways.

First, the book problematises dichotomous portrayals of post-Mao economic development as outcomes of decentralisation and its corollary, uneven development, while the Mao era was characterised by a highly centralised political economy that was committed to socio-spatial egalitarianism. Presenting a fresh conceptual and historical appraisal of the spatial logics of socioeconomic regulation since the founding of contemporary China in 1949, this book argues that the apparent 'downscaling' of governance to city-regional levels since the 1980s has not been a linear, one-track process. What is emerging is at once a further fragmentation of regulatory territories as well as a repurposing of Mao-era institutional foundations. In other words, the on-going round of 'nationally strategic' policy experimentation exemplifies the limits *and* legacies of past socio-spatial configurations, which makes it necessary to historicise the rationale for experimentation in each 'new area'.

Second, the book goes beyond assuming the territorial demarcations of 'nationally strategic' experimental sites as straightforward anointments from the central government.[7] Emerging evidence suggests, indeed, that the establishment

of these new zones are outcomes of competitive lobbying by subnational actors. What counts as a 'nationally strategic' policy is therefore a fluid and actively contested entity; the designation of a site for national-level reforms is politicised rather than preordained. Lu Dadao, a senior economic geographer at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and a longstanding consultant to CPC policymakers, candidly describes how this lobbying has complicated the notion and value of the 'national strategy':

> What is the national strategy? It refers to the guiding capacity of the development of one region within the broad national domain, including a huge supportive impact. Currently, at the demands of different regions, the problem is the designation of regions as nationally strategic when they should not be. […] The current problem is some regions emulate one another to develop plans. Through communication and other manoeuvres, they hope the National Development and Reform Commission [hereafter NDRC, also known as *fagaiwei* 发改委] will organise and draw up these plans and forward them for approval by the State Council. Some of these have been approved, others are still lobbying the central government to organise and include their plans within the national strategy. From the national vantage point, how can it work if everyone is a strategic hub? (Lu, interview with *Liaowang*, 17 June 2010; author's translation)

Xiao Jincheng, the president of the NDRC's Institute of Regional Economy, explains the rationale of this competitive alignment with the 'national strategy':

> There is a particular point of view that so long as the State Council approves a plan for a region, this region will be an important developmental node that will enjoy abundant support through state policies and capital. Hence it is possible to approve many projects and there will be no limits to future development. (Xiao, interview with *Liaowang*, 17 June 2010; author's translation)

These observations by Lu and Xiao collectively suggest that policy experimentation has evolved into a multi-scalar *political* process. This evolution exemplifies the *willingness* within the central leadership to consider proposals from subnational actors 'through communication and other manoeuvres'. Integral to the reconfiguration is the alignment of supposedly favourable local conditions with national-level concerns. Why and how some subnational cadres succeed in convincing central policymakers to 'scale up' their territories as 'nationally strategic' will be further explored in this book's two case studies on the PRD and Chongqing (see, specifically, Chapters 4 and 6).

Last, but not least, this book will evaluate the national impact of the experimental policies in the PRD and Chongqing (Chapters 5 and 7, respectively). At least five years have passed since policy experimentation was instituted in these territories, and the CPC Party Secretaries who were directly involved in their designation – Wang Yang and Bo Xilai – have left their positions. It would be apt,

then, to evaluate whether the policies have generated fresh avenues for changes in national-level institutional foundations. The focus will be on two major policies in the case study of Chongqing – urban–rural integration and state-driven attempts to attract capital inland from the coastal provinces. In the PRD, the book evaluates the effectiveness of RMB backflow channels in Hengqin and Qianhai New Areas, and foregrounds their implications for Nansha New Area (which was still new at the time of data collection and hence difficult to ascertain policy effectiveness). In so doing, these chapters address the concerns of Lu and Xiao by showing the extent to which 'nationally strategic' designation can lead to foundational change at the national level.

To further contextualise the three foregoing research avenues, the next section will consider how recurring spatial differentiation was and remains essential to the production of a hierarchical, unitary Chinese state since 1949. It argues, specifically, that the designation of 'nationally strategic new areas' is characteristic of a longstanding and proactive attempt to retain, if not reinforce, political power through the reconfiguration of state spatiality.

Recurring Spatial Reconfigurations and the Consolidation of a Unitary State

The predominant political project in China over the last century has been to establish and consolidate a modern state structure. Pressures for state formation began during the late Qing period when the Empress Dowager, Cixi, was confronted with demands for constitutional rule. Sustained revolutionary pressures consequently triggered the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911. In its place was a new Chinese state – the Republic of China (中华民国) – formed by Sun Yat-sen, one of the leading revolutionaries (Cohen 1988; Shambaugh 2000; Kuhn 2002). Sun's subsequent tenure was transient, lasting less than three months before his successor, Yuan Shikai, moved swiftly to re-institute the monarchy. Yuan was eventually thwarted in 1916 and fresh state-building efforts were launched by Chiang Kai-shek, the-then leader of the Nationalist Party (or Kuomintang, the KMT). During the two decades that followed, the KMT established institutions conducive to state rule such as the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a strong military force was also developed in tandem. The effectiveness of these institutions was undermined, however, by the KMT's inability to penetrate local communities in the rural hinterland and the total war against Japanese occupation between 1937 and 1945 (Duara 1991; Strauss 1998; Remick 2004; Osinsky 2010). It was only after the CPC emerged victorious in a protracted, three-year civil war with the KMT in 1949 that the state-building project stabilised. Andrew Walder (2015: 2) underscores the historical significance of the CPC victory:

> For the first time in well over a century, there would be a Chinese state that effectively controlled its territory within secure borders, and that was able to stamp out pockets of domestic rebellion. For the first time in China's long history, salaried state officials, not local notables, would administer Chinese society in rural villages and urban neighbourhoods. These officials were part of a national hierarchy that connected the apex of power in Beijing directly, and relatively effectively, with life at the grass roots. Mao and his comrades may have viewed the victory of the Communist Party in 1949 as part of the triumph of world socialism, but it marked the birth of China's first modern national state.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, the CPC succeeded not because it formulated more innovative state building policies. As John Fitzgerald (1995) argues, state formation through the late Qing, early Republican (1912–1927), Nationalist (1928–1949) and communist periods (1949 and thereafter) was underpinned by the *continuous* quest for a unitary state in spite of differences over what kind of nation this state represents. Along the same vein, Samuel Jackson (2011: 76) points out that 'nationalist efforts to secure political unification of China during the 1920 and 1930s informed the strategies and institutions adopted by the CCP to consolidate control'. Building on these insights, this book argues that the CPC's state-building project was distinct from its predecessors because space was not construed as a passive 'container' or epiphenomenon of state-building. To paraphrase Henri Lefebvre (1991), the CPC changed China because it first altered its political-economic spatial formations.[8]

The Mao regime prioritised the integration of a unitary state through large-scale territorial reconfigurations after its victory in the Chinese civil war was imminent. This was a transformative approach because 'China' under the KMT was effectively a patchwork of disparate regional economies – dominated by warlords, Japanese colonialists and local 'land tyrants and gentry' (*tuhao lieshen* 土豪劣绅) – that significantly precluded the concentration of political power. Integrating these territories into a national whole was encumbered by poor access to local economies, particularly in the vast rural hinterland, where widespread resistance was encountered.[9] This pushback was contained and eventually broken after the CPC implemented an important but often-overlooked spatial strategy: the political–geographical division of its newly acquired territories into six administrative divisions. These regions were called North China (*Huabei* 华北), led by Liu Shaoqi; Northeast China (*Dongbei* 东北), led by Gao Gang; East China (*Huadong* 华东), led by Rao Shushi; Central and South China (*Zhongnan* 中南), led by Lin Biao; Northwest China (*Xibei* 西北), led by Peng Dehuai; and Southwest China (*Xinan* 西南), led by Deng Xiaoping. This military-styled territorialisation provided the platform for the CPC to *thoroughly* redefine rural state–society relations through the redistribution of rural land to poor peasants. Once landownership reconfigurations were completed by 1952, the CPC augmented its political power through coercive and at times violent mobilisational campaigns (Strauss 2006).

At the same time, two leaders of the six administrative regions – Gao Gang and Rao Shushi – were suddenly purged on the grounds of insubordination (Teiwes 1990, 1993, chapter 5; Shiraev and Yang 2014). Drawing from this consolidated political strength, the Mao administration rolled out plans for the mass collectivisation of means of production. This was to culminate in the Great Leap Forward industrialisation program between 1958 and 1961.

Writing in support of this economically nationalistic project, the-then Shanghai Mayor, Ke Qingshi, published an article in the Party's leading journal, *Red Flag* (*hongqi* 红旗), in February 1959 to encourage subnational actors to privilege national-level developmental goals. This article attained touchstone status in Chinese policymaking and academic circles for introducing the metaphor 'the whole country as a chessboard' (*quanguo yipanqi* 全国一盘棋). Days after its publication, the key tenets of the article were echoed and endorsed by the party-state through an editorial in its mouthpiece, *People's Daily*:

> Our socialist economy develops along planned ratios. In order to deploy enthusiasm within different spheres in the most efficient and most reasonable way, it would be necessary to enhance centralized leadership and macro arrangements, it would be necessary to look from the perspective of the whole country, and arrange the national economy in the form of a chessboard. (*People's Daily*, 24 February 1959; author's translation)

Particularly pertinent for the analysis in *On Shifting Foundations* is the editorial's insistence on placing national concerns ahead of local calculations:

> The initiatives and flexibility of every leadership organ and department during the implementation of central directives should be promoted at any time; work cannot be performed well when these characteristics are lacking. However, proactivity and flexibility should be brought forth with reference to 'the whole country as a chessboard'. These should first and foremost be used to ensure the victory of 'the whole country as a chessboard', to guarantee the actualisation of the state plan. Only when the projects and plans designated by the state are fully completed can proactivity and flexibility be extended to other areas. (*People's Daily*, 24 February 1959; author's translation)

As the subsequent chapters will elaborate, the CPC's contemporary development of 'nationally strategic' policy experimentation is premised on a repurposed 'chessboard' philosophy. The continued relevance of this philosophy is interesting because, within its original context, Ke Qingshi's imploration to subsume subnational developmental initiatives to national goals neither inspired the Great Leap Forward program to success nor enhanced economic production during the Mao era. After it became apparent that this program was unsuccessful, Mao implemented more radical measures to ensure China did not follow the 'revisionist' steps of the Soviet Union. This was first launched through the Third Front

Construction program in 1964 (*sanxian jianshe* 三线建设), on the premise of growing military threats from 'imperialism and their running dogs' (*diguozhuyi jiqizougou* 帝国主义及其走狗). Mao ordered means of production to be relocated from the coastal city-regions, officially termed the 'First Front', to those in the relatively sheltered interior, termed the 'Third Front' (ref. Li and Wu 2012: 61–64). The relocation was an immensely costly project that more negatively impacted economic recovery than the chaotic Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), as Barry Naughton (1988) shows. Once the national industrial composition was spatially reconfigured, the platform was set in 1966 for the further consolidation of CPC rule – to exterminate the 'clique of capitalist roaders' (*zouzipai* 走资派).[10]

Economic reconstruction unsurprisingly took a backseat during the first few years of the Cultural Revolution. Cell-like administrative units were tied hierarchically to Beijing in tandem with geo-economic insulation (under the nationalistic slogan of 'self-sufficiency') to ensure absolute political control. Provinces were granted significant autonomy to self-finance developmental projects in return for the enforcement of a minimal trade policy. For almost a full decade prior to the 1978 reforms, the 'Chinese economy' looked more like a customs union more than a common market; it was an entity with a common barrier against the global economy, within which free trade did not exist. Embedded within the previously mentioned 'People's Communes' and urban industrial units (*gongye danwei* 工业单位) was effectively a 'cellular' and 'fragmented' economic structure that was constituted by cell-like, self-sufficient and regionally uneven administrative units (Donnithorne 1972; Tsui 1991; Bray 2005). To be explored further in Chapter 2, these policies collectively comprised a 'politics in command' (*zhengzhi guashuai* 政治挂帅) approach to socioeconomic regulation that lasted until Mao's passing in 1976.

Chinese state spatiality was (again) reconfigured to prioritise and incentivise market-driven production under the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping leadership. After taking power in 1978, Deng immediately made it clear his priority was the survival of the CPC through the enactment of the 'Four Cardinal Principles' in the Chinese Constitution: (i) We must keep to the socialist road; (ii) We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat; (iii) We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party; (iv) We must uphold Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. It is important to note that the third principle is the pivot on which the other three principles rest (for full text of Deng's speech on the Four Cardinal Principles, see *People's Daily*, 30 March 1979).

To fulfil his commitment, Deng's signalled his preference for Vladimir Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' in post-Tsarist Russia, which accommodated private enterprises in the quest for socialism. Interestingly, this approach marked a *return* to the CPC's original policy focus of the early 1950s (Horesh and Lim 2017). Deng's flexible approach was predicated on proactive spatial restructuring that facilitated the growing urbanisation of capital and labour power (Lin 1999; Ma 2005). Underpinning this approach was the 'ladder-step transition theory', or

tidu tuiyi lilun (梯度推移理论). First espoused by the Shanghai-based academics Xia Yulong and Feng Zhijun in 1982, this prescriptive 'theory' attracted the attention of a senior CPC cadre, Bo Yibo, and subsequently permeated central policymaking circles. Instituted as a policy blueprint during the 7th Five-Year Plan (1986–1990), this predictive theory divided Chinese state spatiality into three economic–geographical belts: the eastern (coastal), central, and western (Xia and Feng 1982). The Deng administration allowed one belt (the eastern seaboard) the priority in ascending the development 'ladder'. It assumed that the fruits of development in the 'first mover' belt would diffuse downwards to other rungs of the ladder. This template of instituted uneven development became the *basis* of market-oriented reforms: the Deng administration expanded China's re-engagement with the global economy by permitting foreign investments beyond the first four SEZs. Prior to the 1994 fiscal overhaul that (re)concentrated fiscal resources at the central level, preferential fiscal policies were given to selected coastal provinces to accelerate their respective developments, while subsequent tax reforms continued to benefit these provinces (Wei 1996; Dabla-Norris 2005).

Up until Deng's passing in 1997, the CPC did not designate any time for accumulated capital to be proactively transferred from the coastal belt to the central and western interior to attain long-run spatial equilibrium. There was also no detailed plan that explains what would happen to the coastal provinces' economic development as resources are re-directed westwards. Ostensibly aware of potentially-damaging consequences of the widening coast–interior unevenness, Deng's successor, Jiang Zemin, began to focus on developmental issues confronting the interior provinces. Reiterating Deng's philosophy, Jiang averred in a 1999 speech that 'reducing the developmental disparities within the entire country, developing in a coordinated manner and ultimately attaining Common Affluence is a basic principle of socialism' (*People's Daily*, 10 June 1999; author's translation and emphasis). Yet, in an important qualifying point made in the same year, Jiang clarified he was not about to jettison the spatial logic of socioeconomic regulation that had contributed to China's economic growth:

> My understanding is, when Comrade Deng Xiaoping mentioned letting some regions and people to first prosper before gradually reaching Common Affluence, that is still not the end point. Upon reaching a relatively higher standard of living, more advanced regions must still move forward. Equilibrium is relative while disequilibrium is absolute, this is the objective rule of material development (Jiang 2006: 341; author's translation).

It was based on this 'objective rule' that Jiang announced, in November 1999, the 'Great Western Development' spatial project (*xibu dakaifa* 西部大开发). Ratified by the State Council in 2001, this strategic program represented the beginning of more targeted approaches towards developing the large interior regions. The original plan involved enhanced fiscal redistribution to the western provinces; more commitment by the central government to infrastructural development; opening

up more sectors for foreign investments; and implementing preferential policies to attract foreign capital to the interior parts. Two other cross-provincial programs known as Northeastern Rejuvenation (*dongbei zhenxing* 东北振兴) and Rise of the Centre (*zhongbu jueqi* 中部崛起) were launched in 2002 and 2004 respectively.

While fiscal monies have been redistributed to the provinces involved in these developmental programs, the growing population concentration in the coastal cities and the huge inter-regional income disparities over the 2000s indicates the overall pattern of regional unevenness was not ameliorated. Structural change was precluded because these cross-provincial programs entailed no specific institutional (re)formulations at the provincial level (Li and Wu 2012; Liu et al. 2012). According to Weidong Liu (2012: 7), a leading economic geographer from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the broad cross-provincial developmental programs are part of a passive overall plan; they function independently rather than relate to one another, and do not have clear goals. For this reason, Liu adds, these programs do not provide guidance for an overall (i.e. national) regional development strategy.

Unsurprisingly, as indicated previously in Table 1.1, the Chinese State Council overtly identified regional disparities and lack of overall coordination as a major policy issues in its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015). In a televised press conference, the-then Premier, Wen Jiabao, emphasised that despite China's current standing as the world's second largest economy, his government is 'also fully aware that China remains a developing country with a large population, weak economic foundation and uneven development' (China Central TV live telecast, 14 March 2011; author's transcription). Shortly after, the-then President, Hu Jintao, acknowledged that 'there is lack of adequate balance, coordination or sustainability in our development' (*China Daily*, 15 April 2011). This official recognition corroborates the obdurate persistence of uneven economic-geographical development in China despite the previously-mentioned ameliorative attempts.

Against this backdrop, Xi Jinping recently implored the CPC to take 'the "whole country as a chessboard" approach in the developmental activities of the 13th Five Year Plan [2016–2020], through which coordinated development would be decisive' (*Xinhua*, 18 January 2016). Once again, this called for incorporating proactive and flexible governance within the context of the national 'chessboard'; once again, the recourse was to 'feel for stones' to overcome the new challenges. An emergent response over the last decade was to institute experimental policies in the 'nationally strategic new areas'.

Approaching the 'Nationally Strategic New Areas'

To evaluate the emergence and effects of 'nationally strategic new areas' against this backdrop of recurring spatial reconfigurations across China, *On Shifting Foundations* presents an integrated analytical framework that foregrounds the

relationship between state rescaling, path-dependency and policy experimentation. This framework situates these experimental zones as integral to and an impact of the multi-dimensional process of state rescaling. State rescaling is defined as the reconfiguration of regulatory relations between the national, subnational and supranational governments, such that what represents the 'national interest' is no longer expressed and realised at one scale (i.e. nationwide). This reconfiguration is not a simple transference of regulatory capacities from a national government to governments or non-governmental entities located at other scales. The notion of 'transfer' implies a one-directional movement, whereas state rescaling is underpinned by political strategies that re-define how regulatory power is (to be) shared between governments.

This reconfiguration of political power is conceptualised as a dynamic process that shapes and is shaped by *successive* spatial divisions of regulation. First conceived by Jamie Peck (1998) and further developed by Neil Brenner (2004), this conceptualisation parallels and builds on Doreen Massey's ([1984] 1995) 'spatial divisions of labour' thesis, which views spatial change as predominantly driven by private capitalist interests. Specifically, Massey's thesis refers to the way economic investors respond to and reshape geographical inequality, with a primary focus on how the calculations of firms are affected by and in turn reshape localities. 'Spatial structures of different kinds can be viewed historically', writes Massey (1995: 118), 'as evolving in a succession in which each is superimposed upon, and combined with, the effects of the spatial structures which came before'. The key process of note is the 'combination' of different spatial structures within a broader system of production: 'The combination of layers is a form of mutual determination, of the existing characteristics of the area or regional system with those of the geographical patterns and effects of previous uses' (Massey 1995: 114–115). Massey's approach has been creatively adopted to conceptualise local(ised) expressions of regulatory shifts. Central to her approach for geographical studies of regulatory shifts, for Peck (1998: 29), is the emphasis on interaction:

> If, in a parallel sense to Massey's (1984) conceptualization of 'rounds of accumulation' unfolding unevenly across the economic landscape, this can be conceived as a process of institutional layering, then it is one which entails a considerable measure of reciprocal interaction between the layers. The process by which new geographies of governance are formed is not a pseudo geological one in which a new layer (or round of regulation) supersedes the old, to form a new institutional surface. Rather, it is a dynamic process in which national (regulatory) tendencies and local (institutional) outcomes mould one another in a dialectical fashion.

Brenner's (2004: 108) conceptualisation further foregrounds this 'dialectical fashion': 'Spatial divisions of (state) regulation are…directly analogous to spatial divisions of labour insofar as both entail determinate articulations and differentiations of particular types of social relations – whether of capitalist production or

of state regulation – over an uneven territorial surface and within a chronically unstable scalar hierarchy'. Like Peck (1998, 2002), Brenner (2004: 109) calls for an understanding of the 'interactions' between new regulations and the actually-existing 'economic landscape'. While the Chinese context differed from those that informed the conceptual work of Massey, Peck and Brenner, there are striking similarities in the ways regulatory power is reconfigured through spatial restructuring. The emergence of 'nationally strategic new areas', each charged with implementing a unique set of experimental policies, would therefore be assessed in relation to the impact – both constitutive and constraining – of inherited institutions.

Institutions are defined in this book as the rules and regulations, both legalistic and informal, which structure socioeconomic interactions. This structuring process is at once a licence (it sets up the actualisation of specific actions) and a limitation (the rules set boundaries that preclude or criminalise specific actions). Propagandistic campaigns, the CPC constitution, the RMB-denominated monetary system and the so-called 'feudal' clan-based associations all constitute various aspects of formal and informal institutions in the Chinese context. The overall institutional structure is sustained and reproduced holistically through what is known within Chinese policymaking circles as *dingceng sheji* (顶层设计), literally 'top-level design'. A direct legacy of the 'chessboard philosophy' and an inversion of the Marxian base-superstructure logic,[11] this process become the *basis* that determines political-economic evolution in China. Carl Walter and Fraser Howie (2011: 8) offer an incisive description of its enduring impact:

> China's economic geography is not simply based on geography. There is a parallel economy that is geographic as well as politically strategic. This is commonly referred to as the economy 'inside the system' [or *tizhinei* 体制内]…and, from the Communist Party's viewpoint, it is the real political economy. All of the state's financial, material and human resources, including the policies that have opened the country to foreign investment, have been and continued to be directed at the 'system'. Improving and strengthening it has been the goal of every reform effort undertaken by the Party since 1978. It must be remembered that the efforts of Zhu Rongji, perhaps China's greatest reformer, were aimed at strengthening the economy 'inside the system', not changing it.

This observation of continuity-through-change offers an interesting prism to assess Xi Jinping's (2013: n.p.) claim that the 'feeling for stones' approach is 'dialectically unified with top-level design'. Corresponding with Peck's previously quoted point on dialectical institutional layering, Xi's focus on 'dialectics' strongly suggests that policy experimentation is unfolding in tension with established parameters 'inside the system'. This then raises the question on the attainment of structural 'unity' at the national level: does it entail the thorough transformation, subtle refinement or further reinforcement of policies and practices associated with existing institutions?

Answering these questions entails an evaluation of the *extent* to which new initiatives are path-dependent. As existing research in urban and regional studies have shown, geographically-variegated developments are situated within historical pathways. Reviewing the connections between regional development and economic globalisation, Dennis Wei (2007: 25) notes how 'China's reform is a gradual, experiential, and path-dependent process'. At the intra-urban level, Fulong Wu (2009: 886) observes how socioeconomic inequalities 'show a strong path-dependence feature'. This corresponds with George Lin's (2007: 10, emphases-in-original) broader survey of post-Mao Chinese urbanism:

> If state–society relations have a particularly important role to play in Chinese urbanism, which in turn occupies a special position in the state scaling strategy that deals with the Chinese society, then the processes underlying Chinese urbanism would remain culturally specific and path-dependent despite the observation that certain forms of Western urbanism are replicating themselves in contemporary China under globalization.

Despite this acute awareness of path-dependency, the process has been examined largely in isolation rather than in tandem with the politics of regulatory reconfigurations and policy experimentation. Furthermore, the cross-scalar variations and effects of path-dependency are under-explored. Experimental policies can generate changes at the local scale, for instance, but may not lead to new developmental pathways at the national level. In some cases, place-specific policy experimentation could lead to the reinforcement of what Walter and Howie (2011) term 'the system'. Specifically, resistance develops at the national level because some institutions are 'locked in' to the extent that self-reinforcing effects discourage transformative change. Chapter 3 will integrate these processes within a dynamic analytical framework. In so doing, this book circumvents the challenges of state centrism, a common social-scientific approach that view states as 'containing' economies and political authority as limited within the confines of state spatiality.

Three problematic assumptions associated with state centrism will be avoided, namely spatial fetishism, methodological territorialism, and methodological nationalism. Spatial fetishism is defined as the notion that space is distinct and functions autonomously from social, economic and political processes. In contrast to spatial reification, which regards space as a thing with a materiality and life of its own, spatial fetishism treats space as a pre-given entity that needs no separate theorisation. For instance, a foundational assumption of macroeconomic theory – that economic processes could be reduced to 'aggregate demand and supply' – does not ask why it is possible or, indeed, necessary to 'aggregate' to the national scale. That the intrinsic instability of state regulation could problematise the aggregating process over time is never questioned; the assumption 'all things being equal' will not stand once the malleability of state space is

considered, however. This fetishistic approach reduces locational patterns to simple cost–benefit calculations or universal laws that are neither connected to nor capable of explaining unequal power relations that are spatially (re)configured. In short, it is not concerned about how differentiated territories regulate and reproduce social, political and economic phenomena at the national scale.

Contrary to this two-dimensional view of space, research has demonstrated how the inherent instability of socio-spatial formations generates dynamic tensions with state apparatuses (Swyngedouw 1997; Peck 2002; Brenner 2004; Massey 2005; Harvey 2008). For this reason, while state space should never be taken as capable of generating causal influences autonomously, the *conjunctural specificity* of its configuration could direct or confine socioeconomic processes to the sub-national and/or supra-national scales and consequently determine whether the CPC could fulfil its regulatory objectives. This dynamic conception applies to the economic geography of 'new China', as discussed earlier in this chapter, and will be adopted to explore the rationale and ramifications of designating the 'nationally strategic new areas'.

The portrayal of the Chinese political economy as a disparate and inherently unstable territorial mosaic foregrounds two other assumptions problematised by state rescaling research: methodological territorialism and nationalism. Across much of the social sciences, Brenner (2004) observes, social processes are assumed to occur within spatially-delimited 'containers', the most privileged of which remains the nation-state. While national borders generate constitutive effects, they are also inherently porous. In view of this porosity, Brenner (2009: 48–49) emphasises the importance of *not* privileging specific scales when seeking to understand social phenomena, but to understand how and why these phenomena are scaled:

> [S]cale cannot be the 'object' of political-economic analysis, for scales exist only insofar as key political-economic processes are scale-differentiated. From this point of view, it is more appropriate to speak of scaled political economies – that is, of the scaling and rescaling of distinctive political-economic processes – rather than of a political economy of scale per se.

As previously mentioned, a key objective of this book is to foreground the *co-constitutive* relationship between Chinese state stability and regular regulatory reconfigurations. That 'China' as we know it today is an outcome of regular and in some ways cumulative state rescaling rather than a normative national 'container' illustrates methodological nationalism as the third problematic assumption. Social scientific studies predominantly collate, present and compare data at the inter-national level. While subnational socioeconomic data is often available, they are presented as subsets of national data, which underscores the constitutive effect of national borders on statistical quantification. However, these data would not be directly helpful for ascertaining the rationale and politics of

designating 'nationally strategic new areas', Rather, the discourses of key decision-makers positioned at various levels of the regulatory hierarchy would be a more relevant source of information. Juxtaposing the discourses of these actors could open new ways to understand logics of regulatory reconfigurations that are overlooked by nationally-oriented quantitative data. Indeed, while the Chinese political economy comprises the site of analysis, political and economic actors have been proactively seeking to negotiate their place-specific socioeconomic interests in relation to national-level calculations through 'nationally strategic' policy experimentation.

Table 1.2 summarises how this book will address the a-spatial assumptions of state centrism. The counter-cases are delineated along the lines of geographical-historical re-assessment, theoretical re-evaluation, and case studies of 'nationally strategic new areas'. Through reappraising the spatial logics of socio-economic regulation in China after 1949, Chapter 2 foregrounds two distinct geographical processes – the centralisation-decentralisation dynamic and instituted uneven development – in developing and reinforcing the CPC's politico-economic power. This reappraisal provides the platform for challenging the assumptions of methodological territorialism and nationalism in Chapter 3. Specifically, the chapter frames the national scale as a *process*; as constituted by the *tensions* between attempts at change (policy experimentation in subnational locations) and demands for continuity (resistance to the implementation of experimental policies nationwide).

As mentioned earlier, the empirical analysis will be based on case studies about the emergence of 'nationally strategic' policy experimentation in the PRD, where Nansha New Area is designated, and Chongqing, the municipality appointed as the site of Liangjiang New Area. As is now well-documented, the PRD was the frontier of China's 'reform and liberalisation' in the early 1980s. While it remains the leading city-region in export orientation and economic output today, its developmental approach came under pressure during and after the 2008 global financial crisis, which led to a new series of experimental reforms to generate new competitive advantages for this extended metropolitan region. Prior to the designation of Nansha New Area in 2012, the CPC instituted reforms in two smaller 'new areas', one to the east (Qianhai 前海, in Shenzhen SEZ) and the other to the west (Hengqin 横琴, in Zhuhai SEZ). The reforms in both these territories were originally labelled 'nationally strategic', and were then integrated within the broader GFTZ after Nansha officially received national designation. This book will therefore examine financial and trade policies first instituted in Hengqin and Qianhai as they went further back in time (from 2009 to 2010, respectively), while also situating these policies within broader processes of economic integration in and through PRD.

Chongqing, on the other hand, became a reform test bed because it received the short end of Deng Xiaoping's developmental stick. Home to 33 million residents, the majority classified as 'agricultural', and lagging far behind coastal

Table 1.2 Refinement of state-centric assumptions through the Chinese cases.

A-spatial assumptions	Details	A refinement through the framework of state rescaling, path-dependency and policy experimentation	Counter-cases in this book
Spatial fetishism	• State space is timeless and static • State territory is unaffected by changes in the regulatory structure or broader shifts in the global system of capitalism	• Chinese state spatiality is always in the making; the current spatial form was non-existent pre-1949, and its existence is an outcome of Maoist structural and spatial reconfigurations • Current attempts at reflexive centralisation are to reinforce this Maoist politico-geographic legacy while facilitating global economic integration	• Active differentiation of state spatiality in the Mao era • Reconfiguring post-Mao regulatory spaces (Chapter 2)
Methodological Territorialism	• State territoriality is viewed as an unchanging, fixed or permanent aspect of modern statehood • The geography of state space is reduced to its territorial dimensions	• Chinese state spatiality is regularly reconfigured at different scales • Contrary to conventional portrayals, the Mao-era was characterised by entrenched uneven economic-geographical development • Post-Mao decentralised governance was and remains a dynamic extension of centralisation, not an end in itself • Spatial projects and strategies are layered on one another as well as constitute one another simultaneously • The ability of the Chinese state to produce polymorphic economic geographies within a broader global system of capitalism is the basis of contemporary Chinese statehood	• State spatiality as a dynamic process (Chapter 3) • Guangdong government's push for rescaling in response to national and global economic conditions (Chapters 4 and 5) • Rescaling in Chongqing as strategic repositioning in the global economy (Chapters 6 and 7)
Methodological nationalism	• The national scale is viewed, ontologically, as the primary and natural scale of political power and capital accumulation	• Even during the geo-economically insulated Mao-era, the national scale was determined by processes occurring at the provincial/commune and international scales • The apparent primacy of the national scale of accumulation (in relation to the global economy) is constituted by dynamic, subnational repositioning	• Explains how national-level structural coherence is intrinsically unstable (Chapters 2 and 3)

Source: State-centric assumptions adapted from Brenner (2004: 74); refinement and proposed counter-cases by author.

provinces in income and output since 1978, the sprawling city-region was chosen in 2010 to experiment with policies to overturn the (still) widening uneven development across the country. More than two decades after Deng Xiaoping pledged to reciprocate interior China's contributions to the reform process, Liangjiang New Area became the first non-coastal location to institute reforms deemed to be of national significance. These reforms build on the already high-profile attempt to overhaul the 1958 *hukou* institution in the municipality, while attempts at directing manufacturing investments to Liangjiang New Area raised questions on the relevance of coastal-oriented industrialisation (ref. discussion on Deng and Jiang's approaches to uneven development).

Although the 'national strategy' of socioeconomic development is never launched with the aim to conserve old regulatory logics, the fact that experimental policies continue to be 'contained' within specific territories reflect the difficulty of removing regulatory logics inherited from previous regimes. For instance, the previously mentioned *hukou* institution still denies social benefits to rural migrants. This has inevitably generated social discontent and created longstanding speculations about its removal (Chan and Buckingham 2008; Fan 2008). Such was the anger at this institution, 13 major newspapers took the unprecedented step of publishing a joint front-page editorial on 1 March 2010 – just before the annual 'two meetings' of top CPC delegates in Beijing – calling for its immediate removal (ref. Lim 2017). Recent reforms in Chongqing marked a tentative step in this direction, but no transformative change occurred at the national level (see Chapter 7).

The pre-existing state monopoly on financial capital supply – a Mao era legacy – similarly precludes many private investors from accessing capital from the formal financial market. While the financial system has widely adopted management mechanisms employed by market economies after the 'reforms and liberalisation' of 1978 (e.g. the public listing of banks, issuance of bonds, separation of owners from management, etc.), the entire system continues to be a function of party developmental goals (Tsai 2004; Walter and Howie 2011; Sanderson and Forsythe 2013). These phenomena jointly suggest reforms have not relinquished Mao-era regulatory logics. And it is for this reason that the contemporary reforms also reflect the constraints of institutional path-dependency.

The rationale and ramifications of the 'nationally strategic new areas' will be demonstrated through a broad spectrum of empirical data collected prior to, during and after the embarkation of three field visits to China, namely between January and February 2012 (to Beijing, with a stopover in Shanghai); in March and April 2012 (to Chongqing); and in January 2013 (to Hengqin, Qianhai, Macau and Hong Kong). A follow-up fieldtrip was made to Macau, Hong Kong and the GFTZ in June and July 2015. Given that the three primary field visits involved interactions with as many as 80 individuals on various occasions (e.g. lunches and dinner hosted by local governments, chats with guides at visitor centres of the New Areas), it was difficult to define the total number of 'interviews'.

Strictly speaking, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 31 academics and policymakers during the three field visits, while spontaneous interactions with other individuals that yielded insights into developmental processes in the 'new areas' were written into field notes. Major policy documents (e.g. the 12th Five-Year Plan; Plan for Guangdong-Macau-Hong Kong; Great Western Development plan; etc.) and published interviews by state actors were collected, translated and analysed.

Many of these documents, mostly published in Chinese and which have not been discussed by scholars outside China, offered a concrete background knowledge of the historical contexts of the 'new areas' and the reasons why these areas were given national designations. Policy analysis was complemented by an analysis of statistical and qualitative information published in the media. Close to 800 articles published in various media in China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan were collated. These articles provided a significant source of information, including statistical information on updated capital flows into the 'new areas' as well as major firms that have moved into the areas. A substantial amount of this information was not reported in the statistical publications of the Chinese government, but nonetheless helped to highlight both the legacies and limitations of instituted uneven development.

Specifically, the database was constructed to illustrate and explain (i) the socioeconomic relations that constituted and are affected by the production of 'nationally strategic new areas'; and (ii) the impacts of interactions between the experimental policies and the inherited institutions in the two chosen research sites (i.e. Chongqing and the GFTZ). These two case studies helped to sidestep an important 'methodological trap', i.e. the attempt at a totalising reconstruction of the past. Through the identification of theoretically-significant empirical phenomena in the case studies (e.g. which institutions are resistant to change today, which policies the state strives to reform, etc.), new questions were generated. These questions, such as why the *hukou* institution remains so resistant to change despite the reforms to augment Chongqing's economic position through Liangjiang New Area, opened up new avenues to re-interpret events that have had specific and seemingly natural meanings attached to them. The remaining chapters will present and evaluate the implications of these new interpretations.

The Chapters Ahead

On Shifting Foundations comprises three parts that correspond with one another dynamically. The tensions between the 'chessboard' regulatory philosophy and its territorial expressions will be further examined in Part I (Chapter 2). The chapter specifically demonstrate how new rounds of socioeconomic reforms in post-1949 China, each with their distinct geographical expressions, constitute a complex palimpsest rather than a straightforward process of historical succession. Drawing

on a review of published empirical evidence, the chapter complicates two dichotomous portrayals of socioeconomic 'transition' in China, namely centralisation and egalitarianism (the Mao era) and decentralisation and uneven development (the post-Mao era). It demonstrates these binaries cannot adequately explain the post-Mao economic 'miracle' when decentralised governance and uneven development also characterised the Mao era. Indeed, decentralised governance and uneven development are not antithetical to the quest for perpetual CPC rule: just as the Mao administration strategically blended centralising mechanisms with instituted uneven development to consolidate its power, the post-Mao regimes are repurposing Mao-era regulatory techniques to achieve the same objective. The chapter concludes by highlighting the need for a more incisive analytical framework that could foreground the extent to which post-Mao reforms, most recently rolled out through the designation of 'nationally strategic new areas', truly lead to shifting foundations. This challenge will be addressed in the second part of the book (Chapter 3).

Bringing into conversation research on historical institutionalism, geographical political economy and policy experimentation in post-Mao China, Chapter 3 explores how the reconfiguration of regulatory relations in China – which, as previously mentioned in this chapter, is defined conceptually as state rescaling – is dialectically entwined with inherited developmental paths established at different scales. The development of this framework is both necessary and timely because there has been a largely uncritical adaptation of the state rescaling literature, which emerged from western European and North American contexts, to the theorisation of political economic evolution in post-Mao China. This literature presupposes a relatively coherent national regulatory scale that became increasingly fragmented following an emphasis on city-regional growth. While the trend of shifting developmental resources and regulatory capacities towards city-regions may appear similar between China and advanced western economies over the last three decades, the *persistence* of Mao-era institutions in contemporary regulation underscores the necessity to probe beneath appearances (i.e. whether state rescaling is occurring or not) in order to attain more accurate understandings of the logics of rescaling (i.e. why the predominant regulatory scale has shifted to the 'nationally strategic' reform frontiers). This approach proceeds from a different point of departure: neither national-level coherence nor the movement towards urban-based accumulation is assumed as an historical inevitability.

This framework will situate the empirical research presented in the third part of this book (Chapters 4–7). It comprises two case studies of 'nationally strategic' territories in the GPRD and Chongqing. These contemporary cases are presented in two segments that each comprises two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5 on the GPRD and Chapters 6 and 7 on Chongqing). The first chapter of each segment explores how key actors built on the geo-historical context to drive the national designation of specific territories; the second examines the implications of key policy experimentation in the areas.

As Chapter 4 will show, the designations of Hengqin and Qianhai New Areas were part of a broader industrial upgrading strategy officially known as 'double relocation' (*shuang zhuanyi* 双转移) or 'emptying the cage, changing the birds' (*tenglong, huanniao* 腾笼换鸟). Rolled out by the new Guangdong provincial government just as the 2008 global financial crisis was unfolding, this new agenda aimed to relocate unwanted industries and labour power from the PRD extended metropolitan area while injecting, simultaneously, higher-order industries. The chapter shows how this strategy was contested by some actors from the central government and discursively (counter-)justified by Guangdong officials. Its overarching objective is to show how the state rescaling process was an outcome of territorial politics between the Guangdong government, then led by Wang Yang, and senior policymakers in Beijing. Attempts by the Wang administration to introduce 'nationally strategic' sites of policy experimentation in the PRD, culminating in the 2012 designation of Nansha New Area, therefore appear as a *political necessity* to overcome the detrimental socioeconomic effects of the 'double relocation' program.

The specific reforms are documented and evaluated in Chapter 5. In Hengqin, Qianhai and Nansha New Areas, new border regulations were established to 'liberalise' flows of goods, money and people from adjacent Macau and Hong Kong (China's two Special Administrative Regions that function as open conduits to the global economy). However, a new border between Hengqin to the mainland was simultaneously constructed to prevent the 'liberalised' flow of goods and people to move smoothly into China 'proper'. Qianhai is similarly a re-bordered zone, within which approved financial institutions from Hong Kong could issue unlimited loans in Chinese yuan to Qianhai-based businesses (triggering the 'backflow' of Chinese currency from offshore centres). Nansha, the largest and most recent of the three designated territories, was developed with the intention to bring these new financial flows in connection with the 'concrete' economy. The chapter shows how the emergence of these new experimental spaces raise the question about the geographical limitations of economic liberalisation in China: Chinese policymakers want more of such 'free' spaces at the national level (hence the production of Hengqin, Qianhai and Nansha), but these spaces could only be free insofar as they are subject to new forms of geographical control.

Various developmental issues pertaining to urban–rural integration and the reduction of coastal-interior economic disparities are identified and presented in the case study of Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing (Chapters 6 and 7). To fully explain the territorial politics that led to the designation of Chongqing as a nationally-strategic reform site, a historical exploration of institutional evolution proved important. This exploration is presented in Chapter 6. The chapter discusses how the localised lack of market reforms in the Deng and Jiang eras – vis-à-vis the marketisation process along the coastal seaboard – impelled the Chongqing government to reconfigure and in turn enhance its intervention in the economy. In other words, strong state involvement in the pursuit of equitable urbanisation in Chongqing,

which the *Asia Times* (24 November 2009) portrayed as emblematic of the 'resuscitation of Maoist norms', ironically did not arise as a result of some cadres' insistence on following Mao-era regulatory logics. Rather, the retention of strong state economic intervention was made possible by developmental paths generated in the post-Mao era. Interestingly, this means path-changing attempts in the post-Mao era confined some subnational economies (like Chongqing) on the old 'big state' pathway of the Mao era. As such, while the strong state in present-day Chongqing is an extension of an interventionist legacy, it now also includes post-Mao reforms as a condition of possibility. And as the chapter will elaborate, it was this strong state-directed development that enabled the Chongqing government to actualise the designation of Liangjiang New Area as a 'nationally strategic' location in the CPC's economic restructuring agenda.

Chapter 7 proceeds to evaluate the impacts of socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing. The colossal tension caused by the large-scale attempt to build public rental housing for new peasant migrants in Chongqing illustrated how two major reforms implemented at the national scale have potentially encountered limits, namely (i) the persistence of the *hukou* institution, which designated peasants in the cities as socio-spatial 'aliens', and (ii) the apparent lack of employment opportunities in the rural hinterland, which 'pushed' peasants to seek employment in the cities. The fact that equitable urbanisation is used to justify the intensification of export-oriented industrialisation (led by the Liangjiang New Area) contradicts Deng's earlier strategy to privilege capital accumulation over social welfare provision. And it is this contradiction, this chapter suggests, that led to strong opposition to the Chongqing reforms – some interest groups could have become too embedded in the path established by the Deng administration that path-changing policies had to be repudiated.

Bringing the three parts of the book together, Chapter 8 lists and critically reflects on five interrelated conclusions. These conclusions are: (i) There is much greater spontaneity and spatial selectivity in the ways initiatives of national significance are proposed, evaluated and ultimately implemented in the post-Mao era. (ii) State rescaling and geographically-targeted policy experimentation have become necessary strategies for the Chinese central government to preserve domestic socioeconomic stability vis-à-vis the limits of marketisation and an increasingly volatile global context. (iii) The main difference between the policy experimentation in the PRD (Hengqin, Qianhai and Nansha New Areas) and Chongqing (Liangjiang New Area) is how they generate new regulatory paths in the name of the 'national interest'. (iv) The policy experimentation in the two contemporary field sites is in itself filled with uncertainties and inconsistencies, which underscores the difficulties of transforming institutional foundations at the national level. (v) Designed to fit the pre-existing socioeconomic conditions of Guangdong and Chongqing, the experimental reforms are inherently contradictory: it would be unfeasible to have these experiments extended 'as is' to other locations with different socioeconomic developmental pathways. The chapter then connects these conclusions to the three-way relationship of state rescaling

introduced in Chapter 3, namely the constitutive roles of place-specific developmental pathways; evolving national-level logics of socioeconomic regulation; and dynamic demands of transnational capital.

Read in relation to one another, the three parts of the book demonstrate how specific regulatory logics of the Mao-era have been repurposed while others were jettisoned to enable the transitional present. The institutional continuity after each round of experimental reforms since 1978 is construed as of theoretical significance: despite colossal changes engendered by new policy experimentation, the retention of inherited institutions offers a new entry point from which to investigate the relationship between the Chinese economic growth 'miracle' and Mao-era regulatory logics. The economic-geographical configurations along the eastern seaboard and the less developed interior may have changed with each round of regulatory restructuring, but, as it will be emphasised in the concluding reflections, this is engendered by interactions with the spatial logics of regulation instituted during the Mao era. To portray the post-Mao period as antithetical to the Mao era thereby precludes an exploration of inherited institutions as *capacities* that (seemingly still) produce a politically stable state apparatus. The important question, then, is what kinds of inherited capacities have been useful for retaining – if not reinforcing – CPC control during the post-Mao period. As the following chapters will show, contemporary policy experimentation in the 'nationally strategic new areas' strongly suggests it would be premature to pronounce the post-Mao political–economic 'liberalisation' as a mirror of Mao-era institutional errors or, for that matter, as a function of post-1978 reforms. Whether institutional changes became possible *despite* or *because of* Mao-era institutional foundations still needs to be established. This book takes a small step in this direction.

Endnotes

1 Full text transcribed by www.dwnews.com; author's translation.
2 Chen Yun first introduced the metaphor in April 1950. He provided its first elaborate definition in 1951: 'solutions should be reliable, this is called crossing the river by feeling for stones. Problems could emerge if we rush. We would prefer a slow and steady approach rather than be haphazard and make mistakes. This especially applies to the management of national economic problems' (Chen 1995: 152, author's translation).
3 A thorough official account of SEZ formation can be found in the memoirs of Li Lanqing (2010), the former vice Premier of China. Yeung et al. (2009) provides a detailed overview of the SEZs' evolution.
4 The designation was in part a political response to the rise of conservatism following the 1989 Tiananmen chaos. As Sang (1993) notes, Pudong New Area was allocated policies previously available only for the SEZs, which sends a strong statement on economic liberalisation given that the key centrally-governed cities (the others at the time were Beijing and Tianjin) were previously considered too important to become too open. For a detailed delineation of Pudong's emergence, see Marton and Wu (2006).

5 Chen Yun (2000: 69) made clearer his views in 1961, towards the end of the floundering Great Leap Forward program, that "On the one hand, experimentation has to be daring in thought, in talk and in doing; on the other hand, doing things specifically must be begin with actual facts, there has to be a distinction between experimentation and expansion. Expansion must involve things that have matured" (author's translation). Deng Xiaoping would mention the 'black cat, yellow cat' analogy in 1962, noting how it conveyed a Sichuanese notion of pragmatism: the colour of the cat does not matter so long as it can perform the function of catching mice.

6 The reference to 'socialism' in this book does not reflect or impose a normative conceptualisation. Following Whyte (2010), the book examines the CPC's self-proclaimed quest for socialism as an empirical fact rather than what 'socialism' means when it is measured against a particular template (e.g. Marx's version based on the experience of western capitalist economies or Lenin's version based on the largely agrarian Russian economy). While the CPC claims both Marx's and Lenin's versions to be relevant to its quest (at least ideologically), its official commitment to creating 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' is path-setting given the collapse of the socialist internationalist movement. What 'socialism' means for the CPC is thereby an empirical question, to be explored in tandem with marketisation reforms and the emergence of new planning capacities in the party-state apparatus.

7 This geographically nuanced approach is aligned with Aihwa Ong's (2004, 2006) works on graduated sovereignty and spaces of neoliberal exceptionalism in China; Douglas Zeng's (2010) edited collection on China's special economic zones and industrial clusters; and Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson's (2013) analysis of multiple internal boundaries within China.

8 The original expression from Henri Lefebvre (1991: 190), a major social theorist of spatiality, was 'to change life […] we must first change space'.

9 Despite an expanding industrial base between 1912 and 1949, as expertly demonstrated in Chang (1969[2010]), there was a wide array of economies that were not regulated by a unified state regime (Meisner 1999). Many of these economies were controlled by warlords, and this made it difficult for the KMT to centralise power (see Jackson 2011).

10 For an extensive analysis of the specifics of the Cultural Revolution, see Dikötter (2016). The rationale of the Cultural Revolution is set within a broader context of de-Stalinisation in Walder (2015).

11 The 'superstructure' in Marxian terms refers to social aspects such as culture, ideology and religion. The 'base' refers to the means and social relations of economic production. Economic production in this regard refers to the creation of things needed by society. Marxian logic states the economic 'base' generates the 'superstructure', a logic turned on its head in the latter half of Maoist rule. Distinguishing his approach from that of Stalin, Mao argued in the late 1960s that the Stalinist regime 'speak only of the production relations, not of the superstructure nor politics, nor the role of the people' (Mao 1977: 136). Through the Cultural Revolution (which officially lasted between 1966 and 1976), Mao went on to prioritise ideological purity over economic production. It was arguably because of this that the Soviets subsequently charged the CPC of moving from the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism towards a new path of Maoist voluntarism.

Chapter One
Introduction

Laid out during the middle of the nineteenth century, London's Trafalgar Square embodies and displays geopolitical power. At its centre is a massive stone column supporting a statue of Admiral Horatio Nelson, to many, Britain's foremost naval commander. Overlooking the Square from the north side is the National Gallery, an institution that contains one of the greatest collections of European art, while on other sides are located the High Commissions of former British imperial territories that are now independent states. A short walk away down Whitehall lie the main offices of government and state. In close proximity are many other leading cultural institutions, including the National Portrait Gallery, Tate Britain and Tate Modern, each of which has historically tended to focus on European and North American art. The British Museum, which holds one of the world's foremost collections of ancient artefacts, is located a short distance away.[1] At the same time, the Square has also always invited appropriation and subversion. Constructed to assert the grandeur and authority of the British state, military and empire at a time of wars and revolutions, and often hosting officially-endorsed events of national significance, the Square has periodically been taken over by protests and demonstrations, including, in the recent past, protests against British participation in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

At three corners of the Square are located plinths supporting statues of military and political leaders, but the fourth plinth, in the north west corner, was left vacant after a subscription campaign failed to raise sufficient funds to pay for a statue to go there. Since 1998, this 'Fourth Plinth' has hosted a series of installations by

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prominent contemporary artists, who are periodically selected by commission and whose proposed work is then installed there for a few months at a time (de Vasconcellos 2016). The Plinth has offered selected artists an opportunity to introduce something different into public space, something that might be more, less or other than a protest, and which might engage the public and enter into conversation with its surroundings (Sumartojo 2013).

In 2008, the British artist Jeremy Deller was among those invited to propose a work. Troubled by what he saw as the restricted ways in which the ongoing war in Iraq was being represented and debated, Deller proposed that an object such as a damaged car should be relocated from Iraq and exhibited on the Plinth with the title *The Spoils of War*, a harshly ironic reference to the imperial practice of displaying objects taken from conquered lands. The appearance of an actual object from Iraq, destroyed in a conflict in which British forces continued to be engaged, might, the artist hoped, disrupt public discourse about the war. While Deller constructed a photomontage to illustrate his idea (Figure 1.1) and a maquette for the work was displayed for a few weeks along with other proposals in a small anteroom to the National Gallery, his idea was not adopted having been judged unsuitable, or at least not the most suitable. Deller did subsequently succeed in



Figure 1.1 *The Spoils of War*, Jeremy Deller (2008). Image courtesy of the artist.

having a wrecked car from Iraq exhibited in the Imperial War Museum (IWM) in London, but only after British forces had officially withdrawn from the country.[2]

In late 2017, nearly ten years on and several commissions later, it was announced that a work in the series *The Invisible Enemy Should Not Exist* by Michael Rakowitz (an American artist of Iraqi Jewish heritage) had been selected to appear on the Plinth. The proposed object would be a reproduction of a *lamassu*, a protective deity in the hybrid form of a winged bull with a human head. The original had stood at the gates of the Assyrian city of Nineveh in northern Iraq, from around 700 BCE until it was destroyed by Islamic State (IS) militants after they took over the area in 2015 (Greater London Authority 2018).[3]

The *lamassu* (Figure 1.2) was unveiled in March 2018, and the work can readily be interpreted as an act of resistance and affirmation in the face of the

Figure 1.2 *The Invisible Enemy Should Not Exist*, Michael Rakowitz (2018). A Mayor of London Fourth Plinth Commission. Photo by author, courtesy of the artist.

brutal iconoclasm of IS. The sculpture also evoked the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by the United States and Britain, which created the conditions in which a movement like IS could emerge and thrive, and, more specifically, the fact that, while they had defeated the Iraqi military and occupied the country's cities in a matter of weeks, American and British forces had failed to protect Iraq's museums, galleries, archives and libraries, which were subject to extensive looting, vandalism and destruction (Bahrani 2003; see also Bogdanos 2005). The sculpture would serve as a reproduction of a lost object, while bearing a complex relation to the original and carrying wider symbolic and material resonances. As Rakowitz stated, 'I see this work as a ghost of the original, and as a placeholder for those human lives that cannot be reconstructed, that are still searching for sanctuary' (Elbaor 2017). In emphasising its ghostliness, Rakowitz evoked questions of spectrality, of what can be seen and what cannot, of appearance and liminality (Pilar Blanco and Peeren 2013, p.1). Like Deller's proposal for the wrecked car, the *lamassu* conjures up bodies both corporeal and geopolitical, staging a haunting return for people and objects that have been lost through war.

As with other objects in the *Invisible Enemy* series, the *lamassu* was fabricated out of materials used to package and sell groceries produced in Iraq and exported beyond the country, in this case date syrup cans. Through the use of everyday objects, the work would, in the words of the artist, further embody Iraq's 'former economic power, now destroyed by war' (Elbaor 2017), as well as the conditions of displacement, exile and diaspora experienced by millions of Iraqi people. The location of the work was also highly significant. While previous exhibitions of works in the series had taken place in museums and galleries, here the sculpture appeared not just in a major public space, but at a site of huge material and symbolic importance to Britain's military and colonial past, and to its ongoing political and cultural life. On the Fourth Plinth, the *lamassu* provided a dramatic contrast with the other statues in the Square, while seeming to form a strange alliance with several original *lamassu* taken from Iraq by nineteenth-century colonial archaeologists and which continue to be displayed in the British Museum.

The appearance of the *lamassu* was an event in its own right, but one implicated in many other events, which it might be said to have embodied and activated in a variety of ways. Its appearance was especially significant in a situation where, as with so much of the country's colonial history, many of Britain's political and cultural institutions have struggled, or simply failed to recognise or comprehend, the scope, nature and implications of the 2003 Iraq war. While several major public inquiries into aspects of the war have made sporadic reference to the harms suffered by Iraqi people, they have focused principally on Britain, being concerned primarily with British politicians, civil servants, spies, generals, soldiers and administrators; with what they did, what they did wrong, what they did not do, and what they might have done differently. Iraq and Iraqi people, for whom the war was in many ways a quite different kind of event, hardly appear. The *lamassu*,

by contrast, offers a different way into the event. As this book argues, artworks like the *lamassu* expand and complicate what is often taken to be the event of the 2003 Iraq war and point towards the multiple nature, or multiplicity, of geopolitical events more generally.

Official inquiries into the 2003 war have not been tasked with investigating the effects of British colonial influence on Iraq, or of recurring intervention in the country, but such exclusions reflect nonetheless a broader situation in which the appearance and participation of 'other' people and places in British public life are heavily conditioned and circumscribed. Jacques Rancière (2006) conceptualises this process of determining what and whom can appear and be recognised in the public sphere as *le partage du sensible*: the distribution, sharing or division of that which is sensible, or available to sense perception (see also Dikeç 2005; 2013; Dixon 2009; Dixon 2015). Rancière (2006) further argues that the issue of who and what can appear and be seen, and of who can speak and be heard in public, is prior to most definitions of politics. The 'distribution of the sensible', he argues, represents a 'primary aesthetics' that conditions the political realm and the ways in which events can appear as matters for public experience, deliberation and debate (Rancière 2006, pp.12–13). This idea can be linked with the argument advanced by Edward Said (1978) that Europeans have, over an extended period, represented the people and places of the Middle East in ways that systematically diminish their agency, diversity and voice, and ultimately their humanity, a phenomenon he called Orientalism. To the extent that people and places subject to Orientalism appear in Western public life, they do so in a limited and prejudicial manner. As Gregory (2004a, p.253) writes, building on Said, 'colonial modernity is intrinsically *territorializing*, forever installing partitions between "them" and "us"'. One consequence of this is to inhibit the extent to which events might be encountered and apprehended as taking place within a common world.

The *lammasu* brought what were described in its caption as 'the Iraq wars' into public space in Britain in a new and arresting manner, complicating existing distributions and configurations, and appearing to pose the possibility of a common world linking the two countries. This would, however, be a curiously limited intervention, which people would be free to ignore, and its ghostly presence would only appear for a fixed period of time, while the three other plinths and Nelson himself would remain in place long after it had departed. However, as this book explores, we can also approach the Iraq wars, and the 2003 war in particular, via dozens upon dozens of other artworks and exhibitions that have taken place in Britain. The book is based on a study of many of these works and exhibitions, which, it argues, both express and reassemble Britain's Iraq war, resisting, challenging and moving beyond the kinds of accounts offered by broadcast media, politicians, journalists, soldiers, lawyers and campaigners and by official inquiries. As the book shows, the 2003 Iraq war has given rise to numerous examples of critical, creative and imaginative works that in many cases can be said to oppose the war, but which all concentrate

attention on how the event of war is conducted and experienced aesthetically: on how it is embodied, how it is sensed and made sense of, on how it resists sense-making and fails to make sense, and on how war both constitutes, and is brought into, the public sphere. Because such processes are intrinsic to how people experience the world and conduct politics in it, the book argues, an exploration of works like the wrecked car and the *lamassu* offers distinct insights into what we understand geopolitical events to be.

The 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by the United States, Britain and their allies led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, the displacement of millions, the collapse of public order and the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism and extremism. Urban infrastructures and public services were devastated and much of Iraq's cultural heritage was destroyed, damaged or stolen. The 'Iraq war', as it is commonly called, is widely regarded as one of the greatest foreign policy disasters of modern times and a major violation of international law. Its consequences continue to reverberate throughout the country, the region and beyond.[4]

While the political, legal, diplomatic and military dimensions of the war have been the subject of numerous academic, journalistic and judicial inquiries, this book offers a new perspective by exploring how this event has been encountered, appropriated and reworked in art.[5] The invasion and occupation caused severe damage to the cultural heritage and cultural life of Iraq, but they also prompted the creation of many artworks within Iraq and beyond, which form alternative expressions and accounts of the event out of which they have emerged. Focusing critically on Britain as a central actor in the war and the former colonial power in Iraq, the book looks at the diverse ways in which artists experienced this event, the works they created, and the ways in which these works have been curated, exhibited or otherwise brought into the public sphere in Britain, thereby taking part in broader struggles and debates while often retaining a strange distance from them.[6] This provides a complement to other accounts of the war, showing how it was played out in the cultural as well as political sphere, but the broader argument of the book is that artistic enactments of the war not only challenge a straightforward understanding of it as 'an' event, but push us to rethink the nature of geopolitical events more generally, as multiple as well as singular things.

The book argues that a consideration of art has much to contribute to the genealogical analysis of geopolitics, that is, to a form of analysis that seeks to question the apparent self-evidence of events and to consider the possibility of understanding and enacting them in different ways. Borrowing an idea from Gilles Deleuze (2015) and building on the work of Jill Bennett (2012), the book interprets artworks in terms of the 'counter-actualisation' of the event, a process in which artworks can be understood as appropriating events and enacting them otherwise. In so doing, they allow people to enter into and go through the event in ways that differ from other ways of encountering it, thereby offering a

counterpoint to ordinary experience. As the book argues, approaching the Iraq war in terms of its counter-actualisation in art reveals a field of creative resistance to the event, but also enhances our ability to understand it – and by extension other geopolitical events – as being both composed of, and situated in relation to, many other events, as well as being experienced and enacted in often radically different ways by different people, and, while not absolving people of their specific responsibility for the event, as taking place beyond the grasp of any one individual or group.

In pursuing a genealogical analysis, the book builds on other studies of the Iraq war and of contemporary geopolitics, but seeks to go beyond them in a number of ways. One key reference point is Derek Gregory's *The Colonial Present*, a book that was completed in the early months of the occupation and which analysed the resurgence of colonial imaginaries in the context of the war on terror. As that book concludes,

> for us to cease turning on the treadmill of the colonial present … it will be necessary to explore other spatializations and other topologies, and to turn our imaginative geographies into geographical imaginations that can enlarge and enhance our sense of the world and enable us to situate ourselves within it with care, concern and humility. (Gregory 2004a, p.262)

Over the course of the last decade or so, academics working in political geography, international relations (IR) and related fields have indeed paid growing attention to the alternative spatialisations, topologies and imaginaries enacted by artworks engaging with war, militarism and security (e.g. Bleiker 2009; Graham 2010; Danchev 2011; Shapiro 2012; Amoore 2013). Their work can be related to a broader interdisciplinary movement in which art is seen as being not just reflective of historical, political and geographical developments, or as subordinate to, or illustrative of, conceptual inquiry, but as a productive field of experimentation and critique in its own right (e.g. van Alphen 2005; Jill Bennett 2005, 2012; Thompson and Independent Curators International 2009; Dear *et al.* 2011). Where critical discussion has touched upon art related to the 2003 Iraq war, however, this has often been fleeting (e.g. Sylvester 2009; Berlant 2011), and has, beyond isolated examples (e.g. Gregory 2010a; Platt 2011), largely failed to engage with the work of artists, curators and academics of Iraqi heritage within and beyond Iraq, many of whom have come to be based in Britain, have worked here, or whose work bears on Britain's role in relation to Iraq. A fuller consideration of their work underscores the multiplicity of the 2003 Iraq war and poses the question of how we might, via an appreciation of this multiplicity, still understand it as being 'an' event.

A deeper issue with existing literature in political geography and international relations is that it has, with few exceptions (e.g. Bleiker 2009; Sylvester 2009; Danchev 2011), tended not to think very genealogically about art, at least in the

sense that I develop here. At one level, there has sometimes been limited art historical contextualisation of particular artworks or art forms, and limited recognition of their ontological complexity. As a result, artworks have sometimes been thought of as resisting geopolitical power (or criticised for failing to resist it) in an overly straightforward way. Still more fundamentally, there has been insufficient recognition of the extent to which the field of art has itself been implicated and invested in the forms of geopolitical power that artworks may be held to critique, resist and move beyond. As the book argues, it is necessary to recognise more fully that the idea of art as a singular, quasi-autonomous form of practice and experience that is typically at work in critical accounts – and which nationalist and anti-colonial movements have often tried to mobilise in the service of self-determination – emerged in the context of the modern Western European nation state and the forms of capitalism, patriarchy and colonialism associated with it, and that, while it may offer critical potential, this form of art has also long been used to assert, define and justify the superior status of some kinds of people over others (Stoler 2008). Any appeal to the critical potential of art must therefore be alive to its ongoing as well as historical entanglement with geopolitical power.

The book is centrally concerned with what artworks are and what they do, with how they get made and with how they come to acquire public existence, reflecting, participating in and contributing to broader struggles and debates, while not being reducible to them. In order to think about how art can be said to counter-actualise geopolitical events, the book conceptualises art works as evental assemblages, or heterogeneous constellations of things that emerge in relation to events, which are themselves events, and which may engender and participate in further events. If artworks are able to counter-actualise events, it is because they are themselves particular kinds of events.

The approach and arguments of the book can further be located in relation to three broad streams of thought in which ideas of art, aesthetics and geopolitics are being reworked. These streams of thought inform the book as a whole and serve as important reference points in the chapters that follow.

The first line of thinking emerges from what has come to be known as the decolonial project, a set of epistemic and political interventions that challenge what Mignolo (2009, p.162) calls the 'colonial matrix of power'. Seeking to go beyond perceived limits in postcolonial critique and practice, the decolonial project aims to enable the production of knowledge against and beyond this matrix, and to engage in the direct decolonisation of institutions and relationships (see for example Esson *et al.* 2017). This project has fundamental implications for ideas of geopolitics on the one hand, and art, aesthetics and the humanities on the other, the dominant meaning of each having emerged out of modern European nation-, state- and empire-building. It also has implications for how we think about events.

Approaching the Iraq war in terms of its coloniality requires an acknowledgement not just of how Britain, as a colonial power, 'made' Iraq, but of how 'Britain'

has in some ways itself been constituted through its colonisation of Iraq, and of how this process has been aesthetic as well as political. This process becomes apparent if one is able to visit the British Museum, an institution founded in the nineteenth century upon the use of artefacts taken from other countries and displayed in order to foster not just understanding of the world, but a sense of British scientific, aesthetic and racial primacy.[7] The Museum's Mesopotamian Galleries display many beautiful and impressive objects taken from the region, including the *lamassu* mentioned earlier, which were relegated by nineteenth-century museum managers from the category of 'art' to that of 'artefact' (Bohrer 1998; Bahrani 2001; Sylvester 2009). While this distinction has often been challenged in recent museological, curatorial and artistic practices, the deeply sedimented material, institutional, discursive and aesthetic traces of colonialism and contemporary manifestations of coloniality continue to shape how 'Iraq' can appear in Britain. Approaching *Britain's* Iraq war through art takes us beyond invocations of coloniality as condition, towards a critique of a specific geopolitical culture (Toal 2008) and the associated institutions, discourses, sites and practices through which Iraq has been constituted as a concern and problem for Britain.

Such considerations indicate a degree of alignment between genealogical analyses of geopolitics, which question singular accounts of nation, state and empire, and the decolonial project, but this book cannot be said to engage directly in decolonial work. As Vazquez and Mignolo (2013, unpaginated) state, 'The decolonial option operates from the margins and beyond the margins of the modern/colonial'. This is not where I am coming from. As a white, English-speaking, British academic who has grown up, lived and worked in Britain, has never visited Iraq, does not speak Arabic and has not experienced war directly, I am not working from the margins or from beyond them, but from a geopolitical culture that is centrally implicated in the event. In this book, however, I do not aim or claim to represent Iraq or Iraqi experience directly, or in an ethnographic or sociological way. Rather, in much of what follows, I have taken cues from the extensive body of work through which artists, curators, academics and writers of Iraqi heritage have already framed and presented their experiences, thought and creative practice, in English.[8] I do not claim that the book enacts a decolonial intervention, but examine coloniality and a specific geopolitical culture in terms of how they have been questioned, resisted and reworked through art, and consider what the limits to this process might be.

The book is also written in light of feminist scholarship on geopolitics, war and peace, which has been of fundamental importance in opening up ways of thinking about power and aesthetics beyond the state. Drawing in part on feminist approaches to international relations, early feminist scholarship on geopolitics examined the gendered nature of geopolitical discourse and highlighted the body as a site through which geopolitical power was exercised, and in relation to which it could be critiqued (Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2004). Feminist approaches to geopolitics have developed and diversified in a number of ways, including recognising the

intersectional nature of patriarchal and colonial power (Dixon and Marston 2013; Massaro and Williams 2013). Particularly relevant to the approach and arguments of this book is a continued questioning not just of the epistemology and practice of geopolitics but of its ontology, in particular its framing of state and territory as central categories of concern, seeing these rather as being 'enrolled' in particular kinds of practices and materialities not conventionally thought to be geopolitical (Dixon 2015; also Dixon *et al.* 2012; Yusoff 2015). In attending to the transnational dimensions of geopolitical events, the book also chimes with moves in feminist IR arguing for a reorientation in the study of war away from the state, and towards 'a set of experiences that everyday people [as well as] elites have emotionally, physically, and socio-ethically, depending on their locations inside and even far beyond war zones' (Sylvester 2013, p.65, emphasis added; also, for example, Hörschelmann 2008; Hörschelmann and Refaie 2014). In focusing on art, the book's concerns also chime with feminist work (e.g. Dowler and Sharp 2001; Koopman 2011) exploring how geopolitics might be enacted differently. To develop its arguments the book also draws on feminist critiques of aesthetics (e.g. Armstrong 2000) and feminist theorisations of art (e.g. Pollock 2013a, 2013b). To the extent that feminist work and feminist geopolitics in particular are premised upon certain kinds of embodiment and experience, however, the book, again, does not claim to enact a feminist intervention but rather works in alignment and conversation with certain strands of feminist argument and analysis.

The third stream of critical thought informing the book concerns the idea of the anthropocene as a new geological epoch in which humans, or at least certain groups of humans, have come to act as a fundamental influence on earth system processes, necessitating a fundamental rethinking of the meaning of geopolitics, of the human and also of the event (e.g. Dalby 2007; Clark 2014; Dixon 2015; Yusoff 2016; Bonneuil and Fressoz 2017; Davis and Todd 2017). In light of these developments, and, prompted especially by the many artworks emerging from the war that deal with matters of oil, I approach the 2003 Iraq war as an *anthropocenic* war in the following ways. As has been widely discussed and debated, the war can be regarded as a war 'for' oil, coming at a peak in concerns about 'peak oil' and American hegemony after the end of the Cold War (Harvey 2003; Gregory 2004a). As a geopolitical enterprise, the invasion and occupation – as well as the 'war on terror' more widely – themselves consumed vast quantities of petroleum and petroleum-based resources (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2017): this has been a war *of* oil as well as a war *for* oil. Furthermore, in invading and occupying Iraq, US and British forces went into a country that not only forms one of the heartlands of the modern oil industry but a region where oil has been at the centre of social, cultural and political practices for centuries, if not millennia. Finally, since 2003 the role of oil companies in supporting arts institutions in Britain has increasingly been politicised, with the Tate ending its relationship with one of its major donors as a result, and the British Museum and other institutions coming under increasing pressure to do the same (Miller 2015; Ingram 2017). While many artworks emerging from the war have involved oil

and the forms of geopolitics associated with it, the institutions within and around which they have often emerged should also be understood as being implicated in the production of the anthropocene as contemporary condition and problem.

The book advances three main arguments. It argues, first, for approaching Britain's Iraq war through art as a way of rethinking one of the most contentious and consequential geopolitical events of recent decades, and for doing so via a sustained consideration of diverse artworks and exhibitions, over an extended period of time. This provides new, critical perspective on an event that continues to affect political life in Britain as well as Iraq, and with which British public and political culture struggles to reckon. This implies a second, broader argument, that an engagement with art is instructive for the analysis of geopolitical events, but the book argues more specifically that a rethinking of how exactly art and geopolitics might be said to enact each other is required. The book develops this argument by thinking about art as a *dispositif* (Foucault 2000; Rancière 2009a) and by conceptualising artworks as evental assemblages, or as particular kinds of events that are bound up with geopolitics in complex, evental, ways via the process of counter-actualisation. The third, broadest, argument of the book is for developing the event as a central category for critical work on geopolitics, in that this can extend our thinking on some of the fundamental questions of ontology and epistemology with which the field is concerned.

The following chapters develop and exemplify these arguments, themes and concerns in different ways. Prompted by my own experience of, and research on, artworks, exhibitions and other events through which the war has been engaged and addressed in Britain and beyond, they trace diverse trajectories and pathways through the event and seek to question, enrich and expand the ways in which it might be understood and encountered, while still being somehow comprehensible as 'an' event.

Chapter Two works through the problem of the event in light of longstanding interest in this concept across the social sciences and humanities and recent discussions in political geography. Considering the often troubling, paradoxical and confounding nature of events, and echoing other recent interventions (e.g. Clark 2014; Bonneuil and Fressoz 2017), it conceptualises a geopolitical event as a disruptive transformation of the world and of the ability to sense and make sense of it. Engaging with the influential accounts of the event offered by a select group of French philosophers since the Second World War, the chapter also makes connections with feminist, postcolonial and decolonial thought and with critical work on the anthropocene in order to develop, through a series of propositions, a sense of geopolitical events as multiple as well as singular things, and a consideration of how, in the face of their violence and their confounding nature, geopolitical events might be approached and appropriated in a critical manner. The discussion begins to formulate the idea of Britain's Iraq war as a complex, multiple event and points towards the ways in which artworks might be said to counter-actualise events.

Chapter Three critiques existing literature on art and geopolitics and develops the idea of artworks as evental assemblages, or heterogeneous constellations of elements that emerge from events, which themselves constitute events and which are capable of eliciting and engendering further events. In order to think more about how it is that artworks are able to do this, the chapter develops Rancière's (2009a) idea of art as a *dispositif*. It works through debates on affect, posthumanism and sense-making, and turns to Raymond Williams' (1997) idea of structures of feeling as simultaneously affective, semantic, and embedded in practices. It then works Rancière's account of the *dispositif* of art through decolonial, Marxist and feminist critiques of aesthetics before reconsidering the Deleuzian idea of counter-actualisation, building on the work of Jill Bennett (2005, 2012) to argue for tracking the counter-actualisation of an ostensible event across multiple artworks, communities of sense and structures of feeling.

Chapter Four begins to map artistic enactments of the war in Britain, tracing the diverse pathways whereby artworks and exhibitions emerged in relation to the shifting politics of the war and exploring the important roles played by the British Museum, Institute of Contemporary Arts, Imperial War Museum and National Army Museum in mediating this process. The chapter develops the idea of museums as geopolitical institutions and explores how the distinction between art and artefact that is enacted by museums, a distinction in which objects extracted from Iraq have played a central role, comes to constitute a geopolitical division of the world. Building on postcolonial and decolonial critiques, it shows how artistic and curatorial enactments of the war have been both enabled and framed by museum institutions, demonstrating how the ability of artworks to counter-actualise geopolitical events is contingent upon a *dispositif* of art that is itself implicated in the ongoing breaking and making of the world.

While artworks and exhibitions created by artists and curators of Iraqi heritage within and beyond Iraq are discussed throughout the book, Chapter Five focuses on several artists of Iraqi heritage and artworks created by them relating directly to the war. While approaching artworks in terms of their political contexts and framings risks becoming reductive, the chapter notes how questions of national identity, autonomy, freedom and political conflict have, along with the aesthetics of ancient civilisations, formed an important and enduring reference point for many Iraqi artists since the emergence of modern Iraqi art in the middle of the twentieth century, and how these questions have acquired further layers with the development of diverse Iraqi diaspora communities. After considering the relationship of Iraqi art to modernism, the chapter focuses on the work of artists embodying distinct personal, aesthetic and political trajectories and concerns. The chapter both reconnects with themes raised by Rakowitz's *lamassu* and demonstrates the diverse ways in which the event of war has been encountered, appropriated and enacted, further illustrating how an engagement with art contributes to a sense of geopolitical events as multiple as well as singular things and how events may be counter-actualised in artworks.[9]

Chapter Six considers how the materialities and politics of oil have been appropriated and mobilised in artworks responding to the war in relation to questions of the anthropocene, coloniality and embodiment. After a brief survey of oil-related artworks, the chapter centres on a discussion of three sculptural installations that use oil or oil-related materials to configure an exhibition space as a whole: *Souvenir from the Ministry of Justice* by Rashad Selim, *20:50* by Richard Wilson and *Black Smoke Rising* by Tim Shaw. While *20:50*, a work first created in London, gained new geopolitical resonances as a result of its installation in a former regime prison in Iraqi Kurdistan, *Souvenir…* and *Black Smoke Rising* address oil-related geopolitical violence within the works themselves. The chapter argues that the use of oil in these works not only resonates with the idea of the 2003 war as a war for and of oil, but suggests an idea of art as an event that, like geopolitical violence and ultimately the anthropocene itself, places the human body and its relation to the world profoundly in question.

Chapter Seven considers how the 2003 war has been engaged through a specific art form, photomontage, and provides an account of how one photomontage in particular, kennardphillipps' *Photo Op*, has come to function as a definitive artwork of Britain's Iraq war. The chapter first rethinks photomontage via a critique of the reception of the photomontage work of the American artist Martha Rosler in writing on geopolitics, drawing out the multiple ways in which photomontage is entangled with events. It then explores the work of kennardphillipps and *Photo Op* in particular in relation to this revised account, exploring the complex implication of photomontages in the ongoing events of which they are counter-actualisations.

Chapter Eight draws on feminist and feminist-materialist thinking and reconnects with themes of embodiment, coloniality and the anthropocene to consider further how the figure of the body has appeared in artistic responses to the war and how those responses push our understandings of what a geopolitical body might be. The chapter considers how a series of artworks and exhibitions have registered and addressed the violence of the Iraq war, and explores the complicated ethical and political questions they suggest, through and beyond human embodiment. The later parts of the chapter consider how artworks created by people of Iraqi heritage have started to explore ways of living with, through and potentially beyond disaster via a variety of human and more-than-human bodies, and, reaching beyond Britain, the ways in which the Iraq National Pavilion at the Venice Biennale has come to form an important but also contested site at which the event of the war continues to be appropriated and explored. In considering debates surrounding the Pavilion, the chapter returns to consider how the capacity of artworks to operate as evental assemblages remains contingent upon a *dispositif* of art that continues to be implicated in geopolitical power.

The concluding chapter revisits the arguments of the book and considers some of the implications of the analysis. The book ends by revisiting the *lamassu* in Trafalgar Square.

Notes

1 Whitehead *et al.* (2014) open their introduction to political geography with a vignette that also considers Trafalgar Square as a site of geopolitical power.
2 Deller has explained his thinking on the car project on many occasions, including at discussion events at the National Gallery in early 2008, at IWM London in September 2010, and at the Hayward Gallery in October 2012. The displaying of the car at IWM London is discussed in Chapter 4.
3 In 2016, a scaled-down, 3D printed replica of an ancient arch destroyed by ISIS in Syria the previous year was installed in the Square, triggering critiques and debates about the politics of such acts (Burch 2017).
4 The Costs of War project based at Brown University in the United States has since 2011 aimed to assess 'the costs of the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the related violence in Pakistan and Syria' (Costs of War 2018). In March 2013 it assessed recorded violent civilian deaths in Iraq since 2003 at 134,000, but noted that the actual figure could be double this (Crawford 2013). In April 2018, following the rise and apparent fall of the Islamic State (IS) movement, the Iraq Body Count project had assessed documented violent civilian deaths in Iraq since 2003 to be between 181,113 and 203,136; when combatants were included the estimate came to 288,000 (Iraq Body Count 2018). The number of people seriously injured is typically estimated as being a similar number to those killed; writing for the Costs of War, Crawford (2013, p.1) also notes that, 'many times the number killed by direct violence have likely died due to the effects of the destruction of Iraq's infrastructure'. I discuss the politics of body counts further in Chapter 4.
5 A brief list would include, among academic works: Harvey (2003); Gregory (2004a); Boal *et al.* (2005); Herring and Rangwala (2006); Fawn and Hinnebusch (2006); Al-Ali and Pratt (2009); Rappert (2012); Dodge (2012); Bailey *et al.* (2014); journalistic analysis: Keegan (2005); Chandrasekaran (2007); Cockburn (2006); Ricks (2006); Steele (2009); Fairweather (2011); memoirs and personal accounts: Pax (2003); Riverbend (2006); Stewart (2006); Allawi (2007); activist/policy analysis: Ledwidge (2011); Muttit (2011). The report of the Iraq Inquiry, the third major inquiry connected with the war commissioned by the British government, was published on 6 July 2016. See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123122743/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/ (accessed 3 April 2018).
6 The book does not aim or claim to represent the effect of the war on people or cultural life in Iraq directly, but it does consider how artists and others working and living in Britain and beyond have addressed these issues via their own experiences and practices.
7 As I explore in Chapter 4, the emergence of extractive colonial interests in Iraq's petroleum reserves in the twentieth century was foreshadowed by the development of extractive archaeological and museological practices in the nineteenth.
8 In conducting interviews for the project I aimed to be open about my positionality and modest about my experience, inviting participants whose work was already in the public domain to help me understand their experience and work. Participants expressed informed consent and have had the opportunity to review how they have been quoted and how their work has been discussed, in some cases suggesting amendments. I do

not claim that this can or does circumvent issues of positionality and power in research, however. The territorial nation state, the art world and the invitation to participate in academic research each induce, invite and sometimes compel people to present themselves and their work in certain ways. While seeking to mitigate this and to work with respect, fairness and accuracy, academic analysis and writing necessarily involves the exercise of certain kinds of analytical sovereignty and privilege, for which I take responsibility.

9 The term 'ancient' is loaded; in this context it by no means implies primitive; as Zainab Bahrani's (2001, 2008, 2014) work has demonstrated, these civilisations developed sophisticated aesthetic forms.

Introduction

Trevor J. Barnes and Eric Sheppard

'Something Better Change,' The Stranglers (1977)[1]

Both of us have lived our entire academic lives under the aegis of radical geography. In 1971, Sheppard, a geography undergraduate at Bristol University, remembers the newly hired junior lecturer, Keith Bassett, having freshly returned from completing an M.A. degree at Penn State University, carrying into the classroom to show students a stack of *Antipodes* he recently brought back from America. Renowned for sardonic humor, even Bassett cracked a hopeful smile, unabashedly enthusiastic, when he showed and talked about *Antipode* and the new movement of radical geography in America and its possibilities.

Certainly, Barnes was enthusiastic when in 1976 as a second-year undergraduate in geography and economics at University College, London (UCL), he held in his hands for the first time a copy of *Antipode*. It felt as if he was doing something illegal, perusing a smuggled underground publication, probably best done under the bed covers, read with a flashlight.[2] The librarians in the Geography Reading Room at UCL treated it as seditious at least. It was kept behind the counter in a sturdy wooden cabinet under lock and key. The journal could be signed out but for just two hours and read at only designated tables under the scrutinizing gaze of the library beadle. Although such constraints permitted only relatively short snatches of reading, *Antipode* captured brilliantly the riven England in which Barnes lived, of strikes, protest marches, and Orwellian grimness. It connected even to punk rock, born during that same mid-to-late 1970s

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dyspeptic period, and the background music of Barnes' undergraduate and, on occasion, academic life (Barnes 2019). *Antipode* looked like a punk publication, a fanzine of radical geography. The early issues were home-made, DIY publishing, its typographical-error-strewn contents bound between one punk discordant garish cover or another: electric yellow, vibrant scarlet, pulsating green, shimmering gold. Bernard Sumner, a member of the band *Joy Division*, after first hearing punk rock said, it was "terrible. I thought [it was] … great. I wanted to get up and be terrible too" (quoted in Marcus 1989: 7). Reading *Antipode* for that first time made Barnes also want to get up and be terrible, but to be great too: to be a radical geographer.

Our edited volume is a history, or rather a set of histories of radical geography. It includes the beginning of *Antipode* and its lurid covers (Huber *et al*., this volume), but also much, much more. Geographically, the central focus of the book is the United States (US) and Canada. The first nine (long) chapters of the collection – Part I, Histories of Radical Geography in North America – are concerned with the emergence and practices of radical geography at a set of specific U.S. and Canadian sites (six chapters are mostly about the U.S., three mostly about Canada). The last five shorter chapters – Part II, International Perspectives – offer a set of histories, experiences and reflections about radical geography undertaken outside the U.S. and Canada: France, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and the U.K. Radical geography in the U.S. and Canada had some influence in all those places, but it was not the same in each, and exactly how it influenced was a consequence of specific prior conditions – political, social, cultural, institutional, intellectual – found in each place, as well as often the presence of catalytic individuals. There certainly was no simple process of spatial diffusion. Even if it is granted that the most recent form of radical geography developed first in the U.S. and Canada,[3] it did not steamroll across the world, crushing native intellectual traditions, turning every place into Clark or Johns Hopkins Universities. Rather, its course was contingent and variable, geographically and historically. Radical geography requires sensitive historical and geographical narration, a central purpose of this volume.

Historically, the volume covers the period from the origin of radical geography in the U.S. and Canada sometime during the mid-1950s through to its intellectual consolidation in the early 1980s. We begin in the mid-1950s with the first stirrings of radical activism by U.S. geographers, although hinged not around class but race. Audrey Kobayashi (this volume) recounts the involvement of the geographer Thelma Glass, based at the University of Alabama, in the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955–1956 (best associated with Rosa Parks). Race continues as a key theme during the early-to-mid-1960s albeit within the unlikely formal

structure of the Association of American Geographers, involving both geographers of color like Don Deskins and Harold Rose, and white geographers like Jim Blaut, Ron Horvath, and Richard Morrill (Kobayashi; and Peake, both this volume). Also in the early 1960s, issues of race and activism were central to William Bunge's work in Detroit that began in the academy, at Wayne State University, but shifted to his own black inner-city neighborhood of Fitzgerald and to community activists like Gwendolyn Warren (Warren *et al*., this volume). In 1969, *Antipode* was founded at Clark University (Huber *et al*., this volume). Initially eclectic in its topics and approaches, by the mid-1970s it became increasingly aligned with a Marxism focused on capital and class, and best associated with David Harvey at Johns Hopkins University (Sheppard and Barnes, this volume). That said, even during this period there were other radical geographical organizations and publications, such as the Socially and Ecologically Responsible Geographers (SERGE) (founded in 1971) and its journal *Transition*, as well as the Union of Socialist Geographers (USG) (established 1974) and its *Newsletter* that typically published on a broader range of topics and approaches than *Antipode* (Peake, this volume). It was also then that radical geography expanded and consolidated in centers outside Clark and Johns Hopkins: Simon Fraser University in Vancouver (Blomley and McCann, this volume), the U.S. Midwest (Lauria *et al*., this volume), Quebec (Klein, this volume), and the University of California, Berkeley (Peck and Barnes, this volume). By the early 1980s with the publication of David Harvey's 1982 Marxist theoretical compendium, *The Limits to Capital*, radical geography had unquestionably arrived.

It wasn't as if radical geography was then set in stone, however, 1982 was just the end of the beginning. For the form that radical geography took from the early 1970s to the early 1980s especially in *Antipode*, and associated with classical Marxism, began to braid and diverge. Elements of the older Marxist geography were taken apart, critiqued, some thrown out, others joined with new elements, and put together again in novel combinations. This new version, increasingly known as critical geography, more and more became how human geography in the round was done (Castree 2000). The subsequent capaciousness and variegation of critical geography makes telling its story more difficult compared to the earlier radical geography, however. Presenting its history will likely require many volumes, many editors, and many contributors. We very much hope it will be undertaken, but it is not our project. While individual chapters in this book trace how earlier events helped shape critical geography, and our Conclusion will explicitly recount the relation between radical and critical geography, this volume is limited to the early development

of radical geography. While we realize this period is only part of a larger story, it is no less necessary to recount, and has some urgency.

There already exist some excellent individual essays about the early history of radical geography. These tend, though, either to give the complete North American story based on secondary literature (often found in textbooks like Cloke *et al*. 1991, ch. 2, or Johnston and Sidaway 2016, ch. 6), or to focus on just one element or episode or individual within it (for example, on William Bunge's contribution found in Merrifield 1995, or Heyman 2007). In contrast, our volume intends to provide not only the larger North American story of radical geography, but also to follow its relationship with selected places outside that core (the purpose of Part II). Further, rather than resting on secondary literature, many of the chapters draw on primary material. In this sense, the book aims to provide both the broader view and specificity, a larger story arc infused by history but also geography.

The use of primary source material in this volume is especially important. While the authors in our volume sometimes draw on traditional material archival sources (for example, in Huber *et al*. and Norcup, both this volume) a lot of information is gleaned from oral histories conducted with leading protagonists (for example, in Kobayashi, and Peck and Barnes, this volume). In part, the reliance on oral history is necessitated by a lack of formal archival sources. Materials relating to histories of radical geography have never been systematically collected, but remain scattered, found in people's garages, or forgotten filing cabinets in university departmental basements. Of course, oral histories have their problems. Memories are fallible – Hemingway said memory is never true – they are only one person's view, they can't capture large-scale historical, political, social and geographical events, and they are unsuitable for relating abstractions, conceptual schema, and dialectical niceties. They must be triangulated with other kinds of information, as our authors do. But given the dearth of other sources, oral histories remain one of the most important bases for telling histories of radical geography. Further, with aging and death – the earliest radical geographers are now in their eighties with Bunge, Deskins, and Rose having all recently passed, and Blaut and the relatively young Neil Smith (at 58) having died some time ago – the ability to gather this type of information is itself diminishing.

There is one other distinctive feature driving the organization of this collection. While we are concerned to provide histories of early radical geography, we want just as much to provide geographies of it too. John Agnew and David Livingstone (2011: 16) contend we must "think geographically about geography, and thereby 'geographizing' geography itself." This book is an attempt to do just that. Strangely, this has often

been a missing element in histories of the discipline told by geographers. The geographical setting becomes at best only color and background atmospherics for the history. The essays in this volume make a stronger claim, however: Geography goes all the way down. That imperative explains why we organized the book geographically, by place and nation. Running throughout the collection of essays are three fundamental organizing geographical ideas, making this book not just a history but also a geography of radical geographical knowledge.

- The first is place, by which is meant the internal conditions at a site that enter into and shape the production in this case of radical geographical knowledge. Place might affect knowledge through: a specific geographical relation among participants, for example, between homeplace and workplace, or, as Peck and Barnes (this volume) explore in their chapter on Berkeley, the collapse of the two; or as a particular site of investigation that then structures the development of a conceptual framework, for example, the relation between Baltimore and David Harvey's theoretical agenda (Sheppard and Barnes, this volume); or as a specific mix of pressing social issues found in a given urban neighborhood, along with the presence of galvanizing, energetic individuals eager to take them on, the case in Detroit's inner-city Fitzgerald neighborhood during the late 1960s (Warren, Katz, and Heynen, this volume).
- The second is geographical connectivity. Knowledge does not remain fixed in place but circulates, moving from one site to another. Further, the very process of circulation reshapes the ideas that circulate. This is partly because they interact with other ideas, partly because they are interpreted differently in different locations, and partly because they are put to diverse uses at the various sites among which they travel. This is especially clear in Part II, but it also occurs as radical geographical knowledge travels within the U.S. and Canada, for example, as the idea of industrial change moves from the U.S. East Coast to the U.S. West Coast (Peck and Barnes, this volume); or as the idea of the "geographical expedition" is taken from Detroit to Vancouver and later to Sydney (Blomley and McCann, this volume); or as the idea of the circuit of capital migrates from Baltimore to Quebec City (Klein, this volume).
- The third is geographical scale. We focus especially on cases where radical geographical knowledge is originally articulated at one scale, say, the urban (e.g., Baltimore), or the region (e.g., the San Francisco Bay Area), but then scales up and is applied nationally, or globally. While this bears particularly on theoretical concepts and frameworks, it also applies to the very project of radical geography. It

begins at select urban sites like Detroit, Worcester or Baltimore, but scales up, becoming a global movement, replete with international conferences and journals, drawing readers and participants from around the world.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. In the first and longest section we lay out what we call the conditions of possibility for the development of radical geography in the U.S. and Canada. We describe the social, cultural, political, and intellectual ferment of the "long 60s"[4] that provided fertile ground for the development of radical geography and set out some of key moments in that unfolding development (further elaborated in subsequent chapters). Second, we describe some of the tensions within the project of radical geography, often there from the beginning, which contorted and disrupted it, making it heterogenous, preparing it for what it was to later to become. Third, we discuss the rationale for the organization of the book, providing capsule descriptions of each chapter. Finally, we provide a short Conclusion.

"You Say You Want a Revolution:"[5] American Radicalism and Radical Geography During the Long 1960s

In writing about the social sciences since 1945, Roger Backhouse and Philippe Fontaine (2010a: 11) make use of the idea of "the degree of [disciplinary] permeability to social change." They categorize academic disciplines according to their differential social porosity, that is, their internal responsiveness to social events, movements, and interests that lay outside the academy. They argue that social permeability is highly variable by discipline. Some subjects like economics have hermetically sealed themselves from outside social change. While other subjects, including geography, act more like sponges, continually sopping up society's discharge, leaks and spillage, which shape its internal structure and intellectual agenda.

That social porosity can change over time, however, as was the case for geography. Before the Second World, geography was isolated, seemingly immune from social change, doing its own thing. As Neil Smith (1989: 92) argued, geography's strange hybrid form that rolled into one subject natural science, social science and humanities had isolated the subject, given it "a museum-like existence," as if it were some rare entity preserved under glass. From the mid-1950s, however, that glass was smashed. As Smith (1989: 9) puts it, "The museum perimeter" that had been "jealously fenced by a ring of [past] conceptual distinctions, [which] kept geographers

in and effectively discouraged would be intruders" was breached. Not only did geographers breakout in large numbers, taking ideas from and working with non-geographers, but the external social and political world came crashing in. Initially, it was a Cold-War-inspired behavioral science and social physics that geographers transformed into spatial science or the "quantitative revolution," with concomitant practices of mathematical modeling, abstract theorization, and statistical verification (Barnes and Farish 2006). During the 1960s, and our concern, it was loud outside social demands for relevance, activism and revolution that produced radical geography. That outside came rushing in at pell-mell pace – Christopher Hitchens (1998: 101) said, "to blink was to miss something" – and was profoundly unsettling – David Horowitz (1970: 185) said America was "shaken to its roots."[6] And so was geography.

"The times they are a-changin"[7]

If World War II invigorated and shaped American social sciences, the ensuing Cold War Americanized them. Before the Second World War, Germany was the most important home for social science. But after Germany's crushing defeat, the center of gravity for social science moved across the Atlantic, especially to U.S. East Coast centers like Harvard, Yale, and Princeton universities. The Second World War also demonstrated to the U.S. that social science could be effectively mobilized to achieve military and political strategic ends (Barnes and Farish 2006). In this new model, social science was folded into the aims, interests, and bureaucracy of a militarized state. That state brought together different social scientists, setting them to work often in interdisciplinary groups on instrumental projects in the state's interests, fully funding and resourcing them. That same model continued once the hot war of WWII ended, becoming even more entrenched, systematized and formalized within a Cold War in which two superpower states, America and the Soviet Union, played nuclear chicken. Further, the state became a larger assemblage that blurred lines between the military, industry and the academy, forming "a military-industrial-academic complex" in Senator William Fulbright's term (Kay 2000: 10–11).[8] American social sciences, and the sites where they were undertaken, became fully integrated within that complex (Solvey and Cravens 2012).

Social science was thus just another element in the American Cold War boom. Public funding for social sciences increased enormously, and membership in professional societies burgeoned (Crowther-Heyek 2006). American social science became a client of the state, working for it sometimes directly, at other times at arm's length. Further, the state

demanded knowledge of a particular form, more scientific than social. Given that the natural sciences had seemingly won the Second World War with the radar, the earliest computer, and of course the atom bomb, social scientists should mimic the same scientific method. There was an attempt even to change the name of social science to behavioral science to indicate a more rigorous, clinical approach, shunning the messy and politically infused term, society.

That was impossible. Messiness and the political kept on reasserting themselves, pushing for attention, on occasion violently screaming for notice, and no more so than during the long decade of the 1960s. While that period highlighted continual experimentation and change, and the overturning of hitherto older imposed forms of constraint – intellectual, cultural, economic and especially political[9] – strangely it hung together as a whole. As Watts (2001: 162) puts it, the long 1960s had

> a homologous coherence across political philosophy, cultural production, economic cycles and political practice. Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam, Dylan's decision to go electric at Newport, and the appearance of Pynchon's *Crying of Lot 49* were somehow all of a piece.

Katznelson (1997) argues that this multiform roiling of the long 1960s increasingly seeped into at least the more permeable social sciences and humanities, producing significant intellectual change. Protests on the street entered the university lecture theater. "The sixties," he writes, "were a 'a volatile moment of madness' when ordering rules, civilities, limits and expectations were suspended with important effects inside the academy" (Katznelson 1997: 312). That volatile moment was produced by a perfect storm of social unrest, fueled by the heated atmosphere around four turbulent social movements: civil rights, second-wave feminism, environmentalism, and anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. Each was itself powerful; collectively, working together, they constituted a force of cyclonic magnitude. Where they touched down – and American university campuses were a prime site – they could turn existing relations and ideas topsy-turvey, inside-out. Some social sciences and humanities, including human geography, quickly felt the effect. Things fell apart, the center no longer held. In Katznelson's terms, volatile madness was awash.

- Civil Rights in America were a longstanding issue, going back before even the formal declaration of the U.S. as a nation state. They became increasingly urgent and visible especially from the mid-1950s and associated with escalating acts of non-violent civil disobedience to protest against hateful, violent and sometimes murderous forms of

racial prejudice and bigotry held by a predominantly white population against people of color. That disobedience included boycotts, sit-ins, marches, and mass rallies. The larger end was to stop legalized racial segregation and discrimination found especially in the U.S. South, but also in large Northern inner cities where African Americans faced harsh prejudice particularly in employment and housing markets. Those acts included the Montgomery bus boycott by Rosa Parks (1955–1956) (Kobayashi, this volume), the Greenborough sit-in at a Woolworth lunch counter (1960), the March on Washington (1963), Freedom Rides to the U.S. South by civil-rights workers to increase voter registration (1964), and three Selma to Montgomery marches (1965). The assassination of Martin Luther King in April 1968 in Memphis provoked a storm of inner-city riots, and mass arson in major U.S. cities. It was the greatest civil unrest since the American Civil War, with disturbances in over 100 cites, leading to 40 deaths and 20,000 arrests (Sheppard and Barnes, this volume, discuss the Baltimore case). Other inner cities had already gone up in flames, most famously Watts within Los Angeles in 1965 and Detroit in 1967 (Warren *et al*., this volume). If Martin Luther King's strategy to realize civil rights was non-violent disobedience, other black political movements urged more direct and confrontational tactics. These included the Nation of Islam and its leaders Elijah Muhammed and Malcolm X and, from 1966, the Black Panther Party that spread from Oakland, CA, to other cities, including Baltimore in 1968 (Sheppard and Barnes, this volume). As both Kobayashi and Peake (this volume) document, having voices of people of color heard in geography proved slow and difficult, including in radical geography, with the larger topic of race and civil rights marginalized despite their manifest geographies and radical political purpose.

- The feminist movement was also longstanding, but from the early 1960s it became increasingly active in the form of second-wave feminism, taking to the streets as the "women's liberation movement." Inspired in part by Simone de Beauvoir's (2011 [1949]) *The Second Sex*, where she argued women were "Other" to men in a patriarchal society, and so evident in early post-War, Father-Knows-Best America, the feminist movement demanded legal changes and shifts in social and cultural norms around a series of issues that continued to produce gender inequality: sexuality, the family, the workplace, education, and reproductive rights among others. Betty Friedan's (1963) *Feminist Mystique* further galvanized the movement, and in 1966 she founded and became the first President of the *National Organization of Women* (NOW). NOW saw itself as a necessary organization, like the *National Association for the Advancement of Colored*

People, to lobby for changes in civil rights, albeit based on gender rather than race. Through marches and rallies, but also through political lobbying, speeches, writings, cultural performances, and myriad other interventions, feminism contributed to the tumult of the long 1960s. Even during this phase there were internal tensions, as in the civil-rights movement, with second-wave feminism criticized because of its narrow focus on the interests of predominantly white, middle-class and straight women. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, a third-wave feminism began to emerge that took heterogenous identities of women much more seriously both in practice and in theory. Both forms of feminism entered the academy, becoming part of university curriculum, reshaping existing disciplines including geography. Yet women often struggled to participate, including in radical geography, as many of the chapters document, suffering sexual harassment, discrimination, verbal slurs and put downs, a chilly departmental and university environment, a lack of role models, and often unsympathetic male colleagues intent on competitive superiority and noisy mansplaining.

- The U.S. environmental movement had set down strong roots in the nineteenth century through writers like Henry David Thoreau, the geographer George Perkins Marsh, and the institution-builder John Muir (founder of the Sierra Club in 1892). By the 1950s and early 1960s environmental concerns often turned on air and water pollution caused by large-scale industrial and agricultural producers and their use of a bevy of toxic contaminants. Rachel Carson's 1962 *Silent Spring* brought especially widespread attention both to the heavy use of insecticides like DDT in American agriculture and its mortal effect on wildlife. Mixed into the 1960s environmental concerns was also the Malthusian worry that a rapidly burgeoning world population would exhaust the world's resources within two or three generations. In 1968, the Stanford biologist Paul Ehrlich published *The Population Bomb*. Don Meadows' subsequent co-authored 1972 Club of Rome Report, *Limits to Growth*, elaborated on Ehrlich's concerns, using leading-edge computer simulation models to confirm its bleak conclusions, in some cases suggesting that they should be even bleaker (over 30 million copies of the book were sold, still a record for an environmental publication). The resulting environmental protests were less about global-scale environmental Armageddon than about local environmental sites or features: a particular river, a given forested valley, or a specific animal species. On April 4, 1970, there was one mass event for everything environmental. Earthday brought out 22 million people in the U.S., the majority on university and college campuses. Environmental

study had long been part of the very definition of academic geography, and so 1960s environmentalism easily entered disciplinary discussions, including in radical geography. It was a theme preoccupying early issues of *Antipode*, with David Harvey,[10] Richard Walker, and later, Neil Smith, all at Johns Hopkins at the time, writing from a Marxist perspective about nature and the environment. In 1971, Wilbur Zelinski (not a Marxist) and Larry Wolfe (who was), founded the journal *Transition* (1971–1986) to provide a critical understanding of the geography of environment (Peake, this volume).

- Opposition to the Vietnam War was likely the most important of the four movements in setting U.S. radical geography in motion. Tariq Ali (2018: 7) said, "the anti-war movement in the United States … has no equivalent in any other imperialist country. It was the high-point of dissent in U.S. history." Domestic anti-war protests ensued quickly after the first U.S. air bombing of Vietnam on August 5, 1964 – the *de-facto* beginning of a war that was framed as a retaliation for two North Vietnamese Navy boats having allegedly fired torpedoes the previous day at the USS Maddox, a U.S. Navy destroyer in the Gulf of Tonkin.[11] By the end of 1964 the radical Students for a Democratic Society, the most important of the War's student oppositional groups, had approved a proposal to organize anti-War demonstrations often but not exclusively on university campuses.[12] These began the following year. One of their features was "teach-ins," pop-up classes run by professors and graduate students providing political, geographical, and historical information about Vietnam, and America's increasingly belligerent involvement in southeast Asia. The anthropologist Marshall Sahlins led the first teach-in at the University of Michigan in March 1965 (also see Watts' 2012 essay about being at Michigan). As the War expanded during the 1960s, as more and more young American men were drafted (close to 650,000), as more and more U.S. troops were sent to Vietnam (at one point well over half-a-million), and as more and more American soldiers died or were wounded (by the War's end over 58,000 died and over 153,000 wounded – although nothing compared to the millions of casualties in North and South Vietnam), the protests became larger, more violent and more inclusive, involving not just students. Over 400,000 protested in the march on the Pentagon in October 1967;[13] in August 1968 the nation watched on live TV as riot police pounded demonstrators with Billy clubs at the Democratic Party convention in Chicago, and there primarily to protest the continuation of the War; and in May 1970 Americans saw in their newspapers black and white photos of the lifeless bodies of four student protesters at Kent

> State University shot dead by the National Guard. Increasingly these protesters were not only students but politicians (like Eugene McCarthy, who ran against Richard Nixon in the 1972 Presidential race), Vietnam War veterans (most famously John Kerry), and Civil Rights leaders including Martin Luther King, until he himself was murdered. North American Geographers did not study the Vietnam War but many mightily protested it – young faculty, graduate students, and undergraduates – coloring their expectations about the purpose and nature of geographical research.[14]

These four social movements, and their increasing entanglement as the 1960s turned into the 1970s, did not directly cause academic geography to swerve to the political left, to revolutionize its methodological and theoretical underpinnings and substantive foci. But it provided conditions of possibility for those changes to occur. They unsettled and loosened existing nostrums, and began to unmoor the discipline from existing intellectual anchors. The wider disciplinary matrix of social sciences and humanities no longer seemed up to the task of understanding contemporary culture and society; indeed, it often seemed an impediment to that end. It was necessary for the turmoil and the passion of the street, as Katznelson (1997: 312) put it, to "burst the bounds of the lecture hall."[15] It did. He (1997: 312–313) continues:

> However, inchoate and unfocused, there was [from the late 1960s] … a powerful revolt against the silences, limits of method, smug confidence, and regime enhancing functions of post-war scholarship in the humanities and social sciences … Civil rights and student (soon anti-war) movements electrified American campuses. In these hot house environments, graduate students and younger faculty … achieved significant scholarly work produced in exasperation of the indifference of their teachers and the inequalities and tumult in society, in anger at the entanglement of the disciplines and the university as institutions with power and privilege, in revolt against particular standards of objectivity that relied too heavily on models inappropriately drawn from the natural and biological sciences, and in the quest of moving class, race, gender, the national security state, and other neglected subjects from the margin to the center of systematic inquiry.

Disciplines changed across the social sciences and humanities. This was not a mechanical process. Because of contingent factors, Backhouse and Fontaine (2010b) suggest, fields like Anthropology, Sociology, Political Science, and English Literature, were more porous and receptive to the outside context of the street than others (like Philosophy, and especially Economics). Yet even Economics couldn't entirely resist the

potencies of the late 1960s (Coates 2001). The Union of Radical Political Economy (URPE) formed in 1968, the same year that the radical economist Kenneth Boulding was President of the American Economic Association. URPE aimed to address issues that orthodox Economics woefully neglected, such as "war, race, gender, justice and poverty…. Indeed, many [of URPE's members] saw economics as complicit in the problems of American society" (Backhouse 2010: 57). In the end, URPE never transformed economics as a discipline in the same way radical geography transformed human geography. Over time, at least in the United States, radical economics was reduced at best to a rump. Disciplinary forces had disciplined.

Katznelson (1997) suggests that in those disciplines that allowed in the street change was of three main types. First, there was a "forced revision to existing approaches" (Katznelson 1997: 318). Second, "by exploring new theory and new ways of working, the [new radicalized discipline] directly altered the character of their field" (Katznelson 1997: 318). Finally, the change in a discipline "created space for subsequent insurgencies" (Katznelson 1997: 319). All three of these types of changes played out in North American human geography from the late 1960s to which we now turn.

"What's going on"?[16]

Academic geography originated during the mid-to-late nineteenth century, serving the interests of various Western European imperial states (Hudson 1977). From almost the beginning, however, there were subversives within the project. The Russian anarchist geographer Kropotkin (1842–1921), who spent over 40 years in Britain as in effect a political refugee, was one, and the French anarchist Élisée Reclus (1830–1905), banished to Switzerland for much of his professional life because of his political activities, was another (Blunt and Wills 2000: 4–5; Ferretti 2018). There was also Frank Horrabin (1884–1962). Not an academic geographer but an English socialist journalist and graphic artist, his "workers' text," *An Outline of Economic Geography* (1923), sold 20,000 copies and was translated into eight languages (Hepple 1999: 81). As important as these individuals were, none of them, as Jim Blaut (1979: 59) writes, "moved the discipline out of its conformist course." For Blaut (1979: 160), geography in the U.S. at least until 1945 was a staid "culturally monotonic" profession.[17] The Cold War, along with the House UnAmerican Activities Committee and McCarthyism, only further stifled dissent. It was not until the long 1960s that radical geography could emerge as a larger movement. Driven by the period's

social turmoil, its subsequent institutionalization occurred with "surprizing suddenness" (Blaut 1979: 160).

Radical geography was never a *tabula rasa* creation but in part drew upon elements found within "existing approaches." Following Katznelson (1997: 318), radical geographers wanted to "alter the character of the field" and they did, propelling a "forced revision of existing approaches." The radical geographical alternative constructed was variegated, plural not singular, its different versions containing at least traces of pre-existing forms of geography, albeit knitted together in new ways. Existing human geography came in two main varieties. Its older form was an atheoretical descriptive regional geography, oriented to field work, and frequently concerned with the relationship between humans and their environment. The more recent (and alternative) incarnation, developed from the mid-1950s, was spatial science. Driving it was a concern with formulating the kind of geographical theory found in natural science as well as Cold War social science: abstract, mathematical, logically rigorous, explanatory, predictive, and formally tested against an empirical world. Even as radical geography claimed to separate itself from both traditions, particularly the second, it remained marked by them.

That was clear in William Bunge's work. In the late 1950s, as a graduate student Bunge was an original member of the "space cadets" at the University of Washington that spearheaded geography's quantitative revolution (Barnes 2016; Bergmann and Morrill 2018). His Ph.D. thesis, *Theoretical Geography* (Bunge 1960), was likely the most evangelical of any of the theses written by a cadet in favor of the scientific method. He poured scorn on the earlier regional approach to geography, and those who provided its intellectual justification such as Richard Hartshorne (a life-long nemesis, Barnes 2016). Bunge was already on the political Left, however, even owning a specially bought suit to wear at the many progressive political demonstrations he attended. Yet, his private political radicalism did not make its way into his initial public academic writing.

That changed from the mid-1960s as the external context of civil rights began pushing his work in a different direction. In an autobiographical essay, Bunge (1979: 170) recalls that in 1965 he was writing "the logical extension of *Theoretical Geography, Geography: The Innocent Science* …" It was jointly written with William Warntz, and bereft of any politics, let alone radical politics. That book was never completed, though, because, as Bunge continues, "The Crime … [had] started" (Bunge 1979: 170). "The Crime" was the violent abuses of civil rights, which made him "throw himself" into every protest going: "Iwent to Selma. I went to everything. Peace demonstrations in New York, in Washington, Civil Rights demonstrations in Jackson, Mississippi" (Bunge 1979: 170). It also led him to become involved in local community

politics, to start undertaking research differently. By the mid-1960s he was teaching at Wayne State University in Detroit. He began sending his students into the city on field trips to map social conditions, becoming involved in community organization especially in his own residential neighborhood, the increasingly black inner-city district of Fitzgerald (Barnes 2018; Bunge 1969; Warren *et al*., this volume). The July 1967 Detroit rebellion was catalytic, and his own neighborhood was embroiled in it. As he put it, during "the smoke of [that 1967] revolution … I lived in everyone's definition of freedom – No state … [It] had been driven out … I was free to think freely, so I did, I wrote a peace book, *Fitzgerald*" (Bunge 1988: xix).

Bunge's (1971) *Fitzgerald* was the first landmark volume of this emergent version of radical geography. It certainly reflected "the street" in Katznelson's terms, demonstrating Geography's social porosity. It also revealed the continuing influence of repurposed elements of existing disciplinary practices. Geographical theory remained part of the Fitzgerald project. It usually did not take the same form as found in Bunge's earlier spatial science writings (although he managed to work von Thünen's model of land use and rent into the text; Bunge 1971: 132–135). But it was couched in the same language of abstraction, empirical testing, and explanation. Moreover, Bunge recognized that the regional tradition he previously spurned also had its uses. His intensive study of the one square mile of Fitzgerald used maps, field trips, and the deep knowledge of residing in place, leading him to realize his work was in the tradition of his dreaded enemy, Richard Hartshorne. In an interview, Bunge (1976: 2) said that his earlier dismissal of regional geography had been "wrong … which is very painful to admit."

Fitzgerald was rooted in Detroit. Bunge worked with other local activists, including especially the then teenage organizer, Gwendolyn Warren, although it was fraught relationship (Warren *et al*., this volume; and the videoed conversation between Warren and Katz in 2015 at the City University of New York[18]). Warren found him insensitive, arrogant, on occasion a bully and misogynistic. She resented that Bunge acted as if he had discovered Detroit's black inner city (reflected in his terminology of "geographical expedition").[19] That vocabulary of "expedition" stuck, though, and was taken up and practiced elsewhere: In Toronto, at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada, and later still in Sydney, Australia (Peake, this volume; Blomley and McCann, this volume). Bunge's work traveled and scaled up.

Another vital place to the dissemination of the radical geography project was Clark University in Worcester, MA (Hubert *et al*., this volume). Neil Smith said that by the late-1970s Clark became "the center of the radical universe…. The buzz about the School of Geography was palpable."[20]

The three of its faculty most important to radical geography each had intellectual roots in "existing approaches" – Jim Blaut in regional geography, especially its environmental strain; Richard Peet, in geographical theory (his Ph.D. dissertation with Allan Pred was on the von Thünen model); and David Stea through his training in psychology (second only to economics in its formalism as a Cold War social science).

Graduate students also played a crucial role at Clark. Ben Wisner, one of them, says he was radicalized by "student politics …, a reflex against the Vietnam War, racism and environmental pollution."[21] He continues,

> we were groping for root causes of the problems, contradictions and hypocrisies with which we had grown up in the 1940s and 1950s … We had grown up under the nuclear specter of the nuclear Cold War and had been subjected to the flattening out of perspectives described so well by Herbert Marcuse.[22]

The graduate students were for revolution. Their revolutionary act: to publish *Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography*. *Antipode* was a student-led initiative that came out of Stea's graduate seminar (Mathewson and Stea 2003). In 1969, on the first page of the first issue, Stea (1969: 1) wrote: "Our goal is radical change – replacement of institutions and institutional arrangements in our society that can no longer respond to changing societal needs." Wisner, its first editor, describes the inaugural issue published in 1969 as "a shambolic, amateurish adventure."[23] For volume 2, Dick Peet took over the editorship, although the continued publication of the journal rested fundamentally on the free labor of graduate students, as well as pressures put on those graduate students to contribute under what was in effect a patriarchal system of power (Huber *et al*., this volume).

The central importance of *Antipode* was in enabling radical geography to travel; to be in Bruno Latour's (1987) lexicon an immutable mobile, taking its message from Worcester, MA, to far-away places such as Bristol or London in the UK as in our opening stories. As Phil O'Keefe, a later editor put it, the importance of "*Antipode* … [and] the work of the Clark graduate students [was in producing] an international impact from a cottage industry."[24] In our language, *Antipode* enabled scaling up.

There were other techniques to widen the audience for early radical geography. Holding special sessions at national meetings was one. The first national AAG meeting at which radical geographers collectively met was at Ann Arbor, August 10–13, 1969.[25] It was there, as Blaut (1979: 161) says, "that most of the local movements – including the Detroit Geographical Expedition and the *Antipode* group at Clark University – suddenly became aware of one another's existence."

Clark Akatiff (2007: 6) called Ann Arbor the "insurrectionist … meeting." Bunge transported three buses of local participants from his Geographical Expedition project in Fitzgerald, bringing "the presence of the black streets to the walls of Academe." (Akatiff 2007: 7). Oddly, perhaps that led to Bunge being invited to give a plenary session at the following year's annual meeting in San Francisco, August 23–26, 1970. He was given a prized evening slot, 8 pm – 10.30 pm, at the Gold Room, Sheraton-Palace Hotel, on the theme, "Toward survival geography: Reports in human exploration." Even Clark Akatiff, the session organizer, recalls that did not go so well. Presentations, he said, were "confusing," "rambling," and "discursive," some with "long and complicated statistical analyses, illustrated by unreadable and incomprehensible slides" (Akatiff 2007: 9–10). People walked out. When the Toronto geographer Jim Lemon asked Akatiff "'What was that about?'" he said, "I wasn't sure" (Akatiff 2007: 10).

Things went better the next year at the Boston AAG meeting, April 18–21, 1971. It did not start propitiously, with "flurries of snow" the first day. Hugh Prince (1971: 150), one of two on-the-scene correspondents commissioned by the British geographical journal *Area* to report on the meeting for a U.K. audience, observed that the brisk temperature outside the convention hall was mirrored by a "chilly … atmosphere" inside. It was the "winter of discontent" for status quo geography, Prince (1971: 150) said, the moment when in Katznelson's terms, "existing approaches" were about to be confronted. David Smith (1971: 155), the other correspondent for *Area*, reported that "the radical movement was evident even at the AAG's Business Meeting, … [where] a strongly worded resolution opposing the Indochina War was passed along with others concerned with the status of women, graduate students and Spanish-speaking minorities." And then there were the papers themselves. Peet organized a series of sessions on poverty, one featuring David Harvey who had left Bristol two years earlier to take up a position at Johns Hopkins (Sheppard and Barnes, this volume). After speaking, Harvey distributed mimeographed copies of what was to become the hinge fourth chapter in his forthcoming book, *Social Justice and the City* (1973): "Revolutionary and counterrevolutionary theory in geography and the problem of ghetto formation." In an interview, Peet (2002) recalled:

> the room was full, like hundreds of people, you know. And it was clear then what was happening. I remember David said he had ten copies of his paper. It was the first mimeographed version of *Social Justice*, and he said he had ten copies, and it was like a dogfight to get them. Maybe 70 people rushed the stage at the end and grabbed these things. I thought, "God, we've arrived."

Harvey was to become a central figure in radical geography, of course. Yet he too began within the existing tradition of geographical theory and the quantitative revolution, his tome *Explanation in Geography* (1969) providing a philosophical rationale for that movement based on logical empiricism. But like other radical geographers, he too was affected by the street, initially participating in political demonstrations against the Vietnam War before he left England. Once he moved to America in 1969, the streets of Baltimore proved catalytic in his transformation from logical empiricist to Marxist, from spatial scientist to radical geographer. "The travails of Baltimore have formed the backdrop to my theorizing" (Harvey 2002: 170). That theorizing has likely traveled more widely than any other radical geographer's. He once likened its geographical circulation to a "viable … globalized commodity" (Harvey 2002: 160). Given its enormous influence and mobility (scaling up), Harvey's radical geographical theory in this early period came closest in Katznelson's (1997: 318) terms to be the "new theory and new way of working" that replaced "existing approaches."

That new theory and new way or working was classical Marxism, which Harvey took directly from Marx's primary texts, typically without any interposing secondary literature. As Peet (1977: 17) wrote: "From 1972 onwards the emphasis…changed from an attempt to engage the discipline in socially significant research to an attempt to construct a radical philosophical and theoretical base…increasingly found in Marxian theory." Harvey's contributions became foundational, providing a larger theoretical blueprint, its working conceptual parts smoothly integrated, joined, and placed. It was an object of beauty, its logic and design breath-taking. It also had tremendous power, which Harvey would demonstrate by running through it some seemingly off-the-cuff real-world fact or event that was then strikingly illuminated and irrefutably explained.

At the same time, that construction sometimes seemed a bit too good to be true. Everything was explained by a single theorist, by someone who lived a good hundred years before, and who was not a geographer. This is not to gainsaid Harvey, but it contrasted with the beginning of *Antipode* that was eclectic and pluralist. The first serious discussion in its pages of a radical theorist was Mahatma Gandhi not Karl Marx (Philo 1998: 4). Chris Philo (1998: 2) also argues that the mandate of intellectual diversity was etched into the very subtitle of the journal: *A Radical Journal of Geography*, and not how it is sometimes remembered, a "Journal of Radical Geography." There was another issue, discussed further in the next section and this book's Conclusion. The Marxism that dominated early radical geography was mostly about large movements of capital, less about social class, even less about race and gender, with the key theorists all white men. It pushed radical geography,

according to Peake and Sheppard (2014: 310), toward a "progressively masculine discourse, dominated by confident…, assertive …, imposing … and difficult personalities." Bunge was likely the most extreme, accounting for some of the strain existing between him and Gwendolyn Warren (Warren *et al.*), but tensions existed at other sites of early radical geography as many of the chapters make clear. This is neither to subtract from the enormous excitement, creativity, and energy generated by individuals working at those sites, nor the importance of their work, but they also were not immune from forms of prejudice, unsavory conduct, hurtful words, and poor personal choices that also occurred during the North American long 1960s.

While from the early 1970s the dominant strain of Marxist radical geography emphasized the primacy of capital movement and accumulation, there were other topics, theorists who were not white men, and on occasion non-economic based radical theories. They were rare, though, usually on the margins. Race was one of the topics peripheralized during much of the 1970s and early 1980s. As already discussed, the AAG had recognized it at least as a topic requiring further research and attention during the mid-1960s, convening the Commission on Geography and Afro-America (COMGA) (1964) (Kobayashi, and Peake, both this volume). Bunge (1971) contributed through his study of Fitzgerald, and there was also work by Blaut who linked issues of race to imperialism, and studies by Richard Morrill of urban ghettoization. In fact, the very first issue of Antipode contained Fred Donaldson's (1969) paper on the "invisible … black American." But sustaining an interest in race during this first phase of radical geography was difficult. In 1972, a report in *Antipode* by graduate student organizers of a symposium on race recognized a continued "inconsistency between the *Black Imagination* and the *Geographical Imagination*" (original emphasis, Wilson and Jenkins 1972: 42). That was certainly born out in the publication record of *Antipode*. In its first ten volumes up to 1979, there were well over 250 separate contributions, but only a dozen were explicitly and solely concerned with race, with most of them about one ethnic group, the "Native American Indian." It wasn't until well into the 1980s, even later, that race became part of the intellectual furniture of a radical geography that by then was sliding into critical geography.

Gender was even a less prominent topic. Women graduate students were involved in the physical production of *Antipode* at Clark from the very first issue, from typing copy, editing, stapling, stuffing envelopes, making snacks (Huber *et al.*, this volume). But women rarely made it inside the covers of *Antipode* as authors. The first issue of the journal included one female (joint) author, Ruby Jarrett (Jarrett and Wisner 1969). The issue's remaining 10 authors were men. The first papers explicitly

about women were published five years later: a piece by Pat Burnett[26] (1973) about women in the city, with a reply by Irene Breugel (1973). There were two more papers by women, about women, the following year, but nothing more until 1978, when again there were two more papers. So, only six papers directly about women over the journal's first 10 years. It wasn't until the early 1980s that those numbers increased and focused on the debate around domestic reproduction under capitalism.

Non-economic based theory was also scarce. One exception was work at the University of Michigan by Gunnar Olsson and his students, including Bonnie Barton, Jack Eichenbaum, Stephen Gale, Adrian Pollock, and Michael Watts (see Lauria *et al.*, this volume; and Watts' 2012 evocative essay about his Michigan years). Olsson published four papers in *Antipode* during its first 10 years,[27] as well as a long interim summary statement in 1975, *Birds in Egg* (Olsson 1975). While Marx and Hegel were two of his sources, even more so were Aristotle, Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard, Popper, and von Wright, along with Beckett, Joyce and stories from the Old Testament and Homer's Odyssey (Abrahamsson and Gren 2012). What was produced at Michigan was highly eclectic: from fuzzy-set theory to magic theater, from deontic logic to studies of nineteenth century British colonialism in West Africa. It was a profound radicalism, the plumbing, exacting scrutiny and often overturning of all foundations. Everyone went down the rabbit hole. As Watts' (2012: 147, fn. 8) says, for the graduate students "it was a very risky business… [the] anxiety … a constant spectral presence." It is hard to think of anything more radical, although it was rarely couched as political economy.

Despite the lacunae and patchiness, radical geography had established itself as one of the theoretical strands of geography by *Antipode*'s tenth anniversary. Clearly it was not (yet) the establishment, however. It couldn't be. Its origins were with the anti-establishment, with the various social movements that upended the 1960s, with the cohort that said, "don't trust anyone over 30."[28] For that generation existing geography had to change: It was counter-revolutionary, as Harvey (1972c) put it. The disciplinary emergency brake needed to be applied. Yet, at the same time, radical geography was not and could not be completely new, a *de novo* discipline. By holding on to the noun in its title, radical geography necessarily continued to set its inquiries within prior longstanding disciplinary concerns such as the environment, place and region, as well as more recent interests in space and theory. Of course, there were differences between existing and radical geography. The latter was concerned to make the discipline an instrument of radical social and political change, targeting politically and socially relevant topics like regional and urban poverty, U.S. imperialism and colonialism, international and

intra-national uneven development, spatial segregation of all kinds, and environmental despoliation. In this sense, radical geography represented both continuity and disjuncture. Early radical geographers drew on their existing geographical training, but added to it, creating new combinations of ideas and practices. None of them knew how it would end, nor the final shape that radical geography would take. Inevitably, there were arguments, contradictions, *aporia*, cleavages, debates, and unresolved issues. As Katznelson (1997: 319) argued, these internal arguments opened critical space, allowing "subsequent insurgencies." In the next section we turn to some of those tensions within early radical geography, making it an uneven intellectual terrain – striated rather than smooth – which propelled further alterations to the project.

Tensions within the project

Tensions can be both productive and destructive, with no reason to think that they will necessarily be resolved over time into some sort of happy-ever-after story. In radical geography there have been few resolutions, final or otherwise. A continuing tension has been between radical geography as an activist project, participating directly on-the-ground in transforming the world, and as a theoretical project, developing a corpus of abstract geographical theory to represent and explain the world. That tension was evident from the off in the two signal contributions of early radical geography: Bill Bunge's (1971) *Fitzgerald* and David Harvey's (1973) *Social Justice and the City*. While an activist in his time off, wearing his demonstration suit to marches "on the street," when he went to the office in Smith Hall on the University of Washington campus to do serious work Bunge was a theorist. Bunge's (1960) Ph.D. dissertation was called literally *Theoretical Geography*. Moving to Detroit, though, he realized that the serious work was not done in the office but on the street, as an activist. While that activism itself was admittedly fraught and replete with strains (Warren *et al*., this volume), Bunge was in no doubt that the prime role of radical geography (not that the term was yet available to him) was to participate immediately and unhesitatingly in direct acts in improving the world. *Fitzgerald* showed how one version of an activist radical geography could be done involving the local community, sharing knowledge, and providing resources. In contrast, *Social Justice and the City*, was always a book about theory. Its crucial pivot chapter (ch. 4), in which Harvey comes out as a Marxist radical geographer, is opposed to his old self as a leftish liberal reformer. That transformation occurred, as Harvey made clear, because of his new theoretical allegiance to Marxism.

Theory made the difference. It was a crossing-the-Rubicon move from counter-revolutionary to revolutionary theory. The remainder of *Social Justice* details that revolutionary theory, culminating nine years later as the theoretical tome, *Limits to Capital*. That said, in his off-time, like the early Bunge, Harvey was involved in various forms of activism (Sheppard and Barnes, this volume), and nowhere has there been any sense that he belittled Bunge's activist contributions. Yet Harvey stood at the opposite end of the activism-theory pole to Bunge, a tension that continued within radical and later critical geography.

A second tension has been around a monistic versus a pluralist approach to theory within radical geography. The earliest formulations were pluralist, albeit admittedly not described as such. Early proponents used what came to hand, what seemed to offer radical geographical possibilities. Bunge (1971) re-adapted theory from spatial science, using von Thünen's concentric agricultural land-rent theory to show how the capitalist market mechanism has a propensity to create spatial inequality: a geography of uneven exploitation and surplus extraction. More generally, early *Antipodes* were characterized by theoretical variety. Philo (1998: 1) noted the "sheer diversity of … geographical radicalism which coursed through the earliest [*Antipode*] issues." They featured not only Mahatma Gandhi, but also Martin Luther King, Gunnar Myrdal, Murray Bookchin, Robert Coles, Frantz Fanon, Eric Hobsbawm, Petyr Kropotkin, and Élisée Reclus. This diversity began to narrow, however, with what Peet (1977: 16) called the "break through to Marxism." For him, the turning point was the 1972 *Antipode* debate between Harvey (1972b) and Brian Berry (1972) around that pivot chapter in *Social Justice*. Only by systematically pursuing Marxism, suggested Peet (1977: 25), could "radical geography begin to construct a theoretical base capable of providing an analysis of the events of late capitalism and proposing revolutionary solutions." While the focus on Marxist theory may have held through the 1970s and very early 1980s (and even that is not clear), it has not endured. Much subsequent debate within radical geography, and later critical geography, has turned precisely on the theoretical tension between adhering to a monistic Marxism and a wider discussion drawing on pluralist sources. The inclination toward a form of theoretical inquiry based on "not only" Marx, "but also" Foucault, Butler, Fanon, Deleuze and Guattari, Agamben, Derrida, Kristeva … triggered the development of a critical geography that was ecumenical and eclectic

A third tension has been whether radical geographical research must focus on the economic or whether it can also address the non-economic. And if the latter, how should the non-economic be related to the economic? Within classical Marxism, the material and social relations of

production constituting the economy are determining, explaining everything else. In this economistic reading, the economy must and should occupy the center of radical geography's attention. The earliest works within radical geography did not hold to this principle, however. The center of attention was race, connected with battles around U.S. civil rights during the long 1960s. Thelma Glass's involvement in the Montgomery bus boycott was not prompted by concerns about the economy, even though black Americans were subjected historically to hideous forms of economic discrimination. Similarly, propelling Bunge's work was less a concern about the economy, although certainly he had a concern, than moral outrage over how the color of one's skin shaped the life one led in the U.S. This strain carried through in the early volumes of *Antipode*. The economy was there in calls for studying rural poverty or imperialism, but it was not necessarily front and center. That changed with the introduction of Marxist theory. Harvey's study of the housing market in Baltimore, with Lata Chatterjee, made use of Marxist rent theory (Harvey and Chatterjee 1974). In a city riven by racial conflict, the focus was on financial institutions and flows of capital, the economy. Race appeared but was secondary: it was just one of several variables that defined the "Inner City" housing sub-market (Harvey and Chatterjee 1974: 26–29). The market came first along with the financial variables that made it. Struggles over the emphasis to accord the economy continued, with some deconstructing the very idea of an economy, others striving to treat it as a hybrid entity joined with the non-economic, and yet others continuing to assert its theoretical sovereignty. Along with those struggles have also gone attempts to redefine the relationship between the base and the superstructure. There has been a movement away from a simple one-way causality seemingly posited by Marx, to more complicated relationships including, for example, hegemony theorized by Antonio Gramsci, or overdetermination theorized by Louis Althusser, or a structure of feeling as theorized by Raymond Williams, all of which have been taken up by radical and critical geographers.

A final, longstanding pair of tensions are around gender and race. Part of the issue is intellectual. How do feminist scholarship and critical race studies fit within the aims and practices of radical geography? Second-wave feminism, and the associated sophisticated body of theorizing and academic empirical study, developed during the same period as radical geography. Yet there was virtually no consideration of gender issues, or utilization of feminist theory, in radical geography's early works, through the first phase of its Marxist turn. That did not systematically appear until the early 1980s, with discussions about household social reproduction and gendered cities. Critical race theory did not emerge until after the first phase of radical geography was established, but there

were longstanding works, for example, by W. E. B. DuBois, Franz Fanon, and James Brown, as well as more contemporary writing by, say, Malcolm X, that could have been incorporated conceptually into radical geography, but were not.

The other issue goes to the gender and racial identities of those who participated within early radical geography. The early leading figures were all white men – Jim Blaut, Bill Bunge, David Harvey, Dick Peet, and David Stea – as were their immediate followers, like Ron Horvath, Phil O'Keefe, Ben Wisner, Neil Smith, and Dick Walker. Many had large personae and big reputations, stamping their work as masculine. That clearly effected the women who also participated, as is clear from the chapters on Bunge and his work in Fitzgerald (Warren *et al*., this volume), the production of *Antipode* at Clark University along with the classes that were run (Hubbert *et al*., this volume), the Vancouver collective (Blomley and McCann, this volume), and the bilateral creation between the Geography and Urban and Regional Planning Departments of radical industrial geography at Berkeley (Peck and Barnes, this volume). Women at those sites, faculty and students, reflect on the various forms of violence to which they were subjected by male professors and students, including objectification, condescension, discrimination, and sexual harassment. This came in different forms and degrees and certainly not all men participated, but there was often a charged atmosphere, and sometimes a hostile, even vicious one, in the places where female radical geographers worked. This has rarely been acknowledged, nor the male perpetrators called to account.[29] With respect to race, there were very few people of color who worked within early radical geography; Bobby Wilson, was a graduate student at Clark, and there was also Harold Rose, Don Deskins, and later Joe Darden, but none took up the early 1970s version of radical geography as such, but given its emphasis, maybe not surprising.

Organization of the Book

The collection is divided into two parts. Part I traces the development of radical geography in the U.S. and Canada, from the mid-1950s until around the early 1980s. That narrative is organized geographically, focusing on geographical centers where the work of creating radical geography occurred. Some of the chapters examine several centers together, but most focus on a single place. Part II very selectively examines how radical geography outside the United States and Canada has co-evolved with these North American sites. Often there was some pre-existing tradition of radicalism in those places that then joined and forged novel

combinations with the North American variety. This section narrates how radical geography takes on distinctive regional and national forms as it has globalized, producing a variegated landscape of radical geographical knowledge shaped by place, connectivity, and scale.

Part I

Chapter 1 is by Audrey Kobayashi, "Issues of 'race' and early radical geography: our invisible proponents." Examining the contributions of early African American trained geographers, from Thelma Glass outside the academy to Don Deskins and Harold Rose from within, as well as attempts led by Saul Cohen to connect with geographers in historically black U.S. post-secondary institutions, Kobayashi carefully reconstructs the multi-faceted relation between race and radical geography. She argues that race was neglected as a topic in favor of class, a reflection of radical geography's turn to Marx, albeit with some exceptions: Bunge and Blaut.

Chapter 2 is by Gwendolyn C. Warren, Cindi Katz, and Nik Heynen, "Myths, cults, memories, and revisions in radical geographic history: Revisiting the Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute (DGEI)". They reinterpret the work of William Bunge and Gwendolyn Warren in Detroit during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Focusing on the establishment of this community-based organization within the inner-city neighborhood of Fitzgerald where both Bunge and Warren lived, they maintain that the usual history told about DGEI is mythic, reflecting a cult of personality that has formed around Bunge and his work. They work to strip away both the myth and the cult.

Chapter 3 is by Matthew T. Huber, Chris Knudson, and Renee Tapp, "Radical paradoxes: The making of *Antipode* at Clark University." Concerned with the relation between place and knowledge, they examine how the Graduate School of Geography (GSG) at Clark University in Worcester, MA – until the 1950s a bastion of political conservatism and the retrograde geographical theory of environmental determinism – surprisingly emerged in the late 1960s as a center for radical geographical inquiry. From 1969 that position was further cemented by publishing *Antipode*, initially produced in the basement of CSG using free graduate labor. Like the previous chapter by Warren *et al*., Huber *et al*. also seek to unsettle the usual history of radical geography that highlights the celebratory formative role of Clark and *Antipode*. They trouble that narrative by raising difficult questions around the treatment of women and the changing status of the journal.

Chapter 4 is by Nick Blomley and Eugene McCann, "A 'necessary stop on the circuit': Radical geography at Simon Fraser University."

They narrate the emergence of an offshoot of the DGEI, the Vancouver Geographical Expedition, initiated during the early 1970s at Simon Fraser University located in the Vancouver suburb of Burnaby. Simon Fraser itself was a product of the long 1960s, immediately attracting radical geographers, both faculty and graduate students, after it opened. The Expedition did not last – a victim of tensions between activism and theorization as well as gender – but the Simon Fraser group was vital to the creation of the USG, and the publication of its Newsletter. Key also to Simon Fraser's accomplishments was the radical but controversial Michael Eliot Hurst. Chair of the Geography Department during part of this period, he provided comradely encouragement but also necessary material resources.

Chapter 5 is by Linda Peake, "The life and times of the Union of Socialist Geographers". She provides a comprehensive historical geography of the USG, from its creation at a meeting in Toronto in May 1974, to Vancouver, and thence to multiple sites (with their own locals and regional meetings) across North America and abroad, to its final demise in southern California in December 1982. Its key text was the Newsletter, which transformed from a simple means of communication among members to an ever-more ambitious organ of unruly gray literature, before ultimately collapsing from a combination of its own weight and declining membership support. Peake emphasizes that the USG Newsletter from its start was a venue for a far more variegated tradition of radical geographical thought than *Antipode*. The Newsletter functioned as something of a counter-pole both intellectually and geographically, generating a space within which Canadian and U.S. geographers engaged even-handedly with one another.

Chapter 6 is by Eric Sheppard and Trevor Barnes, "Baltimore as truth spot: David Harvey, Johns Hopkins and urban activism". Following the sociologist of science, Tom Gieryn, they argue that even abstract theoretical knowledge is intensely colored by the place in which it is produced. In David Harvey's case it was the travails of Baltimore, the city to which he moved in 1969, which seeped into his Marxist theorizing. That theory was sparked and subsequently shaped by Harvey's initial research project on Baltimore's housing market. Once produced, the theory rapidly circulated through the travels of Harvey's academic papers, including in *Antipode* and his 1973 book *Social Justice and the City*. The theory scaled up, becoming a global geographical Marxism that rendered invisible its local origins and their persistent influences.

Chapter 7 is by Jamie Peck and Trevor Barnes, "Berkeley in-between: Radicalizing economic geography". They examine how during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the internal geography of a collaborative project

linking members of the Geography and City and Regional Planning Departments at Berkeley, in conjunction with the changing external geography of the San Francisco Bay Area, conspired to produce a new, radical geographical rendering of industrial geography. That rendering identified a novel powerful economic geographical dynamic producing new industrial spaces, such as Silicon Valley, while at the same time destroying places of old Fordist manufacturing, such as in Oakland and the East Bay. The Berkeley moment set a new intellectual agenda for radical and industrial geography that circulated widely and scaled up.

Chapter 8 is distinct because it is in effect an autobiographical account by Mickey Lauria, Bryan Higgins, Mark Bouman, Kent Mathewson, Trevor Barnes, and Eric Sheppard, "Radical geography in the Midwest". They describe how graduate students at the University of Minnesota, as well as the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and the University of Michigan, abetted by a few Geography faculty, created nodes of radical geography in the US Midwest. Taking over from Simon Fraser the editing, financing and distributing the USG Newsletter, the Minnesota node catalyzed other Midwestern sites such as Madison, Valparaiso, Iowa City, and Chicago, through the organization of a series of USG regional meetings. Lauria *et al*. also highlight the variegated culture of the radical geography propagated especially from the Twin Cities, combining community activism with conventional scholarship.

Chapter 9 is by Juan-Luis Klein, "Radical geography goes Francophone". His concern is the working out of radical geography from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s within the French-speaking province of Quebec, Canada. Centered at the Université Laval in Quebec City, the radical geographical *Groupe de recherche sur l'espace, la dépendance et les inégalités* (GREDIN) began both theoretically and empirically to apply their radical ideas to their home province. Led by Rodolphe De Koninck and Paul Y. Villeneuve, they drew directly from Marx and dependency theory, as well as on a developing Anglophone radical geography. The group was especially concerned with the core-periphery spatial relationships that had developed within Quebec, that manifest as regional income inequalities, differential service provision by the state, and forms of sub-regional political and economic dependency.

Part II

Chapter 10 is by Fujio Mizuoka, "Japan: The Yada Faction versus North American radical geography". He describes how radical economic geography was initiated in Japan as early as the 1930s, well before North

America, by geographers connected with the Japanese Communist Party working in the tradition of Marx. By the 1990s, however, the leader of this group abandoned Marxism. In turn, that contributed to shifting the Japanese Association of Economic Geographers to align its work with a neoliberalizing Japanese state. Since then, geographers returning from or influenced by U.S. radical geography have struggled to change the direction of Japanese economic geographers, notwithstanding the presence of a continuing undercurrent of that earlier work.

Chapter 11 is by Brij Maharaj, "The rise and decline of radical geography in South Africa." He discusses how radical geography in South Africa co-evolved with the country's dramatic internal transformations from an Apartheid state, to a revolutionary African National Congress (ANC), to the neoliberal turn taken by the ANC after coming to power. Radical geography emerged to challenge Apartheid and mainstream European-style South African geography, influenced by key figures trained in and returning from North American nodes of radical geography in the 1980s (particularly Vancouver and Baltimore). He describes how South African radical geographers are split between those who are more and those who are less critical of the current political regime, how Black radical geographers have struggled to gain acceptance within South Africa, and how a new, younger, and dissenting radical geography is now emerging.

Chapter 12 is by Verónica Crossa, "The geographies of critical geography: The development of critical geography in Mexico". She begins by analyzing how and why geography as a discipline remained largely immune from any radical shift shaped by the long 1960s, unlike cognate social sciences in Mexico, or geography elsewhere in Latin America (notably Brazil). Yet, during the last two decades the landscape of what she calls critical geography has evolved rapidly, influenced by younger scholars trained in and returning from North America, carrying with them interdisciplinary approaches for studying socio-spatial relationships. Nevertheless, critical geographers face the challenge of securing academic positions within an emergent neoliberal audit culture that gatekeeps both appointments to major universities and opportunities in research institutions.

Chapter 13 is by Joanne Norcup, "'Let's here [sic] it for the Brits, You help us here': North American radical geography and British radical geography education". She examines how radical geographical ideas developed in the U.S., specifically associated with Bunge, traveled to the UK, and by the 1980s complemented the aspiration of some in that country for the implementation of a radical education curriculum. In turn, that aspiration became aligned and was joined with anti-racist, post-colonial, and feminist politics emerging in London and across

Britain. This powerful combination of radical ideas was then taken up in British educational curricula in universities, colleges and high-schools. Bunge had left his mark, his work traveling and scaling up.

Chapter 14 is by Yann Calbérac, "'Can these words, commonly applied to the Anglo-Saxon social sciences, fit the French?' Circulation, translation and reception of radical geography in the French academic context". Calbérac argues it was initially a struggle to transfer radical geographical ideas from North America to France because of the deep embeddedness of the Vidalian regional descriptive tradition within French geography. While there has been a very gradual change, in part because of the radical Quebecois literature gaining purchase, there has not yet been a wholesale radical makeover of French geography. Nonetheless, there is an embryonic hybrid form, *géographie radicale "à la française"*, that combines traditional French geographical themes of the social and the political with Anglophone critical and radical approaches.

Conclusion

Over the last 45 years in Sheppard's case, and 40 years for Barnes, we continue to remain shaped, absorbed, and stimulated by radical geography and what it has become. Admittedly, when we pick up the latest copy of *Antipode*, or now more likely read it on-line, it doesn't quite provoke the same febrile excitement, or sense of transgression, that holding in our hands the first paper copy did. It's not that the old is better than the new. Far from it. Precisely because the current version of radical geography remains so intellectually alive and present, so crucial to understanding the present, we think it is vital to remember its past. That's not because of antiquarianism, or Left nostalgia (although that might also be at play). Nor is it because we believe that radical geography is defined by its past, or again, that the past provides clues, hints and anticipations that are fulfilled in the present (this is only another bankrupt version of Whig history). Rather, it is because, as Faulkner put it, "the past is never dead. It's not even past." The past and present are inextricably joined. We cannot escape history because the past never fully passes. Instead, we carry the burden of the past into the present, bringing with us what went before. Such a position was grasped perhaps better than anyone else by Michel Foucault (1970: 219) for whom knowledge is profoundly historical: "the unavoidable element in our thought." We never begin from scratch. The best we can do, the only thing we can do, is to provide a "history of the present" (Foucault 1977: 31). That's what the authors do in our collection. They write compelling histories of radical geography's past in order to understand its present.

Notes

1 From the double A-side single released by The Stranglers in July 1977, and included on their album, *No More Heroes* released in September. 'Something Better Change' went to number 9 in the British top singles chart.

2 On one occasion *Antipode* was viewed by the authorities literally as contraband. In 1977, Dick Peet and Phil O'Keefe drove from Clark University, Worcester, MA, to Toronto, bringing with them a pile of *Antipodes* that they were going to distribute at a meeting. On the Peace Bridge, Port Erie, Canadian Customs confiscated them claiming they were not really geography.

3 As we discuss in the second section, U.S. and Canadian radical geography clearly drew on prior traditions of radicalism developed elsewhere that go back to Europe and the nineteenth century. Fujio Mizuoka (this volume) identifies a radical tradition of geography in Japan that pre-dated the North American version, although it was subsequently abandoned. Each of the other countries also have long traditions of radical thought and practice, which sometimes included geographers.

4 "The long 60s" is inexact and depends on the particular issue at hand, but generally it begins roughly in the mid-50s and continues sometimes to the early-to-mid-1970s. It marks an extended period of political, social and cultural change, particularly in the U.S., but in other places as well. The term is used by Frederick Jameson (1984) in his influential essay, "Periodizing the 60s." He believed the 1960s were produced by the "enlargement of capitalism on a global scale" that in turn induced a significant "superstructural movement.... The 60s were ... an immense and inflationary issuing of superstructural credit" (Jameson 1984: 208–9).

5 The first line of the Beatles' "Revolution," recorded in 1968 for their *White Album*, and on the B-side of their single, "Hey Jude."

6 The quotes from both Hitchens and Horowitz were taken from Michael Watts' (2001: 160–161) brilliant essay about the 1960s.

7 The 1964 song title of Bob Dylan's anthem of change. It was the title track of his album released the same year, and the A-side of a single put out in March 1965.

8 Senator Fulbright's phrase was a reworking of President Dwight Eisenhower's earlier famous term, "the military-industrial complex," from his farewell presidential address on January 17, 1961.

9 Watts (2001) argues that the 1960s were characterized by a set of parallel political changes across different continents and scales, all of them stamped by an "unstoppable predilection for alternatives" (Said 1983: 247; quoted by Watts 2001: 183). From the Prague Spring to the founding of the *New Left Review* to the Cuban Revolution; in each case, to use Walter Benjamin's metaphor, the emergency brake had been forcefully applied to the speeding train of history (Watts 2001: 160).

10 David Harvey (1996: 117) recalls being at Earthday in Baltimore during the first academic year he was at Hopkins. He grasped then that what was

considered an environmental problem depended on the social class position of those who experienced it. Visiting the Left Bank Jazz Club the next day, "a popular spot frequented by African American families in Baltimore," Harvey realised that for them "their main environmental problem was Richard Nixon" (Harvey 1996: 117).

11 There is much dispute over whether any torpedoes at all were launched by the North Vietnamese Navy on August 4. In Earl Morris's 2004 documentary, *The Fog of War*, the U.S. defense secretary at the time, Robert McNamara, suggests they were not: The radar operator on the Maddox saw only noise on their screen, not torpedoes. McNamara was the most important architect of the Vietnam War; by the time he quit in 1967, he believed it was unwinnable, and later still, wrong-headed.

12 Michael Watts (2001: 168–169) provides global maps of student protests for 1968–1969 divided into three types: anti-bureaucratic, anti-authoritarian, and postcolonial. Those maps make the point that the student protests were not only about the Vietnam War, nor were they were confined to the United States. The most famous example is not a student protest in America but one in Paris in May 1968 that came within a hair's breadth of bringing down the French government. Dan Clayton (2018), provides a wonderful geographical account of Paris 1968 that includes such titbits as Henri Lefevre being pelted by well-aimed rotten tomatoes as he lectured students in Nanterre, and the nervous colonial geographer Paul Pélisser carrying a loaded pistol in his pocket when giving his classes.

13 The three radical geography faculty at Clark University, Jim Blaut, Dick Peet, and David Stea were attendees. Blaut flew everyone down to Washington from Worcester but given the flight there Peet declined to fly back. Clark Akatiff (1974) who was also there provides a geographical analysis of the event. He likened the protest to "the clash of two armies. One army represented established order – powerful, disciplined, marshalled by conscription, and representing the status quo … In opposition was an army of rabble – unarmed, undisciplined, marshalled by the mushrooming clouds of alienation, cultural disintegration, and protestation – representing an emergent, revolutionary force …" (Akatiff 1984: 26).

14 The best known geographical research by a geographer about the Vietnam War is by Yves Lacoste (1973), a French Marxist geographer. Drawing on work by the earlier French colonial geographer, Pierre Gourou, Lacoste exposed as a lie the denial by the U.S. Air Force that it had bombed the Red River Delta (Bowd and Clayton 2013).

15 Watts (2001: 158) tells the story of his friend and colleague at Berkeley's Geography Department, Barney Neitschmann, who as a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, "walked out on his final in 1967 scribbling on the examination script: 'more important things are happening on the street'."

16 The title of a song written by Al Cleveland, Renaldo Benson, and Marvin Gaye from the A-side of Gaye's single released by Motown Records in

January 1971, becoming the title track of Gaye's album *What's Going On* released later the same year. Very relevant to our concerns, the lyrics were based on an incident of police violence Benson witnessed against anti-Vietnam War demonstrators at People's Park, Berkeley, in May 1969.

17 Blaut (1979) attributes this cultural uniformity in part to the balloting system for membership to the AAG (along with its members' ability to blackball any applicant). In 1945, the last year of elected membership in the AAG, there were 90 members: 89 white men and 1 white woman.

18 Gwendolyn Warren and Cindi Katz in conversation, CUNY 2015; https://vimeo.com/111159306 (last accessed July 15, 2018)

19 Notes taken from the panel session, "Reflections on the Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute: A Conversation with Gwendolyn Warren, Co-director," organised by Cindi Katz and Amanda Matles, Association of American Geographers, annual meeting, Tampa, Florida, Friday April 11, 2014.

20 Past Editor's reflections: Neil Smith (1979), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467–8330/homepage/editor_s_past_reflections.htm#Smith (last accessed February 11, 2018).

21 Past Editor's Reflections: Ben Wisner (1969–1970). http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467–8330/homepage/editor_s_past_reflections.htm#Wisner (last accessed February 11, 2018)

22 Past Editor's Reflections: Wisner (1969–1970).

23 Wisner (1969–1970).

24 Past Editor's Reflections: Phil O'Keefe (1978–1980). http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467–8330/homepage/editor_s_past_reflections.htm#Okeefe (last accessed February 11, 2018)

25 This meeting was abruptly shifted to Ann Arbor from Chicago because of the civil unrest there associated with the Democratic National Convention just shy of a year before (see Lauria *et al.*, this volume).

26 Pat Burnett intellectually aligned herself with spatial science, although she used those methods to show how women living in Global Northern cities were disadvantaged compared to men. She taught for a period at one of the key centres of spatial science, Northwestern University, but later sued the university for breach of contract citing "a climate of sexual discrimination as cause" (Burnett 2002).

27 See Olsson's on-line CV available at: http://katalog.uu.se/empinfo/?id=N96–1826 (last accessed August 4, 2018)

28 Coined by Jack Weinberger, the student activist involved in the Free Speech Movement at the University of California at Berkeley, 1963–1964 (see Peck and Barnes, this volume).

29 Don Mitchell's tribute to the radical geographer Neil Smith faces up to his long history of sexual dalliances: Neil Smith, 1954–2012: Radical geography, Marxist geographer, revolutionary geographer, https://progressivegeographies.com/2013/11/11/don-mitchell-on-neil-smith-long-article-available/ (last accessed February 27, 2018).

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Keywords in Radical Geography: An Introduction

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Le mot juste: "Radical" Geography

"It appears that *Antipode* will survive, at least for a while, as a radical journal of geography." Thus began Richard Peet's (1972:iv) modest statement outlining *Antipode*'s first editorial policy—quite modest, in fact, considering radical geography's decidedly immodest goals to "transform the scope of a conventional discipline criticized as irrelevant to the great issues of the time" (Peet 2000:951). The journal itself was to directly contribute to this transformation by fostering "the search for organizational models for promoting social change" (Peet 1977:244) and providing a medium "for the dissemination of non-traditional ideas" (Stea 1969:1). Rather than being (just) "another Geography journal", *Antipode*'s "aspiration [then and now] was to produce geographical knowledge that might connect to a larger project for the transformation of economy, society and environment" (Castree and Wright 2009:2).

As has been well chronicled, *Antipode* was founded in 1969 as an intellectual and political intervention in the discipline of geography; in the wider social sciences; and in a world riven by war, racism, sexism, colonialism, and injustice. "The key to *Antipode*'s origin is the term 'radical'", recalled *Antipode*'s first editor, Ben Wisner (n.d.). "We were groping for root causes of … problems, contradictions, inconsistencies, and hypocrisies", spurred by the promises of the Civil Rights movement in the United States as well as the spectre of nuclear war; the ravages of poverty and famine; and the violence of racism, colonialism, inequality, and uneven development. "Early radical geography was anarchic and exuberant, naïve yet nuanced" (Peet 2000:951) and, for better or worse, the pages of *Antipode* reflected these qualities. The journal has, from its inception, moved with and across wider debates in radical geography. For this reason, we write with an

Keywords in Radical Geography: Antipode at 50, First Edition. Edited by the *Antipode* Editorial Collective.

understanding that radical geography and *Antipode* are in conversation, co-constitutive and relational rather than distinct intellectual projects.

Early issues of the journal were eclectic, exploring, for example, the imperialist underpinnings of geographic thought, the militarisation of remote sensing technologies, and white supremacy and racism in geographical texts and urban policy (Anderson 1969; Blaut 1969, 1970; Donaldson 1969; Earickson 1971; Stewart 1969). Articles debated radical methodologies and the merits of advocacy planning, as well as the possibilities for revolutionary social change versus more incremental institutional reform (Amaral and Wisner 1970; Breitbart 1972; Corey 1972; Morrill 1969; Peet 1969; Stea 1970). Volume 1 included an interview with community organiser Ruby Jarrett on what today would be termed "spatial stigmatisation" and "racial-territorial enclosure" (Jarrett and Wisner 1969).

In their survey of the development of radical geography in North America, Linda Peake and Eric Sheppard characterize the late 1960s to mid 1970s as a time of politicised discovery in the face of the unquestioned whiteness of "a segregated and institutionally racist discipline" (2014:315):

> The … [period] saw a flourishing of different voices in *Antipode*, *Transition*, and the USG [Union of Socialist Geographers] newsletters; socialist, feminist, anti-racist, anarchist and environmentalist approaches to studying social problems and advocating social change were all evident. This reflected the multivalent, intersecting protest and social movements unleashed by a 1960s politics of radicalism, anti-racism, sexual liberation and emancipation, in which various protagonists were involved in multiple ways, and the complex linkages between these and academic trajectories. (2014:314)[1]

The vitality of these ideas and movements energised a growing cadre of geographers who were searching for a vehicle to challenge conservative disciplinary structures. Channelling such "anarchic" energies can be an exacting endeavour, however, and attempts to archive radical thought without a shared theoretical framework struck some as incoherent. If *Antipode*'s early volumes were a politicised, though inchoate, foray into some of geography's many misrepresentations, silences and other misdeeds, David Harvey's (1972:6) clarion call, published in volume 4, issue 2, to overthrow prevailing paradigms would soon make plain the stakes for the discipline:

> The objective social conditions demand that we say something sensible and coherent or else forever (through lack of credibility or, even worse, through the further deterioration of the objective social conditions) remain silent. It is the emerging objective social conditions and our patent inability to cope with them which essentially explains the necessity for a revolution in geographic thought.

A proliferation of Marxist scholarship followed, published in the pages of *Antipode* and, to a much lesser extent, in other, more mainstream, geography journals. Thus, the emergence of a sub-discipline that could be named *as* radical geography was, through the early to mid 1970s, emerging *pari passu* with the dominance of Marxist critiques across the social sciences and humanities. However, while Marxism provided coherence, as an emergent orthodoxy it began to crowd out other nascent strands of radical geographical thought. Fortunately, by the

early 1980s, radical geography once again opened out to grasp the heterodox strands of critical thought that were initially incubated in the early pages of the journal and had continued to develop elsewhere within the sub-discipline.

Unlike some other widely read reflections on this period, Peake and Sheppard's (2014) account veers away from celebrating the various achievements made during this time, preferring instead to evaluate the evolution of radical geographical scholarship against the ideals, tenets and demands of radical thought and praxis. As Marxism came to represent a new orthodoxy among radical scholars, some of the openness and creativity that characterised the emergence of radicalism in the discipline was, for a period at least, lost. With few outlets within mainstream geography for the publication of radical texts, *Antipode*'s privileging of articles centring on Marxist theory (O'Keefe 1979) inadvertently narrowed the scope for the publication of other forms of radical research. The impacts of this *de facto* closure were widely felt as early as the mid 1970s across the sub-discipline of radical geography. The field was slow to embrace a number of radical politico-intellectual currents, notably feminist theorising focusing on the situatedness and social construction of knowledge (Christopherson 1989; McDowell 1992a, 1992b). As far as *Antipode* is concerned, aside from a few noteworthy exceptions, early feminist scholarship primarily developed outside the pages of the journal.[2] In addition, radical geography more broadly retreated from the study of race and racism (Peake and Sheppard 2014; cf. Mahtani 2014), something that today is being remedied through the growing subfields of Black geographies and Indigenous geographies.

Although the development of non-Marxist viewpoints and analysis proved challenging, the journal was nonetheless the site of some of the earliest efforts in Anglophone geography to publish "theory from the South", something that continues to energise debates concerning the contested geographies of knowledge production. The call for papers for a special issue on "underdevelopment and domination/dependence" edited by Milton Santos (1975:91), for example, singled out prevailing North American and Eurocentric biases that rendered much of what had been written in geography of little interest to readers in the global South. A rejection of "the empirical and atomized formulations which have been imposed as theories on the Third World … [was to be] questioned", in part through the affirmative inclusion of scholars from "underdeveloped countries" (ibid.).[3] However, even this laudable effort exposed a disjuncture, still in evidence today, between cultures and norms of academic writing as it is practiced in various parts of the world. Ultimately, fewer scholars from the global South were included in the special issue than originally had been envisioned, something that, as Ferretti and Pedrosa (2018) argue, was deeply troubling for Santos.

In the late 1980s, Susan Christopherson's feminist indictment of the discipline encapsulated a critique that had been building in many quarters, calling into question the very knowledge-making and pedagogical practices that constitute radical geography:

> For even among those who advocate political action and theoretical transformation, educational and institutional practice has remained profoundly conservative. Despite

> the lip-service given to the integrity of individual experience, little attention is given to how to teach women, minorities and working-class people … to translate their experiences into theory. (1989:87)

Flatly unconvinced that geography was prepared to confront its class, race and gender biases, Christopherson offered little hope for a "transformed geography" willing to fundamentally interrogate the exercise and basis of authority, "including our own" (ibid.). In case there might be any misunderstanding, Christopherson's response to the rhetorical question of whether she expects such a transformation was shorn of optimism: "No." The reasons for this terse judgment lay in what Christopherson identified as growing elitism within the discipline and a propensity to engage in intellectually moribund citational practices. Although Christopherson was writing 30 years ago, her appraisal of radical geography's epistemology *and contradictions* remains every bit as vital and compelling today. "[S]ome people are quickly out of fashion", she writes (1989:88), while the "[j]ustifiable fear" "of being left out" or "of being labeled" leads many to gravitate to "the 'in' subject" of the moment. Given the debates that are swirling across radical geography in 2019 concerning the field's knowledge-making and theory-building practices, readers today will no doubt have an immediate reaction to Christopherson's pointed and perceptive critique. Likely this will take the form of knowing assent, the assumption being that this critique is directed at someone other than the reader her/himself.[4]

This is not the place for us to weigh in on the nature of the discipline's contemporary debates about appropriate modes of knowledge production. We will do so anyway. One of the generative aspects of changing currents within geography has been the heightened awareness of longstanding biases regarding which authors are read, debated and cited. The prevailing winds determining which theories, concepts, methodologies, *and scholars* are regarded as being "in" or "out" of fashion periodically shift. For this reason, the politics of citation do not tack in a single direction, though the dominant course unquestionably was set long ago. Geography's institutionalised racism, the discipline's class and gender biases, and its underlying heterosexism (Chouinard and Grant 1995; Nast 2002) are among the deeply ingrained biases that have contributed to the field's damaging silences and exclusions along the axes of race, gender and sexuality (Katz 1996). That knowledge production has suffered as a direct result of these silences and exclusions is without question. Scholars must continue to struggle against structures and practices that discriminate and exclude; the transformation of geography, the prospects of which merited such profound scepticism by Susan Christopherson, must continue to be the goal.

At the same time, we must guard against a dangerous crosscurrent that threatens to stifle debate even as new corridors are opening for an expanded and robust discussion of epistemology and consideration of a more expansive set of subjects, methodologies, analyses, and critiques. Christopherson's observation that "some people are quickly out of fashion" points to a troubling characteristic of the discipline, one that is every bit as present today as when she penned these words three decades ago. By now it should be clear that stifling scholarly debate,

which can prematurely rob us of key observations and insights, is antithetical to radicalism within geography and to the transformations that are long overdue. That the field has failed to live up to its own mandates of openness and inclusiveness provides no warrant for attempts to shut down areas of scholarship and to shut out scholars in the process. We need more engagement, not less; deeper engagement, not the summary dismissal of theories and ideas rendered unfashionable. Calls for increased political relevance and greater clarity in writing are well received (Mitchell 2006). But at the same time let us not lose sight of the importance of different modalities of thought and writing, including those that are theoretically dense and not immediately accessible. As problematic as the "race for theory" (Christian 1987) can be, a "race from theory" entails its own dangers and has its own costs. If geography, as a transforming discipline, is always in the process of becoming, we will need theory, in its manifold forms and modalities, to assist us in navigating this transformation and in producing knowledge that challenges injustice.

Yet this is to raise another important question concerning what constitutes theory, or what distinguishes a theoretical text from data, narrative, or the "mere empirics" of disciplinary inquiry. To begin to push at this question is to also render transparent the political economy of radical geographical knowledge production insofar as it is to turn the lens back on to Christopherson's observation that "some people are quickly out of fashion". For fashion has a market, and the market for radical knowledge bears upon the intellectual life of the sub-discipline. Herein lies a tension that *Antipode* has had to, and must continue to, navigate: it is a journal that plays a significant role in channelling the currents of radical knowledge production, yet its mandate has always been to be something of a counterpoint to prevailing orthodoxies. That much is central to its radical mandate. To give space to theorisation that may not (yet) be legible *as* theory has to be part of the journal's task, as long as that theorisation is committed to complementing, building, and extending radical ways of knowing while also seeking social change. Since the journal became a commercial affair in 1986, this tension between market and radicality is one that all its editors have had to negotiate.

Resisting the impulse to quiet different voices was essential to the evolution of Anglophone radical geography in the last decades of the 20th century. The discipline as a whole was fortunate that, throughout the 1970s and well into the 1990s, scholars continued to develop radical thought and practice, though often outside, or in complicated relationships with, the early radical geographical project. According to Peake and Sheppard (2014:315), "[t]his period was especially important for the establishment of the emerging fields of geographies of race and racism, feminist (Marxist, liberal and other variants) geography, and (although slightly less so) for geographies of sexualities", though the fact that these emergent approaches and traditions "existed within or alongside radical geography and in other times and places apart from it" (2014:314) can be seen as "indicative not only of the transversal and unpredictable intellectual and spatial paths of the evolution of Anglophone North American critical geography, but also of the impossibility of attempts to explore its evolution through a core (Clark [University], SFU [Simon Fraser University]) versus periphery (everywhere else) model of

knowledge dissemination" (2014:314–315). The radical tradition within geography, in other words, has—since its very beginnings in the 1960s—been a much broader and more polyvalent undertaking than it is sometimes characterised.

So, what should we make of radical geography's achievements over the course of its first 50 years? "In 1969 when the first issue of *Antipode* was published the very notion that there could be a radical approach to geographical questions was an anathema to much of the profession", write Eric Sheppard and Joe Doherty (1986:1): "Geography had never had a significant critical, radical tradition." Seen in this light, the evolution and enduring relevance of radical geographical thought is notable. At the same time, Peake and Sheppard's appraisal of radical geography's trajectory and achievements is also likely tempered by the further realisation, frequently remarked upon in editorials published in *Antipode* and other journals, that in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s radical geography continued to face sustained resistance, both within and beyond the academy. "A series of subtle oppressions" (Peet 1985:3) experienced by radical geographers left many feeling "beleaguered" (Blomley 2006:87), "battered and bruised" (Chouinard 1994:2), "diminished, dispirited and divided" (Walker and McDowell 1993:2).

In retrospect, now more than five decades into Anglo-American geography's radical turn, these characterisations might strike some readers as surprising. The number of geographers who self-identify as "radical" or (more commonly) "critical" has soared, as have the citation counts of many of the field's leading figures; the days in which Left geographers could be regarded "an embattled minority" (Walker 1989:81) within the discipline having long past (Castree 2000; Johnston 2000; Peake and Sheppard 2014). So too there has been an embrace of radical geography beyond the Anglo-American academy (Belina et al. 2009; Finn and Hanson 2017). For its part,

> *Antipode* has played a crucial role in recasting and transforming the discipline of geography, the forms of geographical theory, and the practice of geographical research. Hostility to inequality, intolerance, and injustice are now at the core of the discipline and the plea for relevancy has been heard. (Peck and Wills 2000:3)

Though falling well short of the transfiguration called for by Christopherson, that progressive change has occurred within the discipline is undeniable. Along with *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*; *Gender, Place and Culture*; *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies*; *Human Geography: A New Journal of Radical Geography*; and now-defunct outlets including *Transition* and the newsletter of the Union of Socialist Geographers, all of which share a commitment to advancing radical geographical analysis and praxis, *Antipode* helped catalyse and propel a transformation of the discipline such that "by the late 1990s radical/critical geography … [had] become the new canon, the new mainstream" (Peake and Sheppard 2014:318). Admittedly, though, for some radical/critical geographers (see Blomley 2006; Castree 2000; Chouinard 1994; Peet 2000; Waterstone 2002) this has been a dubious achievement as the pressures of academic professionalisation have made unwanted incursions that have come at the expense of activism, action and engagement with the world in which radical scholarship seeks to intentionally intervene.

A "Living Archive" of Radical Geography

How might one assess the achievements of *Antipode* and its transition from an upstart, countercultural journal whose founders were committed to disciplinary and societal transformation, though a protracted period in which the journal's very survival was in doubt (see Heynen et al. 2017:8–12), and on to its position as one of the mainstays of the discipline? For Peake and Sheppard (2014:309), "*Antipode*'s emergence was the relational effect of multiple conditions of possibility", occurring as it did during a period of social upheaval in the 1960s that laid bare many of the dangers and contradictions of the times. Key to its significance, certainly far more than citation counts, impact factors and other such metrics, is the simple fact that "it created visibility, and a place, for radical geography by dint of being a concrete and recognized academic object (a journal)" (Peake and Sheppard 2014:309). Here Stuart Hall's inquiry into the formation and consolidation of the archive is instructive to the task of historical assessment. As was the case with *Antipode*, "No archive arises out of thin air", Hall (2001:89) writes; "Each archive has a 'pre-history', in the sense of prior conditions of existence". Peake and Sheppard's illuminating contribution to the historical record documenting the emergence of radical geography in North America—one that invites further elaboration[5]—reveals that a number of geographers, both those who have been widely acknowledged and those who have been wrongly overlooked, played important roles in shaping emergent geographical thought, methodologies, and praxis, contributing to what ultimately would coalesce into geography's radical edge (see also Peake 2015).

"Constituting an archive represents a significant moment, on which we need to reflect with care. It occurs at that moment when a relatively random collection of works, whose movement appears simply to be propelled from one creative production to the next, is at the point of becoming something more ordered and considered: an object of reflection and debate" (Hall 2001:89). Such was the case when *Antipode* was established, seemingly without reference to the radical experiments and practices that preceded the publication of the first issue (Peake and Sheppard 2014). Yet from volume 1, issue 1, and over the course of the next 50 years, *Antipode* has played an important role in both propelling and ordering radical geographical debates. From its founding, *Antipode* has sought to be an outlet for dissident voices, and statements from past editors regularly attest to the avowedly ecumenical orientation of the journal, even if at times the scope of debate was narrowed through editor discretion and decision-making, and even though at times such claims of ecumenical embrace have been a matter of vigorous dispute.[6] As Hall observes, the constitution of a journal *qua* archive is a moment that demands careful reflection. For this reason, since its founding, the journal has invited critique of its own practices (Stea 1969), and critique it has received (for example, see Castree and Wright 2005; Hague 2002; Jacoby 1987; Nast 2002; Waterstone 2002).

The forgoing discussion, like the annals of *Antipode* themselves, makes clear that radical geographical interventions have never been easy or singular or transparent; rather they have been full of contradictions, silences, and shortcomings. This is one reason careful reflection upon the archive is required. But this entails more

than reflection as a form of "looking backward" across a field's oeuvre. *Antipode* should be understood as constituting "a 'living archive', whose construction must be seen as an on-going, never-completed project" (Hall 2001:89). Imperfect and unfinished, open-ended and mutable, "the journal has aspired to be a place of theoretical innovation pushing the ways in which geographers (and others) go about framing a heterodox radical politics" (Heynen et al. 2017:12). Hopefully the underlying modesty inherent in such an undertaking is clear even if it is not evinced by the boldness of the aspiration. *Antipode*, and the field of radical geography in which it is embedded, is an ongoing project. The journal is an expression of those who publish in it and of those who steward the archive at any moment in time. It is a reflection of the discipline and its cognate fields, and its specific identity is therefore indeterminate. In these senses, *Antipode* is always evolving and never fully knowable.

Antipode: Avant la lettre

As *Antipode* enters its sixth decade, its editorial statement has been amended. The (ever-expanding) list of radical subfields (Marxist/socialist/anarchist/antiracist/feminist/sexual liberationist) has been removed, not because these markers are unimportant or because there is a diminished commitment to any of these forms of scholarship, but because the list seems too fixed and static and incapable of reflecting radical approaches that are as of yet unnamed. Here we heed Raymond Williams' (1983:16) warning that in "periods of change" language "and concern for clarity can quickly become brittle", stifling thought and creativity. The journal's revised editorial statement continues *Antipode*'s ecumenical tradition while acknowledging the ongoing transformation of geographical analysis and the concomitant decentring of what it means to be radical, and it upholds the importance of analyses that are theoretically and empirically substantive while also providing a subtle reminder regarding the content and tenor of academic debate. It reads:

> *Antipode* publishes innovative papers that push at the boundaries of radical geographical thinking. Papers will be rigorous and substantive in theoretical and empirical terms. Authors are encouraged to critique and challenge settled orthodoxies, while engaging the context of intellectual traditions and their particular trajectories. Papers should put new research or critical analyses to work to contribute to strengthening a Left politics broadly defined.[7]

The journal thus engages radical geography by imagining it not as an unchanging sub-discipline, but rather as a site, or point of constellation, through which to engage and engender a spatially oriented Left politics. The focus emphasises intellectual and activist praxis, thus displacing the question of who is or is not "radical", and instead drawing attention to already existing and future sites of struggle, liberation, and political change (cf. Gilmore 2017). In a small way, then, *Antipode*'s commitment to publishing, presenting, and supporting the work of geographers and non-geographers imperfectly expresses this kind of vision; in the pages of the journal, through the mentorship of early-career scholars at the

biannual Institute for the Geographies of Justice, in our annual lectures, and through the Antipode Foundation scholar-activist and workshop grants, we seek to honour and support radical politics and action.[8]

Lingua franca: Keywords in Radical Geographical Thought

The chapters collected in this volume commemorating *Antipode*'s 50th anniversary are short, suggestive, conversational and experimental, and they encompass a multitude of ways that radical intellectual scholarship and debate within geography and across its peripheries has unfolded, and continues to do so. They delve into the journal's intellectual history, they speculate on current conjunctures, and they reach for new, unthought horizons of critical potential. Many are playful. But play, we note, is perhaps the most creative of elans and should not be confused with political apathy, or frivolity. When play enables another way of seeing, being, or critically engaging, we should not assume it to be a- or anti-theoretical.

Given, as we have stressed above, the difficulties of knowing *Antipode*'s archive with any certainty, we have, in this volume, left the interpretation of the radical geographical project to our contributors. The 50 short essays gathered here reflect the visions, preoccupations, and not least the speculations of 50+ authors close to the journal. Their essays speak to radical geography's past-present-future in all the ways our contributors imagine them to. *Keywords in Radical Geography* is not, therefore, a dictionary of predictable or generalised words historicised and defined by each author. Instead, contributors have selected terms, concepts, or sets of ideas that resonate with them, that may be important to their research, or that simply provide for them a wormhole to a more free place or a more utopian imagination. Each author discusses the term and/or idea they have chosen in relation to radical geography. The task was simply to connect the entry to key themes and aspirations in radical geography rather than to describe and define radical geography in any sense. Eschewing any pretence of building a coherent narrative, we hope this will be a fitting testimony to the role *Antipode* has played in the generation of radical geographical engagements with the world, and the profusion of different types of radical intervention across the broader discipline of geography.

Keywords?

The title of this volume might well bring to mind Raymond Williams' classic *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. First published in 1976 and revised in 1983, *Keywords* offers "an inquiry into a vocabulary: a shared body of words and meanings" used in discussions of culture and society (Williams 1983:15). This endeavour is alive and well in the 21st century. Two recent edited volumes, *New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (Bennett et al. 2005a) and *Keywords for Today: A 21st Century Vocabulary* (McCabe et al. 2018), similarly provide "a critical reflection on the key terms constituting our contemporary vocabulary of culture and society" (Bennett et al. 2005b:570). To be sure, some might

say that these books include entries that are important to their authors, but arguably are not part of "our contemporary vocabulary"; their authors' interests aren't necessarily shared by others. And absent in them are words that most of us would have expected or hoped to see given their significance in current debates. What is more, one might ask, "who is this 'us'?". Sociology and anthropology, like geography, are diverse, changing fields constituted by a plurality of perspectives. So where are those perspectives from the South, subaltern perspectives, and so on? Of course, the contents of both single- and co-authored works will always be partial (and for various reasons), just as Williams himself warned that *Keywords* was "necessarily unfinished and incomplete", welcoming "amendment, correction and addition" (1983:27, 26). This notwithstanding, we can say that the tables of contents of these books are more or less predictable, non-arbitrary, more or less as they "ought" to be.

Our book is quite different. At first glance, its table of contents looks capricious, if not chaotic. Entries are organised, perhaps rather unimaginatively, via the convention of the alphabet. Indeed, like Williams (and Bennett et al., and McCabe et al.), we are concerned that alphabetic listing obscures the many, diverse and provocative connections between entries. But those connections are there to be made (and remade, and remade again) by readers. As Williams writes, "a book is only completed when it is read" (1983:25)—like an archive, it is not; *it becomes*. The contents of this book are surprising, to say the least, and beg questions. Glancing at it, one might wonder why "Mercury", "Enough" and "Badge", say, are present. Are they really "key terms"? (Badge? *Really*? You cannot be serious …!). And why include these words when "Development", "Migration" "Neoliberalism" and "War", for example, are absent? Well, our book is the product of the creative input of many rather than some version of top-down planning. As editors, we afforded the book's contributors freedom to choose their own words. Like the editors of *Keywords for Today*, we see language as not only "a shared understanding", but also "a site of division" (McCabe et al. 2018:xi), of contestation, of disagreement, and of struggle. Our concern is less with radical geography's "single meaning" than with its "many competing semantic elements" (ibid.). The significance of a given word is neither self-evident nor unproblematic. To make this clear, perhaps the relevance of these words within (and, indeed, beyond) our discipline ought *not to be* obvious but, rather, is there to be demonstrated by our contributors. The meaning of these words is an open question, and arguably the task of exploring meaning and usage can open new political possibilities that otherwise might go unnoticed. The case is the contributors' to make. We think they are a persuasive bunch, passionate and rigorous in their reflections on why "Love" and "Fragments", "Vulnerability" and "Monument", and all manner of other weird and wonderful words speak—*matter*—to radical geography's histories, current condition, and possible future directions. And in this sense, each entry might also be the beginning of a new conversation … which is also what the radical project must be about.

This approach is fitting for a journal like *Antipode*, which has always welcomed the infusion of new ideas and the shaking-up of old positions through dialogue and debate. Despite the prevailing Marxist currents in parts of the journal's early

life, it has never been committed to a single view of diagnosis or critique. Just look at the editorials marking its 10th, 20th, 30th and 40th anniversaries (Castree and Wright 2009; O'Keefe 1979; Peck and Wills 2000; Walker 1989): successive editorial teams have repeatedly reasserted the journal's openness and inclusivity, its commitment to broadening debate, its ecumenism and absence of dogma, its willingness to diversify and complicate. As Phil O'Keefe (1979:1) suggested in the late 1970s, despite *Antipode*'s communion with radical geography, the very equation of the journal with a specific discipline may be misleading insofar as its founders and subsequent editors were always committed to "working within and above disciplinary boundaries". And as we enter our sixth decade we would like to think we are still in a place where the new, the innovative, the creative, and the heretofore unthought radical edges of spatial theorisation and analysis can find a home. Neither unquestioningly bound to what has come before, nor wilfully distant and adrift from it, we hope to continue the tradition of striving, with passion, to know and understand the difficulties facing us without underestimating the possibilities—neither despairing about domination and oppression nor naively hopeful about resistance and alternatives.

Endnotes

[1] The Socially and Ecologically Responsible Geographers (SERGE) formed in 1971, publishing the journal *Transition* until 1986. The Union of Socialist Geographers (USG) formed in 1974; an archive of its newsletter, published until 1982, is available at https://antipodefoundation.org/2017/06/28/usg-newsletter-archive/ (see Peake and Sheppard 2014; Thatcher et al. 2017).

[2] Though *Antipode* likely was the first Geography journal to publish a feminist analysis (Walker and McDowell 1993:2), see Pat Burnett's (1973) "Social change, the status of women, and models of city form and development".

[3] The special issues were published in 1977—volume 9, numbers 1 and 3.

[4] A symposium in honor of Susan Christopherson was published in 2017, including contributions from Jennifer Clark, Amy Glasmeier, Cindi Katz, Katharine Rankin, and Rachel Weber (see: https://antipodefoundation.org/2017/10/23/on-being-outside-the-project/).

[5] Eric Sheppard and Trevor Barnes' (2019) edited book, *Spatial Histories of Radical Geography: North America and Beyond*, which is part of the *Antipode* Book Series (https://www.wiley.com/en-gb/Antipode+Book+Series-c-2222), goes some way towards this.

[6] Our archive of past editors' reflections is available online: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14678330/homepage/editor_s_past_reflections.htm

[7] This statement was written by Nik Theodore, Kiran Asher, Dave Featherstone, Tariq Jazeel, Andy Kent and Marion Werner in late 2018 and opens our guidelines for authors (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14678330/homepage/forauthors.html).

[8] For more on all these activities, see https://antipodefoundation.org

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